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Abstract 
Mental causation is a problem and not just a problem for the nonphysicalist.  One 
of the many lessons learned from Jaegwon Kim’s writings in the philosophy of 
mind is that mental causation is a problem for the nonreductive physicalist as well.  
A central component of the common sense picture we have of ourselves as persons 
is that our beliefs and desires causally explain our actions.  But the completeness of 
the “brain sciences” threatens this picture.  If all of our actions are causally 
explained by neurophysiological events occurring in our brains, what causal role is 
left for our reasons and motives?  It would seem that these brain events do all the 
causal work there is to do, thus robbing the mental of its efficacy altogether or else 
making it a merely superfluous or redundant causal factor.  This essay presents a 
systematic treatment of this exclusion dilemma from the perspective of a 
nonreductive physicalist.  I argue that both horns of this dilemma can be avoided if 
we ground mental causation in counterfactual dependence between distinct events 
and understand the mind-body relation as event realization.  Although in the final 
analysis our actions are overdetermined by their mental and neurophysiological 
antecedents, this overdetermination is entirely unproblematic. 
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Introduction 
Mental causation is a problem and not just a problem for the nonphysicalist.  
One of the many lessons learned from Jaegwon Kim’s writings in the philosophy of 
mind is that mental causation is a problem for the nonreductive physicalist as well.  
A central component of the common sense picture we have of ourselves as persons 
is that our beliefs and desires causally explain our actions.  But the completeness of 
the “brain sciences” threatens this picture.  If all of our actions are causally 
explained by neurophysiological events occurring in our brains, what causal role is 
left for our reasons and motives?  It would seem that these brain events do all the 
causal work there is to do, thus robbing the mental of its efficacy altogether or else 
making it a merely superfluous or redundant causal factor. 
This essay presents a systematic treatment of the exclusion problem from 
the perspective of a nonreductive physicalist.  Chapter 1 is a review of the 
underlying assumptions and arguments that generate exclusion worries.  
Specifically, I introduce the thesis of nonreductionism and some historically 
important considerations in its favor, such as arguments from multiple realizability 
and Saul Kripke’s modal arguments.  Additionally, I introduce the completeness 
and exclusion assumptions.  Along the way, I present some distinctions that will be 
important throughout the remainder of this essay, such as the differences between 
weak and strong modal distinctness and physicalism and nonphysicalism.  I end the 
chapter by presenting the exclusion problem as the dilemma of epiphenomenalism 
and causal overdetermination. 
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Chapter 2 discusses several of the more influential and interesting 
resolutions of the exclusion dilemma.  The aim here is not to offer knock-down 
arguments against any of these views, but provide some reasons for why I think a 
better solution lies elsewhere.  In particular, I approach the exclusion dilemma by 
making the following set of assumptions: (i) strong realism about mental predicates, 
(ii) mental causation and neurophysiological causation are not different kinds of 
causation, (iii) the assumption of completeness is plausibly true, (iv) mental and 
neurophysiological phenomena causally explain the same sorts of bodily 
phenomena, and (v) both type- and token-reductionism are false. 
In Chapter 3, I deny that some of the traditional notions pervasive in the 
literature on the exclusion problem are germane to the real concern facing mental 
causation.  In particular, I jettison talk of “causal sufficiency” and “causal relevance” 
and replace them with the idea of causation as a difference-making relation.  I go on 
to discuss the positions of Stephen Yablo and Sydney Shoemaker, who argue that 
the exclusion problem can be solved given a particular understanding of causation.  
According to these authors, if causation is taken to be a proportional relation, then 
the threat of epiphenomenalism and overdetermination can be avoided.  At the end 
of this chapter, I criticize this general approach and argue that, if consistently 
applied, the proportionality requirement would leave few of our pre-reflective 
causal judgments intact.  The focus on causation as a difference-making relation is 
an improvement over causal sufficiency and relevance, but the failure of the 
proportionality constraint motivates a search for better approach. 
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In Chapter 4, I argue that causation as difference-making should be 
understood in terms of counterfactual dependence.  Specifically, I argue that David 
Lewis’s understanding of counterfactual dependence is a defensible and plausible 
sufficient condition for causation.  Moreover, I argue for a position I call 
counterfactualism, which holds that counterfactual dependence between distinct 
events can vindicate mental causation.  I defend this position against some recent 
criticisms offered by Jaegwon Kim, who argues that the counterfactualist cannot 
adequately distinguish between causal and pseudo-causal relations nor can they 
properly ground the mental causation which sustains agency.  The underlying 
intuition motivating much of Kim’s arguments against counterfactualism is that 
causation is a productive or generative relation.  At the end of this chapter, I argue 
that a productive conception of causation is inconsistent with mental causation.  I 
conclude that counterfactualism, or something very much like it, remains our only 
viable option for grounding the efficacy of our beliefs and desires. 
In the final chapter, I discuss the problem of causal overdetermination.  This 
horn of the exclusion dilemma is particularly troublesome for me as my 
conclusions in previous chapters entail that there is both a mental and 
neurophysiological cause of our bodily movements.  For the most part, the 
assumption that overdetermination is bad and ought to be avoided is a dogma held 
by most philosophers.  If overdetermination is bad, it must be bad for a reason.  I 
explore three features of standard cases of overdetermination that have the potential 
to make overdetermination problematic for the nonreductive physicalist.  These 
4  
problems can be avoided, however, if (a) we ground mental causation in 
counterfactual dependence between distinct events and (b) understand the mind-
body relation as event realization.  Although in the final analysis our actions are 
overdetermined by their mental and neurophysiological antecedents, this 
overdetermination is entirely unproblematic.      
Chapter 1 
The Philosophy of Mind and Mental Causation 
Worries about the causal efficacy of the mind begin with the problem that 
forcefully presented itself to Descartes’s dualistic picture of mind and body.  In 
Section 1.1, I provide a brief characterization of this problem, noting that it is 
rooted in the Cartesian conception of minds as essentially non-extended substances.  
Although much contemporary thought on the problem has not been kind to 
Descartes, it has become evident that worries about mental causation have not 
disappeared with the rejection of his mind-body dualism.  Section 1.2 begins the 
discussion of nonreductionism, the contemporary analog of Descartes’s dualism.  I 
cover some well-traveled ground by discussing two of the more influential 
arguments in support of nonreductionism, namely Hilary Putnam’s argument from 
multiple realizability and Saul Kripke’s distinctive brand of modal argument.  This 
discussion is meant to serve two purposes.  First, I want to make it clear how I 
understand these influential lines of thought.  Second, I use this discussion to 
clarify the thesis of nonreductionism.  In Section 1.3, I provide the formulation of 
nonreductionism that is best supported by Putnam’s and Kripke’s arguments and, 
5  
additionally, take the opportunity to draw distinctions between reductive 
physicalism, nonreductive physicalism, and nonphysicalism.  The present essay 
pursues a resolution of the exclusion problem within the confines of a nonreductive 
physicalism.   
The contemporary problem of mental causation is not a single problem.  In 
Section 1.4, I present two well-known problems of mental causation that resemble 
Descartes’s original problem in that each one is rooted in the nature of the mental.  
In short, the mental lacks causal efficacy because either it is anomalous or highly 
extrinsic.  These problems respectively originate in Donald Davidson’s important 
arguments for the anomalism of the mental and Hilary Putnam’s and Tyler Burge’s 
arguments for anti-individualism about mental content.  Section 1.5 begins my 
discussion and presentation of the problem that will be the focus of this essay, the 
exclusion problem.  Unlike the other contemporary problems of mental causation, 
the exclusion problem is born out of the thought that the physical rather than the 
mental is a certain kind of way.  Specifically, the exclusion problem arises in the 
context of our contemporary scientific conception of the physical world as causally 
complete.  Section 1.5.1 contains a discussion of this completeness assumption, 
making several important points clear.  Section 1.5.2 presents and, to an extent, 
clarifies the standard formulation of the exclusion principle and distinguishes its 
role in generating worries about mental causation.  In Section 1.5.3, I finally 
present the exclusion problem as a dilemma between mental epiphenomenalism or 
causal overdetermination. 
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Section 1.1: Descartes’s Problem of Mental Causation 
The problem of mental causation has transformed since Descartes’s 
contemporaries wondered “how man’s soul, being only a thinking substance, can 
determine animal spirits so as to cause voluntary action”.1  In the sixth Meditation, 
Descartes argues that minds and bodies are distinct substances, existents wholly 
independent of one another.  His argument depends upon establishing that minds 
and bodies do not belong to each other’s essence.2  Very roughly, minds can do 
what minds do without bodies and bodies can do what bodies do without minds.  
For instance, a billiard ball with a specific velocity can cause another billiard ball to 
move in a particular direction with some determinate speed.  One thing that bodies 
do is move and, so the argument goes, bodies can move without the help of minds.   
In the second Meditation, Descartes purports to have shown that minds can 
have “purely intellectual perceptions” in which they cognize reality without the 
assistance of the senses.  This is a critical moment; maybe the most critical in all of 
the Meditations.  In addition to its consequences for the Aristotelian framework 
pervasive in most philosophical thought at the time, it plays a prominent role in 
establishing that minds are substances.  For if minds can cognize reality without 
bodies, minds can do what minds do without the assistance of bodies.  It is at this 
very point in the Meditations, the point at which he claims to have shown us how to 
                                                
1 The Essential Descartes, ed. M. Wilson (New York: New American Library, 1969): 373. 
2 See (Carriero 2009).  My reading of Descartes’s Meditations owes much to this wonderful book.  
However, only I should be blamed for mistakes in the specific interpretation of Descartes’s 
argument that follows.  Though I do intend it to be an accurate characterization of how he argues in 
the sixth Meditation, it is certain that my treatment here does not do justice to the subtleties of the 
text. 
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have “purely intellectual perceptions”, that Descartes is assuming body and all of 
its characteristics are “chimeras”.  Therefore, it is possible that the mind does what 
minds do without any bodies existing at all.  The essences of both minds and bodies 
are free from one another and so minds and bodies are distinct substances. 
This distinctness of mental and physical substance is one aspect of the well-
known radical dissimilarity of minds and bodies.  Minds and bodies are substances 
each characterized by an essential property the other could not possibly have.  
Bodies, which are essentially extended and whose characteristics are specific ways 
of being extended, could not possibly have any mental properties.  On the other 
hand, minds, which are essentially thinking and whose characteristics are specific 
ways of thinking, could not possibly have any bodily properties.  This radical 
dissimilarity between minds and bodies is standardly understood to be the source of 
Descartes’s problem of mental causation.  Gassendi asks, “How could there be 
effort directed against anything, or motion set up in it, unless there is mutual 
contact between what moves and what is moved?  And how can there be contact 
without a body…?”.3  The problem for Descartes appears to lie with the very nature 
of the mental, specifically that it is an essentially non-extended substance.  
Section 1.2: The Thesis of Nonreductionism 
Nowadays, most philosophers have given up on the idea that having a mind 
consists in having some nonphysical substance that underlies the possession of a 
                                                
3 The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2, ed. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984): 236ff.  Evident in Gassendi’s remarks is a 
conception of causation that requires impact or contact between the relata.  There is no wonder that 
Gassendi was puzzled as to how a Cartesian mind could direct effort on a body.  See (Papineau 
2001) for an interesting discussion of this point and its consequences. 
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unique family of properties.  If substances are admitted into our contemporary 
ontology at all, only physical substances are permitted.  Yet, dualism of a sort is 
still widely defended on philosophical grounds, 
(Nonreductionism) For every physical phenomenon p and mental 
phenomenon m, p is distinct from m.4 
 
There are, however, two issues facing this formulation of Nonreductionism.  First, 
it is not clear what it means for phenomena to be distinct.  A recent essay by Stoljar 
(2008) notes that there are at least five different notions doing business under the 
heading of ‘distinctness’ (Stoljar 2008, 264).  Second, it is not clear that the 
arguments advanced in support of Nonreductionism actually support it as stated.  
Instead, a similar though importantly different assumption has been the focus of the 
debate between reductionists and nonreductionists, one which claims that mental 
phenomena are distinct from neurophysiological phenomena.  The assumption of 
Nonreductionism, then, both needs disambiguated and properly restricted.5    
The debate between reductionists and nonreductionists concerns whether 
mental phenomena are identical with or distinct from physical phenomena.  I shall 
consider it an uncontroversial fact about identity that x and y are identical only if 
there is a symmetrical necessitation relation that holds between x and y.  This fact 
about the relation of identity is captured by (I): 
                                                
4 I am following (Yablo 1992b) in the terminology here.  By ‘phenomenon’ I lump together both 
properties and events.  I shall name properties with upper case letters (e.g., M, N, etc.), events with 
lower case letters (e.g., m, n, etc.), and phenomena with italicized lower case letters (e.g., m, n, etc.). 
5 Another and more tricky issue with Nonreductionism concerns the lumping together of properties 
and events.  Are we justified in treating properties and events as the same or similar in the context of 
discussing mental causation?  Perhaps but this ultimately depends on the correct picture of the 
relation between these two kinds of entities.  Specifically, I think this issue concerns the nature and 
individuation of events, an issue I will try to remain neutral on as much as I can in this first chapter.  
See Ch. 3 Section 3.3 for more on this point. 
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(I) For any x and y, x = y only if (a) x necessitates y and (b) y 
necessitates x 
 
The condition in (I) does not specify the metaphysical kinds of things it ranges over 
(e.g., properties, events, facts, states, dispositions, etc.) since it is meant to range 
over all of them.  Furthermore, x necessitates y just in case: it is impossible for x to 
be present in the absence of y.6  In the rest of this essay, I will be concerned 
exclusively with the distinctness of mental and physical phenomena so the relevant 
substitution instance is as follows: for any mental phenomenon m and physical 
phenomenon p, m = p only if (a) m necessitates p and (b) p necessitates m.     
 There are two important and influential lines of thought meant to show that 
mental phenomena are distinct from physical phenomena.  The first line of thought 
originates with the arguments from multiple realizability given by Putnam (1975b).  
According to these arguments, mental phenomena are distinct from physical 
phenomena because the (a)-condition in (I) fails to be satisfied, that is, mental 
phenomena do not necessitate physical phenomena.  According to Stoljar (2008), 
this amounts to mental and physical phenomena being weakly modally distinct 
where x is weakly modally distinct from y just in case it is possible that x is present 
and y absent or it is possible that y is present and x absent (but not both) (Stoljar 
                                                
6 A few more remarks are in order.  First, the notions of “presence” and “absence” are intended to 
be neutral with respect to different ways of being.  Objects exist, events occur, and properties are 
possessed or instantiated.  Second, the modality here should be read as metaphysical and not, e.g., 
conceptual or nomological.  Third, necessitation is temporally invariant in sense that it is stable 
across all the instants of time within a possible world.  If x necessitates y, then it will do so for every 
possible time t in a world.  Fourth, I assume necessitation is non-causal, since x and y are present 
simultaneous.  Fifth, necessitation is a dependence relation.  Assuming that numbers are necessary 
entities it follows that any contingent entity whatsoever necessitates the number 7, since it is the 
case that necessarily, if that contingent entity exists, 7 exists.  But it appears strange to think of the 
number 7 as depending upon this contingent entity.  So, the necessitation relations under 
consideration here are to be understood as non-causal dependency relations.   
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2008, 265).  Therefore, Putnam’s argument from multiple realizability should be 
understood as supporting the following version of Nonreductionism: 
(Weak Nonreductionism) For every physical phenomenon p and 
mental phenomenon m, p is weakly modally distinct from m 
 
The second line of thought derives from the modal arguments developed by 
Kripke (1980).  Unlike the arguments from multiple realizability, modal arguments 
purport to show that mental phenomena are distinct from physical phenomena 
because both the (a)- and (b)-conditions in (I) fail to be satisfied.  Stoljar (2008) 
labels this strong modal distinctness where x is strongly modally distinct from y 
just in case it is possible that x is present and y absent and it is possible that y is 
present and x absent (Stoljar 2008, 266).  Kripke’s modal arguments, then, support 
a much stronger version of Nonreductionism: 
(Strong Nonreductionism) For every physical phenomenon p and 
mental phenomenon m, p is strongly modally distinct from m 
 
In the next two sections, I discuss these two influential lines of thought 
more carefully.  Not only do I want to keep in mind that they support two different 
versions of Nonreductionism, I also want to emphasize that neither support the 
assumption that mental phenomena are distinct from physical phenomena tout 
court.  Instead, mental phenomena are taken to be distinct from the physical 
phenomena cited in or subsumed by the laws of the lower-level sciences.  
Specifically, the arguments are intended to show that mental phenomena are either 
weakly or strongly modally distinct from neurophysiological phenomena.  This 
restriction to the assumption of Nonreductionism is absolutely crucial to properly 
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understand the exclusion problem, since neurophysiological phenomena are 
standardly taken to be the primary causal competitors of the mental phenomena we 
consider to be among the causes of human behavior.       
Section 1.2.1: Multiple Realizability 
A corollary of (I) is that property P is identical to property Q only if P 
necessitates Q.  Putnam’s (1975b) considerations from multiple realizability are 
best understood as establishing that mental properties do not necessitate the 
physical properties cited in or subsumed by the laws of neurophysiology.  In short, 
mental properties are multiply realizable properties and, in virtue of this, do not 
necessitate neurophysiological properties.  The multiple realizability of mental 
properties is inconsistent with the satisfaction of the (a)-condition in (I) and so 
guarantees their weak modal distinctness from neurophysiological properties. 
Putnam’s argument begins with the observation that satisfying the (a)-
condition is in tension with empirical facts about how mental properties are 
instantiated in the actual world.  A variety of creatures that are mentally quite 
similar are neurophysiological quite distinct.  He claims it is reasonable to believe 
on the empirical evidence we presently possess that, for any mental property M, M 
can be instantiated in some nomologically possible creature without that creature 
instantiating neurophysiological property N.  In other words, it is consistent with 
the laws of the actual world that a creature exist which instantiates M without N.  
This nomological possibility shows that the (a)-condition is not satisfied.  If it is 
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nomologically possible to instantiate M without N, it is metaphysically possible to 
instantiate M without N and so M does not necessitate N.   
In addition, Jerry Fodor’s (1974) discussion introduces what John Bickle 
(1998) has called multiple realizability “in a token system over times”.  During a 
single creature’s mental history, it is possible for it to possess mental property M 
and neurophysiological property N at t1 and that same mental property without N at 
t2.  Again, if this is nomologically possible (and it seems to be given our present 
evidence), it is metaphysically possible to instantiate M without N and so M does 
not necessitate N.   
The typical conclusion drawn from these discussions is that mental 
properties are not identical with neurophysiological properties, but instead are 
realized in them. 7   The reason is that mental properties do not necessitate 
neurophysiological properties, since it is nomologically possible for there to exist 
creatures that possess mental properties and either possess neurophysiological 
properties very different from ours (e.g., octopi, reptiles, etc.) or possess no 
neurophysiological properties at all (e.g., Martians, androids, highly advanced 
artificial intelligences, etc.).  The following has become a widely accepted 
condition on the relationship between mental and neurophysiological properties: 
(MR) Necessarily, for every mental property M and every 
neurophysiological property N which realizes M, it is nomologically 
possible that something instantiates M but not N. 
 
                                                
7 Kim (1993a), Sober (1999), and Shapiro (2000) present some reasons to think that these are the 
wrong conclusions to draw. 
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Putnam’s discussion of multiple realizability strongly suggests that the relationship 
between mental and neurophysiological properties must be consistent with the 
nomological possibility of creatures that are mentally exactly similar to us although 
neurophysiological quite distinct. 
Additionally, the considerations from multiple realizability have done much 
to undermine the related project of globally reducing psychological theory to 
neurophysiological theory. 8   Specifically, the nomological possibility of 
instantiating M without P is inconsistent with the common philosophical account of 
inter-theoretic reduction.  The account of inter-theoretic reduction introduced by 
Nagel (1961) is standardly interpreted to require nomic equivalences or bridge laws 
between mental and neurophysiological properties.  It is these nomic equivalences 
that are inconsistent with mental-neurophysiological realization.  Fodor (1974) 
gives us the classic statement of global theory reduction in which the importance of 
these equivalences is apparent.  Presumably, theories are at least interrelated nomic 
generalizations, or laws, of the form 
(1) M1x → M2x 
where (1) should be read as the instantiation of property M1 is nomologically 
sufficient for the instantiation of property M2.  A theory MT is reduced to a theory 
PT just in case each nomic generalization of MT is reduced to a nomic 
generalization of PT.  The reduction of a psychological theory to a 
neurophysiological theory proceeds from the premise that each nomic 
                                                
8 See (Lewis 1980) and (Kim 1993a) for local reductions of psychology to neurophysiological 
theory. 
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generalization of the psychological theory is reducible to a nomic generalization of 
the neurophysiological theory.  Theory reduction, then, is premised upon law 
reduction.  A law such as (1) is reduced to a law such as (2) 
(2) N1x → N2x 
just in case the following pair of bridge laws hold 
(3) M1x ↔ N1x 
(4) M2x ↔ N2x 
where (3) and (4) should be understood as stating nomic equivalences between 
properties.  From the law (2) and the bridge laws (3) and (4), we can logically 
derive (1), a law of MT.  Therefore, a theory MT is reducible to a theory PT just in 
case each nomic generalization of MT is logically derivable from the nomic 
generalizations of PT with the help of bridge laws like (3) and (4).  Considerations 
from multiple realizability prevent the existence of being bridge laws of the form of 
(3) and (4), which prevents a global reduction of psychological theory to 
neurophysiological theory.          
Section 1.2.2: Modal Arguments 
The other family of reasons in support of the distinctness of mental and 
neurophysiological phenomena consists of modal arguments.9  Modal arguments 
are, in a few important ways, different from considerations of multiple realizability.  
First, modal arguments attempt to establish more than Putnam’s arguments from 
                                                
9 Some other well-known considerations are explanatory gap arguments and knowledge arguments.  
Although I have not worked out the details fully, I think modal arguments have a kind of primacy 
when it comes to establishing the distinctness of phenomena.  I suspect that both explanatory gap 
arguments and knowledge arguments depend on the success of modal arguments.   
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multiple realizability.  These arguments purport to show that mental phenomena are 
strongly modally distinct from neurophysiological phenomena, since neither the 
(a)- and (b)-conditions in (I) is satisfied.  Second, as the discussion that follows will 
make clear, modal arguments make explicit appeal to conceivability evidence.  
These arguments begin by appealing to the conceivability of some state of affairs, 
whereas considerations from multiple realizability proceed from the claim that 
some states of affairs are nomologically possible.  To claim that P is conceivable is 
to make the epistemic claim that P is not a priori false.  This is much weaker than 
the empirical premise from which claims of multiple realizability are based, namely 
that certain states of affairs are consistent with the laws of the actual world.  Third, 
unlike multiple realizability arguments which have tended to focus exclusively on 
properties, modal arguments have been developed for both properties and events.10 
Let’s begin with the modal argument against mental-physical property 
identity as it is developed by Kripke (1980).  Where both ‘C-fiber firings’ and ‘pain’ 
rigidly denote some property, suppose for reductio that ‘C-fiber firings = pain’ is 
true.  Kripke (1971) argues that if this identity statement is true, it is necessarily 
true.  However, we can conceive of situations in which C-fiber firing is separable 
from pain:11 
Disembodiment: there is pain without C-fiber firing 
                                                
10 I see no barrier to multiple realizability arguments applying to events.  See (Yablo 1992b) for 
such considerations.  I point this out only to make salient the historical fact that talk about multiple 
realizability has focused upon properties and not on other kinds of things. 
11 Modal arguments begin by establishing what David Chalmers (2002) calls an “epistemic gap” 
between the mental and the physical.  Establishing this epistemic gap is suppose to preclude the 
possibility of reductive explanations of the mental and some argue that all physicalists require such 
explanations (see for instance (Jackson 2007)).  
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Zombies: there is C-fiber firing without pain 
According to Kripke, if there is no way to explain away the apparent separability of 
pain and C-fiber firing, it is metaphysically possible to have one without the other.  
First, if there is no way to explain away the conceivability of disembodiment, it is 
metaphysically possible to have pain without C-fiber firing and so the mental 
property pain does not necessitate this neurophysiological property.  This is the 
same conclusion reached by considerations from multiple realizability although it is 
reached via inter alia a weaker epistemic premise.  Second, if there is no way to 
explain away the conceivability of zombies, it is possible to have C-fiber firings 
without pain.  In addition to the claim that mental properties do not necessitate 
neurophysiological properties, this kind of modal argument purports to show that 
this neurophysiological property does not necessitate the mental property pain.  At 
best, if there is no way to explain away the apparent separability of pain and C-
fiber firing, then ‘C-fiber firings = pain’ is contingent.  But since ‘C-fiber firings = 
pain’ is necessarily true if it is true at all, the identity statement ‘C-fiber firings = 
pain’ must be false.  The question now is whether there is a way to explain away 
these admittedly conceivable scenarios. 
In most cases of identifying a commonsense natural kind with a theoretical 
kind (e.g., heat and molecular motion), we can explain away the apparent 
separability by telling the following kind of story.  When we think we are 
conceiving of heat without molecular motion, what we are really conceiving of is 
something else entirely.  What we are conceiving of is the feeling of heat (viz., the 
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sensation of heat) as separable from molecular motion.  That is, we pick out the 
phenomenon of heat by one of its contingent properties – that it tends to cause 
certain kinds of sensations in creatures like us.  Similarly, when we think we 
conceive of molecular motion without heat, what we are really conceiving of is 
molecular motion not bringing about the feeling of heat in us.  In either case, we 
are not really conceiving of the separability of heat and molecular motion. 
In the case of pain and C-fiber firing, this strategy is not applicable (though 
Kripke admits this is no proof that no such strategies are available).12  When we 
conceive of disembodiment (i.e., pain without C-fiber firing), we are conceiving of 
the feeling of pain without C-fiber firing.  But conceiving of the feeling of pain is 
just to conceive of pain, since we pick out pain by one of its essential properties, 
namely its “immediate phenomenological quality”.  Similarly, when we conceive 
of zombies (i.e., C-fiber firing without pain), we are conceiving of C-fiber firing 
without the feeling of pain and, again, the absence of the feeling of pain just is the 
absence of pain.  Overall, since being in pain is a conscious mental condition, there 
can be no distinction between the feeling and the reality or, as Kripke puts it, “the 
notion of an epistemic situation qualitatively identical to one in which the observer 
had a sensation S simply is one in which the observer had that sensation” (Kripke 
1980, 152).  The conclusion is that since we cannot explain away the apparent 
separability of pain and C-fiber firing, they really are separable and hence neither 
necessitates the other.  The identity statement ‘C-fiber firings = pain’, then, can be 
                                                
12 See (Hill 1997) for an alternative strategy. 
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at most a contingent truth.  But it is necessarily true if it is true at all so it is false 
that pain is identical C-fiber firing. 
 Various kinds of modal arguments have also been advanced in support of 
the distinctness of mental and physical events.13  Kripke’s original argument begins 
by claiming that if mental event m is identical to neurophysiological event n, then, 
by Leibniz’s Law, m and n must share all of their properties, including their de re 
modal properties.  One de re modal property of neurophysiological event n is the 
property being essentially a brain state.  Kripke continues, 
Indeed, even more is true: not only being a brain state, but even 
being a brain state of a specific type is essential to n.  The 
configuration of brain cells whose presence at a given time 
constitutes the presence of n at that time is essential to n, and in its 
absence n would not have existed (minor re-lettering) (Kripke 1980, 
147 – 148). 
 
If the mental event m is identical to neurophysiological event n, it “could not have 
existed without a quite specific type of configuration of molecules” (Kripke 1980, 
148).  Prima facie, m could have occurred without the existence of this very 
specific configuration of molecules and so is not essentially a brain state of that 
type.  Therefore, m and n differ in their de re modal properties and must be 
distinct.14   
                                                
13 If one gives a fine-grained individuation of events along the lines of Kim (1973, 1976) in which 
events have constitutive properties, the distinctness of the constitutive properties entails the 
distinctness of the events.  This kind of individuation of events justifies a unified treatment of 
properties and events in the context of discussing mental causation.  See fn. 5.     
14 Token-identity theorists need to resist this kind of modal reasoning about events.  A common 
reply is as follows: what is clear is that some mental event could have occurred without the 
existence of this very specific configuration of molecules, but it is not so clear that it is the very 
mental event the token-identity theorist claims is identical to this neurophysiological event.  Yablo 
(1992b) reminds us, “Among the lessons of Naming and Necessity is that to find a thing x capable of 
existing in some counterfactual condition, one imagines this directly – as opposed to imagining 
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A similar argument can be run in the reverse.  Mental event m has the 
property being essentially a mental state.  Indeed, even more is true: not only being 
essentially a mental state, but being essentially a mental state of a specific type.  If 
m is an intentional mental event, then the type of propositional attitude it is (e.g., 
belief, desire, etc.) and its propositional content are essential to m or, if it is 
phenomenal, its phenomenological character is essential.  If the neurophysiological 
event n is identical to mental event m, it could not have occurred without being a 
specific propositional attitude having a specific propositional content or having a 
specific phenomenological character.  Prima facie, the neurophysiological event n 
could have occurred without being this attitude with this content or without having 
this character.  Thus, n is not essentially a mental state of that type.  Therefore, n 
and m differ in their de re modal properties and must be distinct.15 
 Tyler Burge (1979) advances an argument along these lines that appeals to 
content properties.  Intentional mental events have their content essentially.  Mental 
content should be analyzed in terms of relational properties the thinker has with 
respect to his or her physical and/or social environment (viz., some kind of anti-
                                                                                                                                   
something y in that condition whose transworld identity with x must then be established.  This is 
crucial if imaginability is to be a source of knowledge about de re possibility” (Yablo 1992b, 269, fn. 
50).  Yablo goes on to argue that the question here boils down to whether m really is imaginable in 
the absence of n or whether what one imagines is a distinct but similar m in n’s absence (Yablo 
1992b, 269, fn. 50).  Here I follow Kripke and Yablo and claim that we are imagining m and not a 
distinct but similar event and that this is prima facie plausible. 
15 Yablo (1992b) questions the second part of this argument.  Roughly, if mental event m is taken to 
supervene on neurophysiological event p, the essential physical properties of p must necessitate the 
essential mental properties of m.  It follows, then, that p has the essential mental properties of m 
essentially (Yablo 1992b, 268).  The point, however, is not to argue for a token identity theory but 
note an asymmetry in the above arguments.  According to Yablo, mental and neurophysiological 
events are distinct, since “the essences of mental events are physically impoverished” (Yablo 1992b, 
268) though the reverse is not the case.    
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individualism is true).  It follows that mental events bear certain kinds of relations 
to the outside world essentially.  Prima facie, neurophysiological event n does not 
bear these same relations to the outside world essentially.  Therefore, m and n have 
different essential properties and so cannot be identical.  As Bennett (2003) notes, 
nothing in this argument hangs on the assumption that some kind of anti-
individualism about content is true.  Suppose that some kind of individualist 
functional or conceptual role semantics is the true story about mental content.  
Given that intentional mental events have their content essentially, it follows that 
mental events bear certain kinds of relations to other mental events essentially.  
Prima facie, neurophysiological event n does not bear these same relations to 
mental events essentially.  Therefore, m and n have different essential properties 
and so cannot be identical. 
 These modal arguments conclude that there is a more robust distinctness 
between mental and neurophysiological phenomena than what follows from 
multiple realizability.  The reason is that it is consistent with (MR) that 
neurophysiological phenomena necessitate mental phenomena, but modal 
arguments purport to undermine even this.  The difference is that multiple 
realizability supports the weak modal distinctness of mental and neurophysiological 
phenomena, since one of the two conditions stated in (I) fails to be satisfied (i.e., 
the (a)-condition), while modal arguments support the strong modal distinctness of 
mental and neurophysiological phenomena, since both conditions stated in (I) fail 
to be satisfied. 
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Section 1.3: The Thesis of Nonreductionism, Again             
If we make sure to separate weak from strong modal distinctness and 
recognize the restriction to neurophysiological phenomena, multiple realizability 
and modal arguments support two different assumptions respectively: 
(Weak Restricted Nonreductionism) For every neurophysiological 
phenomenon n and every mental phenomenon m, n is weakly 
modally distinct from m 
   
(Strong Restricted Nonreductionism) For every neurophysiological 
phenomenon n and every mental phenomenon m, n is strongly 
modally distinct from m   
 
The history I have emphasized shows that the philosophical focus has not been on 
physical phenomena tout court as bad candidates for mental phenomena, but only 
those phenomena cited in or subsumed by laws of the lower-level sciences with 
specific emphasis on neurophysiological phenomena.  This has much in the way of 
a philosophical precedent.  Both multiple realizability and modal arguments were, 
at the time of their original formulations, leveled at philosophers sympathetic to an 
identity theory of the mind.  Theorists like U.T. Place (1956), Herbert Feigl (1958), 
J.J.C. Smart (1959) and even David Lewis (1966, 1972) and David Armstrong 
(1981) argued that mental phenomena are not just some physical phenomena or 
other, but specific kinds of physical phenomena, namely the neurophysiological 
phenomena assumed to be cited in or subsumed by neurophysiological laws.  The 
influence of these arguments against specific reductionist projects eventually led to 
one or the other restricted version of nonreductionism gaining favor with the 
philosophical majority. 
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Furthermore, much of the motivation for arguing against these reductionist 
projects is to preserve the autonomy of psychology as a science.  If mental 
phenomena are neurophysiological phenomena, nomic equivalences between 
mental and neurophysiological properties will obtain and so bridge laws will be 
available for a reduction of psychology to neurophysiology.  Given such a 
reduction, the generalizations captured by psychologists will be generalizations 
already captured by the neurophysiologists or, at least, possibly captured by them.  
Psychologists might as well just become neurophysiologists.  But accepting one or 
the other restricted version of nonreductionism does nothing to undermine this 
motivation.  As long as mental phenomena turn out to be weakly modally distinct16 
from the physical phenomena cited in or subsumed by some lower-level science, 
psychology can continue on with the assumption that its generalizations are not in 
principle subject to theoretical reduction.  No one is in the business of finding 
psychological generalizations besides the psychologist.  As it turns out, the 
autonomy of psychology is consistent with mental phenomena being physical – 
they just cannot be, e.g., neurophysiological phenomena. 
This lesson about the assumption of Nonreductionism has been recently 
stressed by Bennett (2008) and I believe it is one worth remaining clear on.  The 
kind of physicalism that will be the focus of this essay is the nonreductive 
physicalism prevalent throughout much of analytic philosophy.  It would 
misconstrue nonreductive physicalism to consider it as committed to the claim that 
                                                
16 It should be rather straightforward that strong modal distinctness entails weak modal distinctness.  
If (P & Q) is true then P is true by simplification which is enough to make (P ∨ Q) is true. 
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mental phenomena are (weakly or strongly modally) distinct from physical 
phenomena tout court.  Indeed, the nonreductive physicalist is only committed to 
denying that mental phenomena are physical in, what Bennett (2008) calls, the 
narrow sense.  That is, the nonreductive physicalist denies that mental phenomena 
are identical to any neurophysiological phenomena.  My discussion of 
nonreductionism will, therefore, continue to suppose that one or the other restricted 
version of Nonreductionism is the relevant assumption for generating the exclusion 
problem.  But now the question remains: Which restricted version must the 
nonreductive physicalist accept? 
Section 1.3.1: Physicalism and Global Supervenience 
Answering this question is facilitated by looking at what makes the 
physicalist different from the nonphysicalist.  Their disagreement hinges on the 
truth of the following supervenience thesis: 
(Global Supervenience) Any minimal physical duplicate of the 
actual world is a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. 
 
A minimal physical duplicate of the actual world is any world that has precisely the 
same distribution of physical properties and particulars as the actual world and 
nothing more.  Alternatively, we can put the thesis as follows.  If P reports all the 
physical facts and P* reports all the facts, then if physicalism is true, ‘if P then P*’ 
is a necessary truth.17  If M reports a subset of the facts reported by P*, namely all 
                                                
17 See (Lewis 1983), (Chalmers 1996), and (Jackson 1998).  In other words, if someone accepts that 
‘if P then P*’ is a necessary truth, then they hold that the physical way the actual world is 
metaphysically necessitates all the facts about the actual world.  This should not be understood to 
include the epistemic claim that this necessitation is knowable only a posteriori (see (Chalmers 
1996, 69).   Additionally, there should be no further presumption that the necessitation is knowable 
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of the intentional and phenomenal facts, then the necessary truth ‘if P then P*’ 
entails that ‘if P then M’ is also necessary truth.  In other words, Global 
Supervenience implies that any minimal physical duplicate of the actual world is a 
psychological duplicate of the actual world. 
On the other hand, the nonphysicalist denies this and maintains that there 
are minimal physical duplicates of the actual world that are not duplicates 
simpliciter of the actual world.  Specifically, they uphold that it is possible for there 
to be psychological differences in a world that is a minimal physical duplicate of 
the actual world.  In other words, if nonphysicalism is true, then ‘if P then M’ is 
merely a contingent truth.  The following table represents these differences: 
 Global Supervenience 
Nonphysicalism (-) There are minimal physical 
duplicates of @ that are not duplicates 
simpliciter of @ 
Physicalism (+) Minimal physical duplicates of @ 
are duplicates simpliciter of @ 
 
Table 1: Physicalism and Nonphysicalism 
Not only must the nonreductive physicalist differentiate themselves from the 
nonphysicalist by accepting Global Supervenience, they must also differentiate 
themselves from the reductive physicalist by accepting something the reductionist 
cannot. 
                                                                                                                                   
a priori and that Global Supervenience is a form of what Chalmers (1996) calls “logical 
supervenience”. 
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 The obvious candidate is one or the other restricted version of 
Nonreductionism introduced in the previous section.  The reductive physicalist – 
theorists like Smart (1959), Lewis (1966, 1972) and Armstrong (1981) – cannot 
accept that mental phenomena are weakly modally distinct from neurophysiological 
phenomena.  If mental phenomena m is identical with neurophysiological 
phenomena n, then, according to (I), m and n necessitate one another.  The weak 
modal distinctness of m and n means that one or another of these necessitations 
does not hold.  Given that strong modal distinctness entails weak modal 
distinctness (see fn. 15), the assumption of Weak Restricted Nonreductionism is the 
thesis that differentiates the reductive from the nonreductive physicalist.  This 
difference is captured in the following table: 
 Weak Restricted Nonreductionism 
Reductive Physicalist (-) Mental and neurophysiological 
phenomena symmetrically necessitate 
one another 
Nonreductive Physicalist (+) Mental and neurophysiological 
phenomena are at least weakly modally 
distinct 
 
Table 2: Reductionism and Nonreductionism 
Just as there are distinctions that can be made between versions of physicalism, the 
ambiguity in the assumption of Nonreductionism shows that there are distinctions 
that can be made within nonreductive physicalism.   
 The candidate that differentiates versions of nonreductive physicalism is the 
assumption of Strong Restricted Nonreductionism.  A nonreductive physicalist 
26  
might find fault with the modal arguments developed by Kripke (1980), but still 
accept the argument from multiple realizability. Plausibly, this version of 
nonreductive physicalism, which we might call L-nonreductionism, maintains that 
mental phenomena do not necessitate neurophysiological phenomena, but the 
reverse necessitation holds.18  In other words, L-nonreductionists accept a local 
supervenience thesis of mental phenomena on neurophysiological phenomena: 
(M-N Local Supervenience) Any minimal neurophysiological 
duplicate of an actual individual is a psychological duplicate 
simpliciter of that actual individual. 
 
Mental phenomena, though weakly modally distinct from neurophysiological 
phenomena, are asymmetrically necessitated by them.  Roughly, this supervenience 
thesis captures the position of many individualists about intentional mental 
properties, namely that Putnamian Twins are psychological duplicates (see Section 
1.4 for more discussion on individualism and anti-individualism). 
However, nothing about the general thesis of physicalism requires that one 
accept M-N Local Supervenience.  All the nonreductive physicalist must maintain 
is that the physical way our world is, not the neurophysiological way it is, 
metaphysically necessitates the psychological way it is.  Recall, if physicalism is 
true, then ‘if P then M’ is a necessary truth and P reports all of the physical facts; 
not just the neurophysiological facts.  Therefore, it is consistent with one version of 
nonreductive physicalism that it is metaphysically possible for two individuals to 
                                                
18 If we construe the neurophysiological phenomena to be properties of the whole brain or neural 
events occurring “holistically” rather than in local regions of the brain, Yablo (1992b) seems to be 
an example of a nonreductive physicalist who accepts this at least with respect to some mental 
phenomena (e.g., phenomenal properties and events and/or intentional phenomena with narrow 
content). See Section 5.2.1. 
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be neurophysiological duplicates without being psychological duplicates. 19  
Plausibly, this version of nonreductionism, which we can call G-nonreductionism, 
accepts the entirety of Kripke’s modal arguments and/or finds anti-individualist 
considerations about mental content persuasive.  In short, G-nonreductionists 
consider mental phenomena to be strongly modally distinct from 
neurophysiological phenomena.  The differences between L- and G- 
nonreductionists are captured in the following table: 
 Strong Restricted 
Nonreductionism 
L-Nonreductionism (-) Mental phenomena are weakly 
modally distinct from 
neurophysiological phenomena but 
the latter necessitates the former 
G-Nonreductionism (+) Mental phenomena are 
strongly modally distinct from 
neurophysiological phenomena 
 
Table 3: Two Kinds of Nonreductionism 
One might be inclined to assimilate G-nonreductionism with 
nonphysicalism, since the latter view is commonly understood to posit only a 
contingent connection between mental and neurophysiological phenomena.20  This 
is precisely the kind of connection the G-nonreductionist takes to hold between 
mental and neurophysiological phenomena, since they accept Strong Restricted 
                                                
19 Think here of the twins in Putnam’s Twin Earth cases.  Ex hypothesi they are molecule for 
molecule identical to one another and so neurophysiologically exactly the same, but their 
psychologies differ, since they instantiate different intentional mental properties.  The possibility of 
Putnamian Twins is not taken to undermine physicalism and historically is one reason for 
formulating it in terms of a global rather than local supervenience thesis.   
20 In what follows, I assume that G-nonreductionism involves a commitment to physicalism. 
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Nonreductionism.  The assimilation, however, is a mistake.  First, what defines 
nonphysicalism is the rejection of Global Supervenience, not their acceptance of 
some version of Nonreductionism.  By accepting that there are minimal physical 
duplicates of the actual world that are not psychological duplicates of the actual 
world, the nonphysicalist has a substantive disagreement with all physicalists 
including the G-nonreductionist.  G-nonreductionists accept, while the 
nonphysicalist denies, that ‘if P then M’ is a necessary truth.  Second, most 
versions of nonphysicalism accept Strong Restricted Nonreductionism like the G-
nonreductionist.  In other words, if Ni reports a subset of the facts reported by P, 
namely all the neurophysiological facts concerning a specific individual, and Mi 
reports all of the mental facts of that individual, then both the G-nonreductionist 
and the nonphysicalist hold that ‘if Ni then Mi’ is a contingent truth.  But an 
important difference remains even about the status of this truth.  In order to see this 
difference, consider an important argument set out by Terrance Horgan (1993).   
Horgan (1993) has forcefully argued that all versions of physicalism – 
reductive and nonreductive alike – cannot take the metaphysically necessary 
connections between the mental and the physical as explanatorily brute.  He claims 
there must be in principle some deeper and physicalistically acceptable explanation 
as to why there is this necessitation from the physical to the mental.21  In other 
words, despite being necessary, the physicalist cannot hold that ‘if P then M’ is a 
brute fact about the actual world.  The nonphysicalist is in a decidedly different 
                                                
21 What Horgan thinks the physicalist owes us is a kind of non-causal explanation of supervenience. 
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position.  They contend that ‘if P then M’ is contingent and, furthermore, that the 
search for why this contingent connection holds is misguided.  For example, things 
just happen in accordance with the fundamental physical laws.  Likewise, things 
just happen in accordance with these fundamental psychophysical laws and “there 
is no asking ‘how’” (Chalmers 1996, 170).  The proposition ‘if P then M’ is an 
explanatorily brute contingent fact about the actual world.   
Given that G-nonreductionists are physicalists, I think we should extend the 
arguments of Horgan (1993) and apply them to the metaphysically contingent 
connections they posit between mental and neurophysiological phenomena.  In 
short, G-nonreductionists cannot accept that ‘if Ni then Mi’ is a brute contingent 
fact about our world.  Other contingent truths are explainable and the G-
nonreductionist should think that this contingent truth is as well.  This extension of 
Horgan’s argument is vindicated by the fact that most nonreductive physicalists 
nowadays take the mental to be realized in the neurophysiological.  The 
nonphysicalist and the nonreductionist can both consistently hold Strong Restricted 
Nonreductionism.  However, the nonphysicalist claims that ‘if Ni then Mi’ is a 
brute contingent fact, while the G-nonreductionist holds that it is explainable in 
terms of a realization relation between the mental and the neurophysiological.  In 
addition to the acceptance of Global Supervenience, this is the defining difference 
between G-nonreductionism and nonphysicalism. 
 What, then, is the answer to the question posed at the end of Section 1.3: 
Which restricted version of Nonreductionism must the nonreductive physicalist 
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accept?  The nonreductive physicalist differentiates themselves from the reductive 
physicalist by accepting Weak Restricted Nonreductionism, so they must accept at 
least this.  I have argued, however, that Strong Restricted Nonreductionism is 
consistent with Global Supervenience so there is a version of nonreductive 
physicalism that accepts something stronger than Weak Restricted 
Nonreductionism.  The ambiguity in Nonreductionism infects the position of 
nonreductive physicalism, splintering it into two positions: L- and G-
nonreductionism.  In later sections we will see that this ambiguity creates similar 
problems for some of the other assumptions taken to generate the exclusion 
problem.  The way I elect to proceed in light of this ambiguity is to define a notion 
of modal distinctness that is general enough to subsume both weak and strong 
modal distinctness.  Here is the obvious proposal: 
(Modal Distinctness) x is modally distinct from y just in case it is 
possible that x is present and y absent or it is possible that y is 
present and x absent. 
 
where the ‘or’ is to be read as inclusive disjunction.  Equivalently, x is modally 
distinct from y just in case either (i) the (a)-condition in (I) fails to be satisfied, (ii) 
the (b)-condition in (I) fails to be satisfied, or (iii) both conditions in (I) fail to be 
satisfied.  Both the L- and G-nonreductionist can agree that mental and 
neurophysiological phenomena are modally distinct, hence, Nonreductionism can 
be reformulated as follows: 
(Nonreductionism) For every neurophysiological phenomenon n and 
every mental phenomenon m, n is modally distinct from m. 
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Again, anyone who accepts either the weak or strong versions of Nonreductionism 
can accept this reformulation.  Therefore, this essay will consider the exclusion 
problem as being generated by inter alia the assumption of Nonreductionism as just 
stated.  Furthermore, it will examine a resolution to this problem from the point of 
view of a nonreductive physicalist, where this entails a commitment to Global 
Supervenience and Nonreductionism (restricted and clarified as above).  Therefore, 
the reductive solutions advanced by authors such as Kim (1993b, 1998, 2005) will 
be of only secondary concern.       
Section 1.4: Two Problems of Mental Causation 
 Making sense of mental causation faces at least three different problems.22  
In this section, I will discuss two contemporary problems of mental causation that 
share an important similarity to the problem that forcefully presented itself to 
Descartes.  Roughly, these problems are making sense of how anomalous mental 
phenomena and extrinsic mental phenomena can be causal.  The issue, as the 
discussion will hopefully make clear, is that if the mental is either of these ways, 
then its very nature threatens to preclude its causal efficacy.  This is in stark 
contrast to the problem of mental causation presented in the following section in 
which it is assumed the mental has the potential to causally influence the physical.    
The first of these problems arises most forcefully for those who endorse 
Donald Davidson’s (1980d) anomalous monism.  Davidson argues for the thesis he 
calls “anomalism of the mental” which states that there are no strict laws on the 
                                                
22 See (Kim 1998) for these three different problems.  My discussion in this and the next section is 
heavily influenced by Kim’s discussion and analysis.   
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basis of which mental events can be predicted or explained or can predict or explain 
other events.  Exactly how Davidson argues for this claim is a matter of 
considerable controversy, but what has been clear for much of the philosophical 
community is that anomalism threatens to lead to what Brian McLaughlin (1989) 
has labeled “type-epiphenomenalism”.23  The problem is to make sense of how 
anomalous mental properties can be causal properties.  More precisely, if mental 
properties are anomalous, then nothing is efficacious in virtue of possessing these 
properties.  The thesis of “anomalism of the mental” appears to threaten the causal 
efficacy of mental properties.   
According to Davidson, mental events enter into causal relations with 
physical events.  Furthermore, he endorses the view he calls the “nomological 
character of causality”, that is, every instance of causation is subsumable by a strict 
law.  But since there are no strict psychophysical laws24, mental events that enter 
into causal relations with physical events must be subsumed by some strict physical 
law.  Events are subsumed by laws, we may suppose, in virtue of their properties.  
So the mental events that enter into causal relations with physical events must have 
physical properties and hence be physical events.  The conclusion Davidson draws 
is that commonsense facts about mental causation, the nomological character of 
causality, and anomalism of the mental lead to a token-identity theory which holds 
that every mental event that enters into causal relations with physical events is itself 
a physical event.   
                                                
23 Davidson himself, not surprisingly, denies that it has this consequence (see (Davidson 1993)). 
24 This presumably follows from the stronger thesis of anomalism of the mental. 
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No matter how congenial this picture of the mental looks to mental 
causation, epiphenomenalist worries loom large.  Ernest Sosa expresses this worry,  
The being of a desire by my desire has no causal relevance to my 
extending my hand … if the event that is in fact my desire had not 
been my desire but had remained a neurological event of a certain 
sort, then it would have caused my extending my hand just the same 
(Sosa 1984, 278). 
 
The event that causes the extending of my hand enters into this causal relation in 
virtue of being subsumed by some strict physical law, and it is subsumed by this 
law because of the physical properties it possesses.  But in no way are the mental 
properties of this event relevant to it causing anything, since there are no strict 
psychophysical laws to subsume these events.  This is why Sosa complains that the 
fact that my desire is a desire has no causal relevance to the extension of my hand.  
The physical properties of my desire look to be the only causally relevant 
properties it possesses.  The problem is that, in virtue of being anomalous, mental 
properties are just not the right kinds of things to make a causal difference.  The 
problem stems from the nature of the mental itself, namely its anomalousness. 
 The second of these problems arises after one takes seriously Putnam’s 
(1975a) and Burge’s (1979) arguments for anti-individualism about mental content.  
Anti-individualism is a thesis about the kinds of physical properties that do not 
necessitate intentional mental properties.  Specifically, it claims that the localized 
(i.e., intrinsic) physical properties of cognitive agents do not necessitate intentional 
mental properties.  Anti-individualism can be understood as a rejection of M-N 
Local Supervenience and, therefore, inconsistent with the position I have labeled L-
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reductionism (see Section 1.3.1).  The most famous considerations in favor of this 
view are the reflections on Twin Earth-type scenarios.   
Tyler Burge’s original thought experiment25 asks us to imagine a member of 
our linguistic community, call him Jones, who has many true beliefs about the 
ailment we call ‘arthritis’.  Jones believes that having arthritis in the joints is 
painful, that arthritis is an inflammation of the joints, that there are many different 
types of arthritis, etc.  However, Jones also has some false beliefs about arthritis, in 
particular that the pain in his thigh is due to arthritis.  When Jones informs his 
doctor about this pain, his doctor tells him that since arthritis can only afflict the 
joints, the pain in his thigh cannot be due to arthritis.  Showing deference to the 
medical expert, Jones quickly revises his position and no longer believes that he 
has arthritis in his thigh.   
Next we are asked to imagine a microphysical duplicate of Jones, an 
individual who is molecule for molecule identical and so, we may suppose, 
neurophysiologically identical to Jones – let’s call him Twin-Jones.  Twin-Jones is 
a member of a linguistic community on Twin-Earth, which is almost identical to 
Earth save that according to its conventions the term ‘arthritis’ applies to both 
inflammations of the joints and ailments in the thigh.  When Twin-Jones informs 
his doctor about the ailment in his thigh by saying, ‘I believe I have arthritis in my 
thigh,’ his doctor does not correct him.  Both Jones and Twin-Jones express their 
initial beliefs with the same sentence-form, but only Twin-Jones’s belief is true.  
                                                
25 Burge (1986) presents a different version of this argument that does not assume what many take 
to be a controversial premise in his argument from (1979): that one can possess a concept while only 
incompletely grasping it. 
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The preliminary conclusion is that the content of their mental states must differ.  
But given that they are neurophysiologically exactly alike, it cannot be that their 
neurophysiological conditions necessitate their intentional mental states.  The only 
difference between Jones and Twin-Jones is that they belong to different linguistic 
communities.  The anti-individualist draws the conclusion that the supervenience 
base of intentional mental properties must include details about one’s 
neurophysiology supplemented with details about one’s linguistic community. 
The conception of intentional mental properties as extrinsic-relational-
historical properties of cognitive agents has arisen out of considerations similar to 
these.  The problem this raises is the tension created between the extrinsicness of 
mental properties and the philosophically intuitive conception of causation in 
which the causal properties of an object are its localized (i.e., intrinsic) properties.  
Since intentional mental properties are not properties like these, they do not look to 
be good candidates for being among the causes of our bodily movements.  A 
famous passage by Fred Dretske illustrates the problem intentional mental 
properties appear to face, 
Something possessing content, or having meaning, can be a cause 
without its possessing that content or having that meaning being at 
all relevant to its causal powers.  A soprano’s upper register 
supplications may shatter glass, but their meaning is irrelevant to 
their having this effect.  Their effect on the glass would be the same 
if they meant nothing at all or something else entirely different 
(Dretske 1988, 79). 
 
The presumption is that the soprano’s upper register supplications have meaning 
and it means what it does, not in virtue of its intrinsic character, but rather in virtue 
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of some of its extrinsic features.  These extrinsic properties of the supplications 
made no difference to whether it shattered the glass.  The content properties of the 
events that cause behavior are supposed to be analogous to the meaning possessed 
by the supplications – causally irrelevant given their extrinsic character.   
Coupled with a prevalent and influential cognitive theory that mental 
processes are computational processes, the problem only seems to be worse.  For 
the computational theory of thinking explicitly endorses the view that the causally 
relevant properties that drive the computational process are the syntactic properties 
of the representational elements the computations are defined over.  When these 
computational processes are implemented in human neurophysiology, it is the 
neurophysiological features of a cognitive agent that stand to be best suited for the 
“syntactic” equivalents that are efficacious in the production of, e.g., bodily 
movements.  The problem is that, in being extrinsic, intentional mental properties 
are just not the right kinds of things to make a causal difference.  Like the problem 
of the anomalousness of mental properties, this problem stems from the very nature 
of the mental itself.  Intentional mental properties being extrinsic rules out their 
being causally relevant. 
 Both of these problems of mental causation have the same general structure: 
mental properties have feature F essentially; properties with feature F cannot be 
causally efficacious properties; therefore, mental properties cannot be causally 
efficacious properties.  And notice the similar reasoning involved as to why mental 
properties face a problem when it comes to causation.  Sosa claims that the event 
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which causes the extension of my hand is not efficacious qua mental (viz., being a 
desire to extend my hand), since had the event not been a desire the effect would 
have occurred all the same.  Similarly, Dretske says that the event which causes the 
shattering of the glass is not efficacious qua event with a certain content, since had 
the event not had this content the effect would have occurred all the same.  
Presumably, intentional properties face the same problem when considerations 
about causation and computation enter the picture – had the event that caused my 
bodily movement not had these intentional mental properties, the bodily movement 
would have occurred just the same.  Prima facie, the anomalousness and 
extrinsicness of mental properties precludes their being causally efficacious 
properties.26 
Section 1.5: The Exclusion Problem 
 The third problem of mental causation – the problem that will be the focus 
of this essay – is known as the exclusion problem and differs from the problem of 
anomalousness and extrinsicness.  The source of this problem does not lie with the 
nature of the mental but rather with a feature of the physical world.  Bennett (2003) 
nicely points out the difference here, 
Those worries turn on claims about the failings of the mental – that 
it is not spatially extended, or is not invoked in the requisite sort of 
strict laws, or is somehow inappropriately extrinsic.  The exclusion 
problem, in contrast, does not purport to show that mental events 
and properties are somehow by their nature unsuited to causing 
anything.  It is rather that even if they are perfectly suited to causing 
                                                
26 Notice that these arguments only work if the event that caused my bodily movements can occur 
without it possessing any (intentional) mental property.  In other words, these considerations assume 
that intentional mental properties are not essential to the events that cause bodily movements. 
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things, there is nothing around for them to cause (Bennett 2003, 
471). 
 
The anomalousness and extrinsicness of the mental looks to undermine the very 
possibility of mental causation.  On the contrary, what Bennett claims is that we 
can assume mental phenomena to be, by their very nature, fully capable of causing 
things; the possibility of mental causation is not what is at issue.  Instead, the 
exclusion problem forces one to make sense of how mental phenomena actually 
cause things if the physical is “sufficient” and accomplishes all of the causing that 
needs to be done.  
Section 1.5.1: The Principle of Completeness 
 The idea of the physical doing all of the causal work brings to mind a world 
in which, were we capable, tracing the entire causal history of a physical 
phenomena would never require us to go beyond the realm of physical phenomena.  
If a physical phenomenon has a causal history at all, it has a complete physical 
causal history (Menzies 2003, 197).  According to David Papineau, this idea of the 
physical world as being causally complete is “purely a doctrine about the structure 
of the physical world.  It says that if you start with some physical effect, then you 
will never have to leave the realm of the physical to find a fully sufficient cause for 
that effect” (Papineau 2001, 3).  Following Kim (2005), the idea of the causal 
completeness of the physical world can be codified in the following principle: 
(Completeness) For every physical phenomenon p that has a 
sufficient cause occurring at t, some physical phenomenon p* is 
causally sufficient for p at t. 
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This formulation presupposes that the physical world is deterministic and some 
may take this to be problematic.  However, this is of little consequence, since if 
indeterminism is true, Completeness may be reformulated as follows: for every 
physical phenomenon p that has its probability distribution fixed at t, some physical 
phenomenon p* fixes this probability distribution at t.  Since it is not obvious that 
anything concerning mental causation hangs on the truth of determinism or 
indeterminism, I shall work only with the deterministic formulation.  Before 
moving on it would be good to spend a little time getting clear on the assumption of 
Completeness. 
First, Completeness should be distinguished from the stronger assumption 
that the physical world is causally closed: 
(Closure) Any phenomena causally sufficient for some physical 
phenomena is itself a physical phenomena. 
 
Notice how Papineau informally characterizes the completeness assumption by 
saying that you never have to leave the physical realm to find a fully sufficient 
cause.  Closure, on the other hand, states that you simply cannot leave the physical 
realm to find a fully sufficient cause.  It follows from Closure, but not 
Completeness, that physical effects do not have sufficient nonphysical causes. 
In addition, it was causal completeness, not causal closure, that initially 
generated worries about the mental being causally excluded.  Norman Malcolm 
introduces the problem, 
Given the antecedent neurological states of his bodily system 
together with the general laws correlating those states with the 
contractions of muscles and movements of limbs, he would have 
40  
moved as he did regardless of his desire or intention.  If every 
movement of his was completely accounted for by his antecedent 
neurophysiological states (his “programming”), then it was not true 
that those movements occurred because he wanted or intended to get 
his hat (original emphasis) (Malcolm 1968, 53). 
 
Suppose we were capable of tracing the complete causal history of some bodily 
movement.  The suggestion is that what we would find is a causal chain of 
neurophysiological states leading up to the bodily movements in question.  
Malcolm’s worry is that if these physical states of the body and brain provide a 
complete causal history of our bodily movements, then every bodily movement will 
have a sufficient neurophysiological cause; the presence of mental states would not 
have made any difference to the occurrence of these bodily movements.  The 
problem is not that neurophysiological states are the only states that can be causally 
sufficient for bodily movements.  Rather, it is that the causal work the mental is 
assumed to do vis-à-vis bodily movements is already done by these physical states.  
The problem, at least as Malcolm saw it, is that our neurophysiology provides a 
causally complete account of our bodily movements, not that it provides a causally 
closed account of such movements.27 
 What I have claimed differentiates Completeness from Closure is that the 
latter, but not the former, rules out physical effects from having nonphysical causes.  
Giving this claim substance requires that we face the terminological issue of 
                                                
27 What I am calling a causally complete account of our bodily movements Malcolm refers to as 
“mechanism”.  He says, “The version of mechanism I wish to study assumes a neurophysiological 
theory which is adequate to explain and predict all movements of human bodies except those caused 
by outside forces” (Malcolm 1968, 45).  Claiming that a theory is adequate to explain and predict 
some phenomena is consistent with it not being the only theory adequate to explain and predict 
some phenomena (see (Kim 1989) for issues concerning multiple explanations).  The problem 
begins with the completeness of neurophysiology, not with its closure.       
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specifying what is meant by ‘physical’.  This is a controversial matter and I 
presently have nothing new to add to this debate.  I do think it is useful for our 
present purposes, however, to follow Papineau (2001) in stipulating that ‘physical’ 
means non-mental.  His justification for this usage is that this sense of the term fits 
nicely with the line of reasoning that has come to be called the “causal argument 
for physicalism”: for every physical phenomena p that has a sufficient cause 
occurring at t, some physical phenomena p* is causally sufficient for p at t; all 
mental phenomena have physical effects; the physical effects of mental phenomena 
are not overdetermined; therefore, mental phenomena must be identical with 
physical phenomena.  Various kinds of causal arguments have been advanced in 
support of the identity of mental and physical phenomena and these arguments are 
both philosophically interesting and controversial.  If ‘physical’ meaning non-
mental allows these arguments to remain interesting and controversial, this is prima 
facie reason to continue with such a usage of the term.   
Adopting this usage allows ‘physical’ to be construed broadly enough to 
include many of the common and everyday phenomena we intuitively take to be 
physical (e.g., tables, chairs, cars, pool sticks, pool balls, bodily movements, etc.) 
and, furthermore, it allows us to include all of the phenomena cited in or subsumed 
by the lower-level sciences to count as physical (e.g., neurophysiological, 
biological, chemical, and microphysical phenomena).  What it does rule out are the 
intentional (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, etc.) and phenomenal 
phenomena (e.g., pains, sensations, feelings, etc.) cited in our psychological (both 
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folk and scientific) explanations of purposeful behavior.  This is surely a virtue 
since no intuitive categorization of these phenomena would include them as 
physical.   
Additionally, multiple realizability and modal arguments have made it 
almost philosophical orthodoxy to reject the view that mental phenomena are 
neurophysiological phenomena.  The philosophical response has been to claim that 
though distinct from such physical phenomena the mental is still realized in the 
physical.  The prevalence of such phrases in discussions about the mind suggests a 
conception of the physical that includes the brain and all of its neurophysiological 
properties as physical phenomena.  Capturing both our intuitive and philosophical 
categorizations in this way is more prima facie reason to adopt the sense of 
‘physical’ as non-mental. 
Therefore, for the remainder of the present essay, I shall adopt the sense of 
‘physical’ as non-mental, counting both macroscopic and microscopic phenomena 
alike as physical.  The principle of Completeness, then, takes on the following 
interpretation: for every non-mental phenomenon y that has a sufficient cause 
occurring at t, some non-mental phenomenon x is causally sufficient for y at t.  A 
consequence of adopting this interpretation is that Completeness holds in both the 
micro-world of chemical, atomic, and quantum phenomena and in the macro-world 
of car accidents, tornadoes, and cab hailings (contra Baker (1993) and Sturgeon 
(1998)).  In addition, the commitment of the nonreductive physicalist to Global 
Supervenience should be understood in a way continuous with this interpretation of 
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Completeness: the non-mental way our world is metaphysically necessitates the 
mental way it is.  If God were to fix the non-mental (i.e., non-intentional and non-
phenomenal) way our world is, no more work would need to be done in order for 
him to fix the mental way our world is.   
Let it be noted, however, that typically in the context of discussing mental 
causation the completeness of the physical world is given a weaker interpretation 
(Menzies 2003, 197).  We are asked to trace the causal history of not just any 
phenomena, but, specifically, bodily movements.  Furthermore, the idea is that in 
tracing the causal history of these phenomena we will find a chain of 
neurophysiological phenomena leading up to the bodily movements in question.  
Codified into a principle we can say that for every bodily movement b that has a 
sufficient cause occurring at t, some neurophysiological phenomenon n is causally 
sufficient for b at t.28  It seems to me that there is no need to insist on the causal 
completeness of the physical world as a whole to generate problems for mental 
causation.  Instead, all we need to insist on is what an optimistic neuroscientist 
would insist on, namely that neurophysiology can provide a complete causal 
history of all the intentional movements of our bodies.  For the most part, this 
weaker interpretation of Completeness will be the assumption at issue.     
Section 1.5.2: The Principle of Exclusion 
                                                
28 The bodily movements I am concerned with are endogenously produced bodily movements.  If 
Jones lifts my arm, then my body has moved.  But this kind of bodily movement is not considered to 
be the effect of either the mental ways I am nor the neurophysiological ways I am (unless of course I 
told Jones to raise my arm). 
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If physical phenomena like bodily movements have sufficient causes at all, 
then Completeness entails that they have sufficient physical causes.  On rather 
ordinary empirical assumptions (and along the lines of the weaker interpretation 
typically given to Completeness in the context of discussing mental causation), the 
sorts of physical phenomena that cause bodily movements are neurophysiological.  
It follows that neurophysiological phenomena do all of the causal work there is to 
do vis-à-vis bodily movements.  The result is that there looks to be no causal work 
left for mental phenomena to do vis-à-vis these movements.  As Malcolm worried: 
wouldn’t my body move just as it actually does regardless of my actual mental 
condition?  A simple solution to this problem is to accept the view that mental 
phenomena just are neurophysiological phenomena.  This mental-
neurophysiological identity promises to completely bypass any worries about 
causal exclusion for  
On the identity view, there is here one cause ... not two.  As for 
explanation, at least in the objective sense, there is one explanation 
here, and not two.  The two explanations differ only in the linguistic 
apparatus used in referring to, or picking out, the conditions and 
events that do the explaining … they both point to one objective 
causal connection, and are grounded in this single causal fact (Kim 
1989, 87).   
 
This is the point at which the exclusion problem becomes most troublesome for the 
nonreductionist, since on their view mental phenomena are modally distinct from 
neurophysiological phenomena.29  Of course, the reductionist is not completely out 
                                                
29  Identifying mental phenomena with physical phenomena does not, without some further 
assumptions, avoid the exclusion problem.  For, if mental phenomena turn out to be non-
neurophysiological physical phenomena they still stand to be causally excluded by 
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of the water either, since multiple realizability and modal arguments are strong 
reasons in favor of the modal distinctness of the mental and the neurophysiological.  
Either one embraces Nonreductionism and faces the bugbear of exclusion or one 
endorses some type of reductionism putting oneself in the tough dialectical position 
of having to deny the multiple realizability of the mental and rejecting the modal 
arguments for distinctness.  Whatever route one finds most reason to take, the 
philosophical work is not insignificant. 
Upon closer inspection, however, Nonreductionism and Completeness are 
not enough to generate the exclusion problem all by themselves.  Completeness 
tells us that whatever causal work there needs to be done vis-à-vis bodily 
movements is done by the neurophysiological, and Nonreductionism assures us that 
none of that work is work done by the mental.  But this is consistent with the 
mental’s causal work being redundant or superfluous.  In other words, if we are 
willing to countenance multiple sufficient causes of bodily movements, mental 
phenomena may still be causally relevant despite the complete account of these 
movements being given by the neurophysiological.  Perhaps, this line of thought 
goes, my mental condition does not matter to the movement of my body, since it 
would have moved either way.  But this is consistent with my mental condition 
being something extra, a gratuitous cause of my bodily movements but a cause 
nonetheless.   
                                                                                                                                   
neurophysiological phenomena.  The problem is not that the mental isn’t physical but that the 
mental isn’t neural.   
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However, the following consideration is highly plausible: unless these 
bodily movements are genuine cases of overdetermination then the 
neurophysiological simply excludes the mental from causing them.  Kim (2005) 
takes considerations like this to involve the application of an exclusion principle: 
“No single phenomenon can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at any 
given time – unless it is a genuine case of causal overdetermination” (Kim 2005, 
42).  There are a variety of ways to articulate the principle appealed to here, but for 
present purposes I will follow Kim (2005) in his general formulation: 
(ExclusionGEN) Necessarily, if some phenomenon x is causally 
sufficient for an effect y, then unless y is overdetermined no 
phenomenon x* distinct from and existing simultaneously with x is 
such that it is causally sufficient for y. 
 
A few clarifications are in order. 
 First, besides its initial plausibility one might wonder if there are any other 
reasons to accept ExclusionGEN.  Menzies (2003) interprets Kim as giving the 
following argument in its favor.  According to Kim, the supervenience relation 
between the mental and the neurophysiological is best explained by taking mental 
properties to be higher-order functional properties realized by lower-order 
neurophysiological properties. 30   For some object to possess a higher-order 
                                                
30 One might construe Menzies as interpreting Kim as holding M-N Local Supervenience.  If so 
then it should be noted that this is a rather strong form of supervenience and its denial is consistent 
with Global Supervenience.  On the other hand, perhaps Menzies is interpreting Kim only as 
holding a supervenience thesis that is restricted to a set of worlds less inclusive than the set of 
metaphysically possible worlds.  For instance, the quantifier expressed by ‘any’ in ‘any minimal 
neurophysiological duplicate of an actual individual is a psychological duplicate simpliciter of that 
actual individual’ ranges only over the nomologically possible individuals.  If so then it should be 
noted that this is a rather weak form of supervenience and its acceptance is consistent with the 
denial of Global Supervenience.  If this supervenience thesis is suppose to signal a commitment of 
the physicalist then it is either too strong or too weak.   
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property is for it to possess some lower-order property that satisfies a certain 
condition (Kim 1998, 19).  In the case of mental properties, they are higher-order 
properties because for an object to possess them requires that it possess some 
lower-order property that has a certain kind of causal profile.  According to this 
characterization, mental property M is the property of having some property P that 
typically has such and such causes and such and such effects. 31   Whatever 
properties typically have these causes and effects are said to be realizers of the 
higher-order mental property.   
Furthermore, Kim thinks that the following principle is highly plausible for 
higher-order functional properties and their realizers: 
(Inheritance) If a higher-order property P1 is realized by a lower-
order property P2, then the causal powers of P1 are identical with the 
causal powers of P2 (or at least a subset of them). 
 
A consequence of Inheritance is that the causal powers of a higher-order mental 
property are the same as the causal powers of the property that realizes it.32  If we 
suppose that the mental property M is causally sufficient for some bodily 
movement B, then the manifestation of the power to bring about B is the 
manifestation of a power the lower-order property P also possesses.  There is, then, 
only really one manifestation of a causal power and so only one causal connection 
                                                
31 I think the way to understand a property as having a causal profile is in terms of what causal 
generalizations or type-causal claims are true of that property rather than which token-causal claims 
are true of that property.  So saying that the mental property pain typically causes wincing is to say 
that the type-causal claim that pain tends to cause wincing is true.  And this type-causal claim could 
be true in a world even if no instance of pain ever causes anyone to wince. 
32 Inheritance is ambiguous: are the causal powers of the higher-order property qualitatively 
identical with those of the lower-order realizer or are they numerically identical?  I find it natural to 
read it as claiming the powers are numerically identical and this is how I interpret Menzies as 
reading Kim.   
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to B.  Therefore, at least as it pertains to mental properties and their lower-order 
neurophysiological realizers, there will only ever be a single instance of causation 
that connects them to effects such as bodily movements.  This looks awfully close 
to maintaining that the mental/neurophysiological causal situation is one in which 
ExclusionGEN is true, namely that the presence of one sufficient cause, and so one 
causal connection to bodily movements, excludes the presence of others assuming 
that there is no overdetermination.   
Second, many think that, in order to prevent it from being obviously false, 
ExclusionGEN pertains only to phenomenon which exist at the same time.  Yablo 
(1992b) provides us with some reason for including it: 
Though there may be irreflexive relations R whose relata do contend 
for causal influence as the principle says, for many Rs this 
competition arises only sometimes, and for others it never arises.  
Ironically, R = causation is a case in point.  Let x be causally 
sufficient for y.  Then taken at its word, the exclusion principle 
predicts that y owes nothing to the causal intermediaries by which x 
brings y about.  When R is causation’s converse, the predication is 
different but still absurd: events causally antecedent to x can claim 
no role in y’s production (Yablo 1992b, 272). 
 
Lacking this rider, ExclusionGEN would rule out both causes further back in the 
causal chain from x and causes intermediate between x and y as being causally 
sufficient for y.  No one thinks there is any problem with an effect having more 
than one sufficient cause.  Worries about exclusion and overdetermination arise 
when an effect has multiple sufficient causes existing at the same time.  Whether or 
not this rider is entirely necessary is not clear.33  However, not much harm is done 
                                                
33 See (Bennett 2003, 478-479). 
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in including it especially if it gets us to focus on the kinds of causal situations in 
which the purported causal competitors exist simultaneously.  This is standardly 
taken to be the case in the mental/neurophysiological causal situation, since the 
mental is supposed to be realized by the neurophysiological.  For the sake of 
brevity, I will not always be explicit in mentioning this rider, but it will be implicit 
unless noted otherwise. 
Third, the principle of ExclusionGEN invokes the notion of 
overdetermination.  Besides providing a major obstacle for most extant 
counterfactual theories of causation, there is no consensus as to what an adequate 
characterization of overdetermination looks like.  If we stick to characterizing it at 
an intuitive level, it looks to involve “two or more separate and independent causal 
chains intersecting at a common effect” (Kim 2005, 48).  A standard example may 
help to illustrate this point.34   
Assassin and Badgirl simultaneously poison Victim’s coffee with 
identical doses of a lethal poison.  Either dose by itself would have 
sufficed for Victim’s death.  Victim drinks the coffee and dies.  He 
would have survived if the coffee had not been poisoned.  
  
What looks to be true of these kinds of scenarios is that an effect is brought about 
by two causes35 where each was itself sufficient for the effect.  Whether this is all 
there is to overdetermination is not clear, but our intuitive characterization of it at 
the very least requires the presence of two or more sufficient causes.36 
                                                
34 See (Hitchcock 2007, 522 – 524). 
35 Lewis (1973, fn. 12) disagrees and claims that he has no firm intuitions about whether cases of 
overdetermination involve multiple causes.  I think that Lewis’s intuitions are simply mistaken on 
this point. 
36 See (Bennett 2003, 477). 
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Finally, the principle of ExclusionGEN invokes the notion of distinctness.  In 
Section 1.2, I discussed two ways in which phenomena can be distinct: weak and 
strong modal distinctness.  As long as there are multiple well-defined notions that 
can be expressed by the term ‘distinct’ then, just like Nonreductionism, the 
principle of ExclusionGEN is ambiguous.  If the principle of ExclusionGEN is to 
engage with Nonreductionism to generate the exclusion problem, both must employ 
the same notion of distinctness.  I elected to proceed by defining a notion of modal 
distinctness that both versions of nonreductive physicalism could accept and then I 
reformulated Nonreductionism in terms of this (see Section 1.3.1).  I elect to 
proceed in the same way with ExclusionGEN, reformulating it in terms of modal 
distinctness: 
(ExclusionGEN) Necessarily, if some phenomenon x is causally 
sufficient for an effect y, then unless y is overdetermined no 
phenomenon x* modally distinct from and existing simultaneously 
with x is such that it is causally sufficient for y. 
 
To repeat, saying that x* is modally distinct from x is saying that either (i) x fails to 
necessitate x*, (ii) x* fails to necessitate x, or (iii) neither x nor x* necessitates the 
other.  The idea behind ExclusionGEN, then, is that modal differences between 
phenomena will manifest in the realm of causation.  If these phenomena exist 
simultaneously, then either the phenomena overdetermine their purported effect or 
one causally excludes the other.  At least part of the curiosity of the exclusion 
problem is whether the modal differences between mental and neurophysiological 
phenomena manifest in either of these ways. 
Section 1.5.3: The Exclusion Dilemma 
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Now that some of the details of ExclusionGEN have been covered, we can 
apply it to common causal situations involving mental phenomena to generate the 
exclusion problem.  Completeness tells us that in tracing the causal history of our 
bodily movements we will find a chain of neurophysiological phenomena that serve 
as causally sufficient conditions of those movements.  Hence, every bodily 
movement has a sufficient neurophysiological cause.  ExclusionGEN says that any 
effect that has a sufficient cause has no other modally distinct sufficient causes 
unless it is overdetermined.  Let us formulate the relevant substitution instance of 
ExclusionGEN (which I will simply call ‘Exclusion’): 
(Exclusion) Necessarily, if some neurophysiological phenomenon n 
is causally sufficient for bodily movement b, then unless b is 
overdetermined no mental phenomenon m modally distinct from and 
existing simultaneously with n is such that it is causally sufficient 
for b. 
   
Assuming the truth of Exclusion and Completeness, the exclusion dilemma follows: 
no mental phenomenon m modally distinct from and existing simultaneously with n 
is such that it is causally sufficient for b unless b is overdetermined.  Are mental 
phenomena modally distinct from neurophysiological phenomena?  So long as one 
or the other version of Nonreductionism is true, the answer is ‘yes’.  The 
assumption of Nonreductionism says that mental phenomena are modally distinct 
(either weakly or strongly) from neurophysiological phenomena.  Therefore, in 
conjunction with the exclusion dilemma, it follows that m is not causally sufficient 
for b – it is causally excluded by n – or bodily movement b is overdetermined.  
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Either the neurophysiological excludes the mental from having bodily effects or 
mental causes are redundant, overdetermining causes. 
Prima facie, neither option is appealing.  Many find there to be something 
metaphysically absurd about the kind of systematic causal overdetermination that 
the second horn appears to force on us (Kim 1993c, 281).  Others merely maintain 
that “we ordinarily take [overdetermination] to be false, and it is not clear why we 
should change the belief” (Peacocke 1979, 143).  It is, as Stephen Schiffer has said, 
“hard to believe that God is such a bad engineer” (Schiffer 1987, 148).  On the 
other hand, if the mental is causally excluded by the neurophysiological, we are 
forced to the conclusion that the mental is entirely epiphenomenal with respect the 
movement of our bodies.  This conclusion requires a radical revision of what we 
commonly suppose is the case.  Some of the most central assumptions we make 
about ourselves – e.g., that we are morally responsible agents who at times exercise 
control over what do – are standardly understood to require mental causation.  
Furthermore, if we can extend the above argument to effects other than bodily 
movements, say to other mental phenomena, then the epiphenomenalist horn places 
in jeopardy not just agency, but perhaps our ability to reason and make inferences 
as well.  The exclusion problem is the dilemma of mental epiphenomenalism or 
causal overdetermination. 
The centrality of mental causation to the manifest image we have of 
ourselves is to my mind the primary reason to explore the exclusion problem.  
Perhaps another reason is that this problem does not rely upon assumptions about 
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how the mental is – e.g., that it is non-extended, anomalous, or highly extrinsic – 
but instead only on general principles about causation (ExclusionGEN), well-
grounded doctrines about the causal structure of the human organism 
(Completeness), and a philosophically respectable position about the relation 
between the mind and the brain (Nonreductionism).  The exclusion problem truly is, 
as Kim (2005) has said, a “world-knot”. 
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Chapter 2 
Resolutions of the Exclusion Problem  
There are a variety of ways to respond to the exclusion dilemma and in this 
chapter I will present some of them.  A few warnings are in order before doing so.  
First, the following is not intended to be exhaustive.  What I have included are 
those views well represented in the literature and those I find philosophically 
interesting and worthy of further development.  Second, the literature on the 
exclusion problem is enormous and a diverse range of solutions have been 
developed quite extensively.  I will not offer knock-down arguments to any of these 
strategies.  I cannot possibly give any of these views what they are rightfully due in 
the little space I have dedicated to them.  Instead, my brief discussion of them will 
hopefully make clear which strategies I will not be pursuing in the rest of this essay. 
To summarize: (a) I am a “strong” realist about intentional and phenomenal 
mental predicates; (b) I hold that mental and physical causation is a homogenous 
relation; (c) I maintain an amended version of Completeness, one which states that 
every bodily effect that has a cause has a neurophysiological cause; (d) I accept that 
mental and neurophysiological causes have the same bodily effects and that there is 
sufficient motivation to reject a token-identity theory (viz., mental events = 
neurophysiological events); and, finally, (e) I reject a type-identity theory (viz., 
mental properties = neurophysiological properties).  My overall philosophical 
perspective is the mainstream view of contemporary analytic philosophy, that of a 
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nonreductive physicalist, and my preferred solution to the exclusion problem will 
reflect this perspective within the confines of the theses (a) – (e). 
Section 2.1: Weak Realism 
John Heil (1999) has argued that most of the recent attempts at 
understanding multiple realizability leave us with an obscure ontological picture of 
the relation between higher- and lower-levels of reality.  Specifically, the 
functionalist inspired attempt to understand the relations that hold between levels of 
reality as realization engenders more problems than it solves.  There is no doubt 
that our descriptions of the world can be hierarchically ordered, but the mistake is 
in “reifying the hierarchy, imagining that it corresponds to ontological strata” (Heil 
1999, 204).  He characterizes the problem as having its source in the dogma that 
realism about a given set of predicates requires that those predicates to designate 
properties (Heil 1999, 199).37  Heil’s proposal is to reject this realist dogma and 
show that doing so has many welcome consequences.  One of the more significant 
consequences is that worries about causal exclusion are dissolved. 
 The view put forth by Heil is one in which, 
Many predicates apply to objects in virtue of properties possessed 
by those objects.  Of these predicates, some designate properties 
shared by objects to which they apply.  Others do not.  Realism 
about a given predicate, ‘φ’, requires only that ‘φ’ applies truly to 
objects in virtue of properties actually possessed by those objects.  
                                                
37 Heil (2003) identifies the problem more broadly as the tacit philosophical acceptance of the 
Picture Theory of Language.  This family of theories about the way in which representations, 
including linguistic representations, relate to the world they represent involves the commitment to 
the realist dogma mentioned above.  As far as I can tell, Heil offers no straightforward argument 
against this Picture Theory of Language and its corollaries concerning realism.  Instead, he offers an 
alternative theory (part of which involves what I’ve dubbed ‘weak realism’) and accepts it on the 
basis of its power to “resolve a wide range of problems in a natural way” (Heil 2003, 14).    
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Realism does not require that ‘φ’ designate a property shared by 
every object to which it truly applies.  If ‘φ’ does designate a 
property, then objects satisfying ‘φ’ must be identical (or exactly 
similar) in some respect, a respect in virtue of which ‘φ’ holds true 
of them.  The bulk of our predicates, however, are satisfied by 
ranges of similar, but not exactly similar properties (Heil 1999, 200 
– 201). 
 
If we concern ourselves specifically with the mental predicates employed in 
vernacular psychological discourse, Heil’s position is that mental predicates do not 
designate properties, but nevertheless apply truly to objects in virtue of the (non-
mental) properties actually possessed by those objects.  In fact, there are no mental 
properties at all.  Heil does not endorse eliminativism about the mental, since, 
unlike eliminativism, his view admits that mental predicates apply truly to objects.  
Nor is his view reductionist, since “reductionism requires that there be something 
to reduce” (Heil 1999, 201).  The view is a “weak realism” in which mental 
predicates do not designate mental properties but, all the same, apply truly to 
objects in virtue of properties those objects actually possess.        
 The resolution of the exclusion problem is anticlimactic.  If there are no 
mental properties at all, it is not possible for those properties to be causally 
excluded by neurophysiological properties.  As it turns out, our worries about 
epiphenomenalism and the causal irrelevance of mental properties are perverse.  He 
says, “Your belief, desire, and intention could be epiphenomenal, however, only if 
they existed a part from your neurophysiological condition” (Heil 2003, 45) and 
since no mental properties exist at all, a fortiori, they do not exist a part from your 
neurophysiological condition.  Additionally, neither is it possible for mental 
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properties to be causally redundant and overdetermine their effects, since there are 
no such properties.  One might suppose that Heil’s view commits him to the 
troubling claim that it is false that your mental condition causes you to do anything.  
His response to this is interesting, 
On this occasion, it is true in virtue of your being in 
[neurophysiological] state P1 that you have these beliefs and desires, 
and it is true, by virtue of your being in [neurophysiological state] P2, 
that you have this intention.  It is true, as well, that your belief and 
desire caused you to form the intention, true in virtue of P1’s causing 
P2 (Heil 2003, 45).38 
 
Even if there are no mental properties designated by the predicates of vernacular 
psychology, claims concerning mental causation are not systematically false.  
Instead, their truth is grounded in “causal occurrences involving the truth-makers 
for [mental] predicates” (Heil 2003, 46). 
 I find Heil’s weak realism persuasive especially when applied to certain 
kinds of predicates (e.g., moral and ethical ones).  Furthermore, it seems difficult to 
accept his weak realism with respect to one area of discourse, but reject it with 
respect to another.  What reason is there for thinking that, e.g., mental predicates 
designate properties, but moral and ethical predicates do not?  Regardless of these 
issues, I think weak realism about the mental and, in particular, about mental 
causation is a position of last resort.  Much of the motivation for accepting weak 
realism about the predicates of vernacular psychology is that multiple realizability 
                                                
38 This sounds similar to Kim’s (1984) proposal of supervenient causation, however, there are 
important differences.  Both Kim and Heil would agree that lower-level facts about physical 
causation are the truth-makers of claims of mental causation.  Where they disagree is that Kim 
thinks these facts about physical causation make higher-level mental properties causally relevant or 
efficacious properties while Heil denies that there are any such higher-level mental properties at all. 
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and the level conception of reality has engendered more problems than it is worth.  
It would be reasonable to suppose that one of these problems is the exclusion 
dilemma.  My suggestion, then, is to understand the present project as an attempt to 
gain a dialectical advantage against Heil’s weak realism.  I want to show that 
whatever other problems multiple realizability and the level conception of reality 
engender, it does not pose an irresolvable exclusion dilemma.  Hence, for the 
remainder of this essay, I’ll assume a strong realism about mental predicates and 
consider talk of mental causation as picking out a causal relation involving 
nonreducible mental phenomena.   
Section 2.2: The Homogeneity Assumption 
To the best of my knowledge, Tim Crane (1995) was the first to make 
explicit the Homogeneity Assumption and describes it as such, “The labels ‘mental’ 
and ‘physical’ as applied to causation are really transferred epithets – what is 
mental and physical are the relata of causation, not the causation itself” (Crane 
1995, 219).  Hence, one way of avoiding both horns of the exclusion dilemma is to 
deny that mental and physical causation are homogeneous relations.  Although 
Crane (1995) does not appear to endorse this solution himself, he does say that it is 
one of the more common responses to the exclusion problem (Crane 1995, 232).39  
More specifically, the idea here is that worries about overdetermination are 
misplaced if mental causes do not bring about their effects in the same way that 
                                                
39 Crane classifies both Dretske (1988) and Yablo (1992b) as denying the Homogeneity Assumption.  
I classify both of these authors differently.  Dretske’s distinction between triggering and structuring 
causes entails that mental and neurophysiological phenomena do not have the same effect and it is 
this which seems to do most of the work.  See Section 2.4.  I interpret Yablo, on the other hand, as 
rejecting a suitably amended version of Completeness.  See Section 3.2. 
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physical causes do.  Suppose that mental causes are only supervenient causes of 
their effects along the lines of Kim (1984): mental property M superveniently 
causes effect e just in case M supervenes on property P and P causes effect e.40  
Alternatively, suppose that mental causes merely program for the occurrence of 
their effects, as Frank Jackson and Phillip Pettit (1990) argue all special science 
properties do.  According to this strategy, mental properties are causally relevant 
properties, not by being causally efficacious themselves, but instead by “ensuring 
that there would be some property there to exercise the efficacy required” (Jackson 
and Pettit 1990, 114).   
Both Kim (1984) and Jackson’s and Pettit’s (1990) strategy of rejecting the 
Homogeneity Assumption begin by claiming that physical properties are causally 
relevant for their effects by entering into a non-derivative causal relation.41  Kim 
says physical properties are causes of their effects, while Jackson and Pettit talk 
about physical properties being efficacious.  This non-derivative causal relation is 
not the same type of relation that mental properties enter into with respect to those 
effects.  This is why concerns about overdetermination are simply misplaced.  
Instead, each defines an alternative notion of relevance in which the non-derivative 
causal relation enters explicitly.  In the end, the mental possesses only a derivative 
                                                
40 Kim defines supervenient causation as follows: x superveniently causes y just in case x 
supervenes on x*, y supervenes on y*, and x* causes y* (where the supervenience in question is 
strong supervenience).  What I have suggested above is not quite this but something very similar.  If 
we used Kim’s notion of supervenient causation then mental and physical causes would not have the 
same effect.  Avoiding the exclusion problem in this way has more to do with denying that mental 
and physical causes have the same effect then it does with denying that mental and physical 
causation are homogeneous.    
41 Non-derivative is not intended to mean unanalyzable or primitive. 
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kind of causal relevance – a kind of relevance it has in virtue of supervening on or 
programing for the physical.  Even though mental properties enter into a derivative 
causal relation with their effects, this should not condemn explanations citing 
mental causes as defective or incomplete.  As Jackson and Pettit emphasize, these 
kinds of explanations may still provide information, which explanations citing the 
non-derivative physical causes do not (Jackson and Pettit 1990, 116). 
 One might complain that although the mental looks to be explanatorily on a 
par with the physical, metaphysically something has been lost.  Admitting that 
mental causes do not cause in the same way that physical causes do looks to be 
nothing better than a thinly veiled form of epiphenomenalism (Kim 1998, 74).  This 
appears to be Kim’s primary motivation for abandoning his account of supervenient 
causation.  Worries like this might be deflected if we employ a less crude 
conception of causation.42  I shall be the first to admit, however, that I do work with 
a “crude” conception of causation in which mental and physical causation are 
homogeneous relations.  I do not have any knockdown arguments against this 
strategy, but, again, I consider it a position of last resort.  Maybe after all is said 
and done saving mental causation requires jettisoning our “crude” and 
homogeneous notion of causation and accepting that it just isn’t the same as 
physical causation.  But I think sense can be made of non-derivative mental 
causation and so I shall take the homogeneity assumption to be true.  My disclaimer, 
                                                
42 See (Crane 1995, 234) and (Hall 2004a, 2004b). 
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then, is that the project of the present essay is to vindicate non-derivative mental 
causation.  
Section 2.3: Rejecting Completeness 
 What makes the exclusion problem different from the other problems of 
mental causation is that its source does not lie with the nature of the mental itself.  
We can assume that mental phenomena are causal in exactly the same way as 
physical phenomena.  Instead, it is a feature of the physical world – its causal 
completeness – that threatens mental causation.  Therefore, one straightforward 
resolution of the exclusion problem is to cut it off at its very source by rejecting 
Completeness. 
 Lynne Rudder Baker (1993) pursues a resolution of the exclusion problem 
along these lines, although it is important to note that her discussion focuses on 
what she calls “closure”.  Baker’s thesis of “closure” states, “for every event that 
has a physical property … there are sufficient physical conditions for its occurrence 
and for its having all of its physical properties” (Baker 1993, 78-9).  This is very 
similar to the principle I have called Completeness.  However, the major 
dissimilarity is that Baker understands “closure” to be true only if ‘physical’ is 
understood as micro-physical, since “a system is causally closed if and only if the 
elements of the system interact causally only with other elements of the system” 
and this only holds for the micro-physical (Baker 1993, 79).  However, her 
objections to “closure” do not require one to understand ‘physical’ as ‘micro-
physical’.  I believe one could broaden the conception of physical to include macro-
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properties of objects and still run Baker’s objection.  This is what I elect to do in 
this section.  So even though Baker does not concern herself with Completeness, I 
will formulate her objections using it.    
Baker’s (1993) argument is that principles like Completeness are part of a 
metaphysical worldview that “interferes” with “a range of explanations that have 
been found worthy of acceptance” (Baker 1993, 92).  Furthermore, Completeness 
plays a role in generating problems for macro-causation generally.  The exclusion 
problem would be just one of a variety of ways in which our allegiance to 
Completeness “subvert[s] our ordinary causal notions … constitutive of law, 
morality, and everyday life, but also [makes a mockery] of the causal claims and 
explanations in the special sciences” (Baker 1993, 90).  Baker’s suggestion is that 
these consequences are sufficient to motivate a rejection of Completeness.   
But the exclusion problem is not just a consequence of Completeness.  By 
itself Completeness neither says nor entails that physical phenomena cannot have 
non-physical causes.43  Why reject Completeness and not some other part of the 
metaphysical worldview that generates the problem (say, Nonreductionism)?  
Baker admits that the problem is really brought about by the conjunction of strong 
supervenience and Completeness (Baker 1993, 91).  But even this cannot be the 
whole truth, since Completeness and any single supervenience thesis (whether it be 
strong or global) is consistent with physical effects having non-physical causes (i.e., 
one could endorse overdetermination).  There must be some special reason to 
                                                
43 This is true even if Completeness is read as Baker prefers in which every microphysical effect 
that has a sufficient cause at t has a sufficient microphysical cause at t. 
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isolate Completeness as the main culprit of the metaphysical worldview that 
generates the exclusion problem.  She says, “The trouble caused by the conjunction 
of [strong supervenience] and [Completeness] can be avoided by rejecting 
[Completeness] and rethinking the notion of causation” (Baker 1993, 91).  The 
problem, as Baker analyzes it, is that Completeness presupposes an erroneous view 
of causation.44 
The erroneous view of causation is one “founded on the idea that causation 
is an ‘objective relation’ between events”.  According to Baker, an objective causal 
relation is one the instantiation of which entails nothing about the existence or non-
existence of intentional mental states unless intentional mental states serve as the 
relata of the relation (Baker 1993, 91).  She finds this conception of causation 
erroneous because it fails to count as legitimate many connections we intuitively 
take to be causal (Baker 1993, 92).  She claims that, for instance, Smith’s failing 
French intuitively is among the causes of his ineligibility to play NCAA Division I 
basketball even though these events “could not occur if there were no intentional 
psychological states” (Baker 1993, 92).   
The replacement she suggests for this objective conception of causation is 
one in which we “begin with the explanations that earn their keep, rather than with 
the metaphysics” (Baker 1993, 93).  The result is a revised concept of causation 
                                                
44 Baker’s general strategy for avoiding the exclusion problem is similar to Loewer (2007) who 
rejects principles like Exclusion for presupposing an erroneous view of causation.  Besides the 
principle they reject, their positions differ in that Baker finds fault with the objective conception of 
causation supposedly presupposed by Completeness while Loewer finds fault with the productive 
conception of causation supposedly presupposed by Exclusion.  Both of these authors think the 
problem of mental causation is a problem because our conception of causation is confused. 
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that becomes primarily an explanatory concept.  Armed with this new concept, we 
can see that the exclusion problem is dissolved, 
We begin with the question: Does what we think ever affect what 
we do? ... With the reversal of priority of cause and explanation … 
the original question has an easy answer.  For example, when Jill 
returns to the bookstore to retrieve her keys, what she thinks is that 
she left her keys on the counter and she wants them back.  What she 
thinks affects what she does in virtue of the following explanatory 
fact: if she hadn’t thought that she had left her keys, then, other 
things being equal, she wouldn’t have returned to the bookstore; and 
given that she did think she had left her keys, then, other things 
being equal, her returning was inevitable (Baker 1993, 93). 
 
Baker’s overall proposal is that the problems that arise from endorsing a particular 
metaphysical worldview are sufficient to motivate a rejection of that worldview.  
Her diagnosis is that the real problem lies in our acceptance of principles like 
Completeness that presuppose an objective conception of causation.  This objective 
conception is mistaken, since it jeopardizes many connections we intuitively take to 
be causal.  By rejecting Completeness the exclusion problem is dissolved and there 
is no difficulty in making sense of how what we think affects what we do – these 
causal facts are grounded in the facts about a whole range of successful 
commonsense and scientific explanations.   
 Baker’s position is radically revisionary in that causation turns into a 
fundamentally explanatory and hence epistemic concept rather than a metaphysical 
one.  It is not difficult to see that such a revision of our concept of causation would, 
in some fashion, vindicate mental causation.  I do not think, however, that Baker 
motivates this approach to the exclusion problem well enough.  The crux of her 
proposal is that the “objective” concept of causation is flawed independently of its 
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role in generating the exclusion problem, since it fails to accommodate many 
relations we intuitively take to be causal.  In what follows, I suggest that an 
“objective” concept of causation is not flawed in the way Baker argues, although I 
readily admit more needs to be said about her overall proposal.   
I do not think the example she works with is a causal relation at all because 
Smith’s failing of French is not a distinct event from his ineligibility to play NCAA 
basketball.  This relation is more like the relation between Socrates’s death and 
Xanthippe becoming a widow.  According to Kim (1993), Socrates’s death 
constitutively brings about Xanthippe becoming a widow where constitutively 
bringing about some event involves inter alia bringing it about with absolute 
simultaneity.  Furthermore, the relation here is more intimate than causation, since 
Socrates’s death is logically sufficient for Xanthippe becoming a widow (Kim 
1993c, 23-4).  Similarly, in the above situation, Smith’s failing of French causes his 
ineligibility to play basketball with absolute simultaneity and the former event 
logically sufficed for the latter event.  It is of course true that had Smith not failed 
French, he would have been eligible to play NCAA basketball, but the truth of this 
counterfactual does not indicate the presence of causation.  The alleged cause event 
is not distinct in the right way from its purported effect. 
 Perhaps the example is not the best.  Luckily, Baker offers another for our 
consideration: taking a deduction for the office in your home is among the causes 
of you being audited by the IRS (Baker 1993, 92).  This example does not have the 
same problems as the previous one.  Her issue seems to be with the idea that 
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causation is an “objective” relation that “exists out there”, independent from us.  In 
other words, that causation is a “mind-independent” relation.  She cashes the idea 
of being mind-independent out by saying that, unless the relation holds between 
mental states, instances of it entail nothing about the existence or non-existence of 
mental states.  The deduction-audit relation, then, is not counted as causal, since 
there could not be deductions and IRS audits without the existence of some mental 
states.   
It is right to say that the relata here do entail the existence of some mental 
states.  But the fact that the relation entails the existence of mental states does little 
to suggest that it is not “mind-independent”.  Even though the deduction-audit 
relation entails the existence of mental states, we still consider it to “exist out there”, 
independent from us.  The reason is because Baker’s idea of what “objective” 
amounts to is far too narrow.  The notion of “mind-independence” we should work 
with is one in which the relation holds independent of the way anyone theorizes 
about it.  That is, a relation R is “objective”, “exists out there”, and is “mind-
independent” just in case it holds regardless of us representing it as holding or the 
way we represent it as holding.  With this broader notion, we can see that the 
deduction-audit relation does not fail to get counted as “objective” and so still 
qualifies as causal.  No one need represent this relation between the deduction and 
the audit by the IRS as holding in order for it to hold. 
 Perhaps an “objective” concept of causation is flawed in some other way 
and we can avoid the exclusion problem by recognizing this flaw.  What has been 
67  
suggested above is that Baker’s specific attempt at revealing this flaw and thus 
avoiding exclusion worries is not successful.  So, for the remainder of this essay, I 
will presume that we can make good sense of causation as being “objective” and 
“mind-independent” (i.e., causal relations hold independent of anyone representing 
them as holding) and, furthermore, that its being so does not present us with an 
indefensible principle of Completeness.  However, later in this essay, I consider a 
similar though different line of reasoning that attempts to avoid the exclusion 
dilemma by rejecting an appropriately amended version of Completeness.  
According to this solution, a proper analysis of causation in terms of 
proportionality grounds the rejection of the idea that every bodily effect has a 
difference-making neurophysiological cause.  The details of this solution are 
discussed at length in Chapter 3. 
Section 2.4: The Dual Explanandum Strategy 
 The very idea that the neurophysiological threatens to causally exclude the 
mental presupposes a certain structure of the causal scenario, namely one in which 
mental and neurophysiological causes are competing to bring about one and the 
same effect.  If mental causes do not have the same effects as neurophysiological 
causes, neither is it possible for the mental to be excluded by the 
neurophysiological nor is it possible for the mental to be relegated to a mere 
overdetermining cause by the neurophysiological.  The possibility of exclusion and 
overdetermination are worrisome only if mental and neurophysiological causes are 
in competition for the same effect.  Malcolm’s early discussion of the exclusion 
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problem is sensitive to this, “There would be a collision between the two accounts 
[the mental and the neurophysiological] if they were offered as explanations of one 
and the same occurrence of a man’s climbing a ladder” (my emphasis) (Malcolm 
1968, 52).  Therefore, one solution to the exclusion problem is to simply deny the 
structure of the causal scenario in which mental phenomena have the same effects 
as neurophysiological phenomena. 
 A well-known advocate of this dual explanandum strategy is Fred Dretske 
(1988), who argues that mental events are causes of behavior.  However, behavior 
is not mere bodily movement, but instead a process consisting in 
neurophysiological events standing in causal relations to one another which results 
in bodily movement.  On this view, neurophysiological events are causally 
sufficient for bodily movements – the end products of behaviors – while intentional 
mental events are causally sufficient for the behaviors themselves.  Dretske is clear 
that it is a mistake to conflate the process with the end product, so 
neurophysiological events do not have the same effects as intentional mental events.  
Although Dretske’s distinction between behavior and bodily movement would 
seem to dissolve worries about exclusion or overdetermination, Marras (1998) has 
pointed out that Dretske faces a similar exclusion problem for behaviors.  The 
crucial feature is that behaviors and bodily movements are not just type-distinct, 
but token-distinct as well.  Specifically, some token bodily movement is a 
component of some endogenously initiated process that Dretske identifies with 
behaviors.  So if we consider some token behavior, “the question arises whether 
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that structured event (or process) is physical or nonphysical.  If it is physical, then it 
ought to admit of a physical (biological) explanation even if it admits of an 
intentional one, and the exclusion problem arises all over again” (Marras 1998, 
450).  
 Marras pursues an approach similar to Dretske’s, but the crucial difference 
is that the effects of mental causes are type-, but not token-distinct from the effects 
of neurophysiological causes.45  According to Marras, on a Davidsonian conception 
of actions and events, we should view a single token event as falling under both an 
action type and a movement type.  Additionally, the cause of this event should be 
understood itself as falling under both an intentional type and a neurophysiological 
type.  From this picture Marras concludes that “a single event can have both a 
physical/biological explanation and an intentional explanation: the former 
explanation explains why a certain type of movement occurred on a certain 
occasion, the latter explains why a certain type of action occurred on that occasion” 
(Marras 1998, 450).  The idea here is that a cause c qua intentional type M explains 
an effect e qua action type A, but that same cause qua neurophysiological type N 
explains only e qua movement type M.  The exclusion problem for mental and 
neurophysiological events is avoided, since alleged competing causes end up being 
the very same event.  In other words, mental and neurophysiological causes are 
                                                
45 Thomasson (1998) considers an approach very similar to this when she claims that causation 
occurs “only within a level” such that “there is no upward or downward causation” (Thomasson 
1998, 187).  The idea here is that mental properties are higher-level properties determined and/or 
constituted by lower-level neurophysiological properties and, importantly, the effects of higher-level 
mental properties are only ever other higher-level properties.  The mental can be causally relevant in 
the physical world without fear of being excluded by the physical or fear of overdetermining its 
effects, since “there is no cross-level causation” (Thomasson 1998, 188) and hence no competition 
for the same effect.     
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token-identical.  Any remaining issue concerning the causal relevance of mental 
properties is avoided because mental and neurophysiological properties are 
causally relevant to different effects.  Mental properties are relevant to events qua 
action types, while neurophysiological properties are relevant to events qua 
movement types.     
 One might wonder whether neurophysiological properties are relevant to 
events qua action types, but Marras argues that this is not so.  He proposes the 
following necessary condition for causal relevance 
(Relevance) Where c causes e, where c is F and e is G, c’s being F is 
causally relevant to e’s being G only if ‘~Fc □→ ~Ge’ holds 
 
and goes on to claim that the relevant counterfactuals are false (Marras 1998, 448).  
In other words, for some neurophysiological property N and action type A, it is 
false that if c were not-N then e would be not-A.  He remarks, 
It is false to say … that George would not have intentionally risen 
from the couch, on that occasion, if the neural event in his brain 
(which on that occasion was an intention of type M), had not been a 
neural event of type N: for George’s intention might have been 
physically realized by a neural event of type N* (causing him, 
perhaps, to get up from the couch in a slightly different way) 
(Marras 1998, 448 – 449). 
 
According to Marras, the worlds relevant to evaluating the counterfactual ‘~Nc □→ 
~Ae’ are ~Nc-worlds where N is replaced by N*, which also realizes the 
intentional type M.  If Marras intends to be working with the standard Lewis-
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Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals, then I think there is little reason to accept 
his claim that the counterfactual ‘~Nc □→ ~Ae’ is false.46 
 The task of evaluating counterfactuals with negative antecedents is a tricky 
business, but at least in causal contexts there is a presumption against so-called 
“replacement readings” like Marras’s.  Suppose that Assassin poisons Victim’s 
coffee with substance S (in circumstances where there are no preempted back-up 
causes), Victim drinks the coffee and dies.  We assume that the presence of 
causation here reveals itself in the truth of the counterfactual (C) ‘If Assassin had 
not poisoned Victim’s coffee with S, then Victim would not have died’.  However, 
without a ban on replacement readings, the obviously true counterfactual (C) might 
turn out false.  If we replace Assassin’s poisoning of the coffee with substance S 
with something closely resembling this event (e.g., Assassin poisoning Victim’s 
coffee with substance S* where S* is similar to S and also lethal to Victim) then 
Victim still dies.  The dependence we expect between Assassin’s poisoning of the 
coffee with substance S and Victim’s death is simply not there.   
Generally, replacement readings make counterfactuals like (C) with 
negative antecedents come out false more often than we would like.  In a discussion 
of fragility, David Lewis remarks, 
                                                
46 Additionally, I think cases of preemption and trumping preemption provide some reason to doubt 
Marras’s account of causal relevance.  Suppose Assassin poisons Victim’s coffee with a fast-acting 
poison and Badgirl poisons the same coffee with a slow-acting poison.  Assassin’s action is a cause 
of Victim’s death, but Badgirl’s action is a preempted cause of the death.  Assassin’s action being a 
fast-acting poisoning certainly seems to be causally relevant to Victim’s death being a death by 
poisoning.  But it is false that if Assassin’s action had not been of the former type, Victim’s death 
would not have been of the latter type, since Victim’s death would still have been a death by 
poisoning given the presence of Badgirl’s slow-acting poison in the coffee.    
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What is the closest way to actuality for C not to occur?  It is for C to 
be replaced by a very similar event, one that is almost but not quite 
C, one that is just barely over the border between versions of C itself 
and its near alternatives.  But … if almost-C occurred instead of C, 
very likely the effects of almost-C would be almost the same as the 
effects of C.  So our causal counterfactual will not mean what we 
thought it meant, and it may well not have the truth value we 
thought it had (Lewis 2000, 190). 
 
Therefore, given the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics, the closest ~Nc-world is 
not a world where N is replaced by N* which also realizes R.  Karen Bennett 
makes this point nicely, 
When you are supposed to imagine c1 gone, you imagine it gone.  
You do not worry about how the past would have to be different to 
make it fail to occur, and you do not worry about what else might 
occur in its place.  You simply snip it away as though you had a 
metaphysical hole-puncher (Bennett 2003, 482).   
 
Thus, Marras has no guarantee that counterfactuals like ‘~Nc □→ ~Ae’ are false 
and it remains possible that even this iteration of the dual explanandum strategy 
faces the exclusion problem all over again.  In fact, if we embrace a coarse-grained 
view of events as Marras does and we interpret Completeness as entailing that 
every intentional action that has a cause has a neurophysiological cause possessing 
some relevant neurophysiological property N, then we have reason to think 
counterfactuals like ‘~Nc □→ ~Ae’ do hold.   
Marras’s solution to the exclusion dilemma is a form of token-reductionism 
where mental and neurophysiological events are identical.  This kind of 
reductionism offers a straightforward solution to the problem posed by 
overdetermination.  But, as mentioned in Section 1.4, the commitment to type-
nonreductionism leaves him with the horn of (type-) epiphenomenalism, which he 
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attempts to combat by evoking a partial analysis of causal relevance in terms of 
counterfactuals.  I have tried to give some reason for doubting that the initial 
attempt to avoid type-epiphenomenalism succeeds, but I nonetheless think Marras’s 
Davidsonian inspired solution deserves serious consideration.  However, the 
present essay pursues an explicitly non-Davidsonian solution to the exclusion 
dilemma, so let me clear about what I think this means. 
Although there are good reasons to endorse token-reductionism about 
events, there are, on the other hand, good reasons to consider mental and 
neurophysiological events distinct.  In an attempt to avoid this controversy, I will 
simply assume throughout the present essay that mental and neurophysiological 
events are distinct.  There is, I believe, prima facie justification for this assumption 
(see, e.g., the modal arguments discussed in Section 1.2.2).  Furthermore, I shall 
also assume that mental and neurophysiological events have the same bodily effects 
and that the respective properties are relevant to the same things, namely events 
qua action types or, as I have been calling them, bodily movements.  What I hope 
to show in the following chapters is that nonreductionism of either variety (type- or 
token-) does not lead one into irresolvable difficulties concerning 
epiphenomenalism or overdetermination.   
Section 2.5: Reductionism 
 The exclusion problem presents us with a scenario in which two distinct 
phenomena are in competition with one another for causing a single effect.  What 
strikes me as the most obvious solution to the problem is simply to deny that the 
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phenomena in causal competition are distinct.  If there is really only one cause here 
(and two distinct ways of designating it), then the supposed competition is an 
illusion.  Now, I say that this reductionist solution is the most obvious, but not 
because it is obviously true.  Multiple realizability and modal arguments show at 
the very least that reductionism is not obviously true.  Nor do I say that it is the 
most obvious solution because I think out of all of the assumptions that generate 
the exclusion problem we have most reason to doubt Nonreductionism.  Once again, 
multiple realizability and modal arguments present forceful reasons in favor of 
Nonreductionism.  Instead, I claim this is the most obvious solution to the 
exclusion problem because considerations about mental causation have been 
explicitly used in arguments for a reduction of the mental to the neurophysiological.  
Not to mention, Malcolm’s presentation of the exclusion problem involved quite a 
bit of effort to exorcize our reductionist sentiments (Malcolm 1968, 53). 
 There are roughly two traditions of argument for reductionism, both of 
which base their defense on mental causation.  The first originates with the idea 
that general theoretical considerations speak in favor of a reduction of mental 
properties to neurophysiological properties.  This was argued for and developed in 
various ways by U.T. Place (1956), Herbert Feigl (1958), and J.J.C. Smart (1959).   
According to Place, in order to establish the identity of phenomenal 
properties with certain neurophysiological properties “it would be necessary to 
show that the introspective observations reported by the subject can be accounted 
for in terms of processes which are known to have occurred in his brain” (Place 
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1956/2002).47  Although Place is not entirely clear, a natural way of understanding 
him is saying that if the neurophysiological properties of a subject causally explain 
these introspective reports, we have good grounds for accepting the identity of 
phenomenal properties with neurophysiological ones.  Along with his stated 
purpose of showing that it is a meaningful scientific hypothesis that phenomenal 
properties are neurophysiological properties, he remarks, “We can identify 
consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain the subject’s 
introspective observations by reference to the brain processes” (my emphasis) 
(Place 1956/2002, 55).  Furthermore, there would be no need to suppose that these 
introspective reports are a result of special non-physical objects and events within a 
private “phenomenological field”.48  A reduction of phenomenal properties to 
neurophysiological properties is grounded partly on the claim that these properties 
have certain physical effects. 
Smart’s (1959) defense of reductionism begins by offering rejoinders to 
several objections to the identity of phenomenal and neurophysiological properties.  
This negative component of his overall defense is crucial, since the only positive 
reasons he offers in support of the reduction is an appeal to Occam’s razor.  Near of 
the end of his essay he remarks, 
If it be agreed that there are no cogent philosophical arguments 
which force us into accepting dualism, and if the brain process 
                                                
47 It is worth being clear that the focus in most early discussions of reductionism is on the identity 
of experiential mental properties (i.e., phenomenal properties) and neurophysiological properties.  It 
seems that many of the early advocates of the identity theory were convinced of a behaviorist 
analysis of intentional properties but not for phenomenal ones (Smart 2002/1956, 55).  These 
phenomenal properties, then, had to be accounted for in a different way. 
48 See (Place 1956/2002, 59) for the “phenomenological fallacy”. 
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theory and dualism are equally consistent with the facts, then the 
principles of parsimony and simplicity seem to me to decide 
overwhelmingly in favor of the brain-process theory (my emphasis) 
(Smart 1959/2002, 67). 
 
Although Smart does little to give us an idea of what sorts of facts are amongst “the 
facts”, we can safely assume various kinds of causal facts would be included.  We 
might, then, be able to extract the following kind of argument from Smart’s 
discussion.  Experiences of yellowish orange after-images typically have physical 
causes {C1, C2, …, Cn} and typically have physical effects {E1, E2, …, En}.  Both 
the reductionist and the dualist explain equally as well these typical causes and 
effects of yellowish orange after-images.  Given Occam’s razor, there is reason to 
endorse the reductive theory over the dualist theory.  Once again, we can see how a 
reduction of mental properties to neurophysiological properties is grounded partly 
on claims that mental properties are causal properties with certain physical effects. 
 Both Place’s and Smart’s arguments in favor of reductionism proceed 
relatively free from a priori considerations concerning our mental concepts.  
Placing them within a more contemporary dialectic, we might identify them as 
endorsing the kind of a posteriori physicalism advanced by Ned Block and Robert 
Stalnaker (1999).49  This is the feature that places them at odds with the second 
tradition of arguing for reductionism exemplified by David Lewis (1966, 1980), 
David Armstrong (1981) and more recently elaborated and defended by Kim 
(1993a, 2005). 
                                                
49 Another way of putting this is that Place and Smart might be thought to endorse the view that 
mental/neurophysiological identities are in no need of explanation while reductionists like Lewis, 
Armstrong, and Kim think mental/neurophysiological identities can be further explained. 
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 Lewis (1966) begins with the premise that the definitive characteristic of 
any experience is its causal role (Lewis 1966, 19).  This amounts to saying that our 
concept of pain is defined in terms of its typical causes and its typical effects.50  
Lewis (1980) elaborates on these points by claiming that the causal role definitive 
of phenomenal properties (and any mental property for that matter) is the role 
attributed to it by our folk psychology.  The second premise of his argument is 
interestingly similar to Completeness.  It is the plausible scientific hypothesis that, 
There is some unified body of scientific theories, of the sort we now 
accept, which together provide a true and exhaustive account of all 
physical phenomena (i.e., all phenomena describable in physical 
terms).  They are unified in that they are cumulative: the theory 
governing any physical phenomena is explained by theories 
governing phenomena out of which that phenomenon is composed 
and by the way it is composed out of them.  The same is true of the 
latter phenomena, and so on down to fundamental particles of fields 
governed by a few simple laws, more or less as conceived of in 
present day theoretical physics (my emphasis) (Lewis 1966, 23). 
 
Lewis’s second premise involves more than just the claim that every physical 
phenomenon that has a cause has a sufficient physical cause.  It also incorporates 
the claim that all physical phenomena have a “vertical” explanation in terms of 
lower-level physical phenomena.51  The result is that it is quite likely some physical 
property or other will occupy the causal role definitive of each mental property.   
                                                
50 Lewis goes further and claims that “by analytic necessity these conditions are true of the 
experience and jointly distinctive of it” (Lewis 1966, 20).  Although, Armstrong (1981) agrees that 
our concept of a mental property is a concept of a property with certain sorts of causes and effects, 
he does not go as far as Lewis.  Despite his claim that this is a conceptual analysis of our concept of 
a mental property, he explicitly rejects that such analyses are meaning-giving: “I think that sentence 
translation (with synonymy) is too strict a demand to make upon purported conceptual analysis.  
What more relaxed demand can we make and still have a conceptual analysis?  I do not know” 
(Armstrong 1981/2002, 85). 
51 A “vertical” explanation is suppose to be a reductive explanation without any presumption that 
such an explanation involves an a priori element.  These “vertical” explanations are contrasted to 
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The argument, then, is rather straightforward: if it is an analytic truth that 
mental property M occupies causal role R and some physical property P occupies 
causal role R, then M is identical to P.  The identification of mental properties with 
some physical property is not grounded in theoretical considerations like Occam’s 
razor, but instead follows from the semantics of theoretical terms and the plausible 
scientific hypothesis quoted above (Lewis 1980/2002, 88).  Additionally, Lewis 
thinks there is little reason to doubt that the physical properties that occupy these 
roles are the properties cited in neurophysiological theory, since “we have no 
notion of any other physical phenomena that could possibly occupy them, 
consistent with what we know” (Lewis 1966, 24).  Not only are mental properties 
physical properties, but, the argument concludes, they are neurophysiological 
properties.   
Both traditions of arguing for reductionism place claims of mental causation 
at the forefront.  It is because mental properties are taken to have these kinds of 
causes and these kinds of effects that we should accept their identity with 
neurophysiological properties.  However the reductionist prefers to defend the 
identity of mental properties with neurophysiological properties, the dissolution of 
the exclusion problem is the same – there is no competition without distinct causal 
competitors. 
 This is not an essay on the faults, problems, heresies, or sacrilege of 
reductionism.  In fact, I have strong sympathies with the kinds of causal arguments 
                                                                                                                                   
“horizontal”, causal explanations.  See Ch. 4 and 5 of (Kim 2005) for a great discussion of “vertical” 
explanations and an argument that all such explanations must be reductive (i.e., involve an a priori 
element).   
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discussed above for a reduction of mental to neurophysiological phenomena.  I 
have always felt that the best reasons in favor of a reduction of mind are 
considerations having to do with causation.  The present essay, however, is an 
approach to the exclusion problem from a nonreductionist perspective.  This is, of 
course, not an undisputed perspective to take, but it is nonetheless the perspective I 
have elected to explore these issues from.  The motivation for this has mainly to do 
with the potential for a dialectical shift in the philosophy of mind.  If it can be 
shown that the exclusion problem can be avoided while accepting Nonreductionism, 
then what we have are good reasons for thinking that the causal argument is 
mistaken.  The impetus for reductionism would thereby be frustrated.  A secondary 
goal of this essay is to show that reductionism is frustrated in precisely this way. 
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Chapter 3 
Proportionality and the Exclusion Problem 
Late for a meeting, Suzy decides the quickest way to get to her office is to 
hail a cab.  This decision comes after a brief episode of deliberation, since several 
options were available for Suzy to take.  Commonsense tells us that Suzy’s 
deliberation causally led to her decision to hail a cab which is causally responsible 
for her cab hailing behavior.  But, given the principle of Completeness, her cab 
hailing behavior has a sufficient neurophysiological cause.  However, the 
nonreductive physicalist must admit that her decision to hail a cab is distinct from 
the neurophysiological cause of her cab hailing behavior.  Therefore, by Exclusion, 
this mental phenomenon is either causally excluded by some neurophysiological 
phenomenon or limited to being a mere causal overdeterminant.  The nonreductive 
physicalist, therefore, faces a serious dilemma: epiphenomenalism or 
overdetermination.  The principal challenge for the nonreductive physicalist is how 
to avoid superfluous mental causation without diving headlong into 
epiphenomenalism.  How is it possible for anyone besides the reductionist to 
eschew both horns of the exclusion dilemma? 
 This chapter serves as a bridge between the typical presentation of the 
exclusion problem and the solutions I find most promising, which employ 
importantly different causal notions.  In Section 3.1, I introduce the distinction 
between the notions of sufficiency and relevance as opposed to difference-making.  
Section 3.2 reformulates the exclusion problem in terms of difference-making and 
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then explores Stephen Yablo’s and Sydney Shoemaker’s solution to the problem.  
The idea unifying these authors is that genuine causation is not sufficiency or 
relevance, but difference-making.  For Yablo and Shoemaker, once we take the 
difference-making idea seriously, we will discover a rather straightforward solution 
to the exclusion problem.  Specifically, each author claims that the reformulated 
version of Completeness is false: some bodily effects do not have difference-
making neurophysiological causes.  Their rejection of this amended version of 
Completeness thwarts the exclusion dilemma before it can even get started.  In 
Section 3.3, I criticize Yablo and Shoemaker’s solution to the exclusion problem 
which motivates a search for an alternative solution that takes the difference-
making idea seriously.   
Section 3.1: Causation as Difference-Making 
I have followed the philosophical precedent and framed the exclusion 
problem in terms of the question of how the mental can be causally sufficient for or 
relevant to some bodily effect if the neurophysiological is already sufficient for and 
relevant to those effects.  The notions of causal sufficiency and relevance are so 
pervasive in the literature on the exclusion problem that most formulations of the 
assumptions that generate the dilemma are strictly in those terms.  For instance, 
although formulations of Exclusion vary slightly from author to author, the central 
idea is relatively clear: the causal sufficiency of x for an effect y threatens the 
causal status of anything x* appropriately related to and distinct from x vis-à-vis y.  
Roughly, the threat is either that the causal relevance of x* for y is effectively 
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removed by x or x limits x*’s role to that of a causal overdeterminant (Yablo 1992b, 
fn. 53, 273).   
However, as the literature on causation and explanation has made clear, we 
should be unsatisfied with vindicating the mere causal sufficiency or relevance of 
mental phenomena.52  A famous example given by Wesley Salmon (1984) nicely 
illustrates that a condition can be sufficient for an effect, but fail to be a cause of 
that effect.  Suppose that Jones is a man who takes birth control pills and, therefore, 
fails to become pregnant.  Not only is it true that all men who take birth control 
pills fail to become pregnant, but this is non-accidentally true.  There is a lawful 
connection between men who take birth control pills and the failure to become 
pregnant.  But it should be clear that Jones’s taking of birth control pills is not a 
cause of his failure to become pregnant.  As we are likely to say, Jones would have 
failed to get pregnant regardless of whether he took birth control pills.  His taking 
of the pills made no difference to his failure to become pregnant, but rather it was 
his lack of the requisite biology.  Furthermore, many discussions of the exclusion 
problem make heavy weather of the distinction between causal relevance and 
causation.  For example, Yablo remarks that “even if some mental antecedent is 
causally relevant, it is a further question yet whether it actually causes the effect” 
(Yablo 1992b, 273).53  Peter Menzies (2008) echoes this distinction between 
causation and causal relevance when he says, “Causal relevance … is a loose and 
                                                
52 Here we are to understand causal sufficiency as one event determining the occurrence of another 
or, if indeterminism is true, fixing the objective probability of the occurrence of another (Yablo 
1992b, fn. 7, 247).  Given the laws of nature, the occurrence of this condition fixes the objective 
probability of or determines the occurrence of this other condition. 
53 I’ll discuss the details of Yablo’s account of causation further in Section 3.2. 
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undiscriminating concept … By contrast, the concept of causation is more 
discriminating” (Menzies 2008, 200). 
 The reason we should be unsatisfied with just the causal sufficiency or 
relevance of the mental is that neither guarantees that the mental makes a difference.  
And finding a way for the mental to make a difference in a world that is 
fundamentally physical is the real prize for the nonreductive physicalist.  Consider 
Norman Malcolm’s (1968) early presentation of the exclusion problem,        
The movements of the man on the ladder would be completely 
accounted for in terms of electrical, chemical, and mechanical 
processes in his body … Given the antecedent neurological states of 
his bodily system together with general laws correlating those states 
with the contractions of muscles and movements of limbs, he would 
have moved as he did regardless of his desire or intention (Malcolm 
1968, 53). 
 
Malcolm’s concern is that the thesis of “mechanism” threatens the difference-
making causal status of the mental.  If the man had moved as he did regardless of 
his mental condition, then the mental made no difference to the man’s actions.  A 
true vindication of mental causation is finding a way for the mental to be a cause, 
something “that ‘makes the difference’ between the effect’s occurring and its not” 
(Yablo 1992b, 274) (see also (Menzies 2008, 205)).    
Section 3.2: Intensive Parts and Proportional Causes 
Let us proceed forward with Yablo and consider the exclusion problem 
from the perspective in which real mental causation is having the mental make a 
difference.  In lieu of this, the primary worry for the nonreductive physicalist is 
finding a way for the mental to make a difference in a physical world that is 
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causally complete.  If every bodily effect that has a cause has a difference-making 
neurophysiological cause, the mental appears forced into being a second and 
superfluous difference-making cause of its effects.  How does mental causation not 
introduce overdetermination?  Yablo avoids the threat of redundant mental 
causation by denying an appropriately amended version of Completeness, that is, it 
follows from his view that not every bodily effect has a difference-making 
neurophysiological cause.  The same general solution to the exclusion problem 
follows from Sydney Shoemaker’s (2003c, 2007) recent account of realization.  In 
this section, I discuss Yablo and Shoemaker’s view that mental phenomena are 
intensive parts of their neurophysiological realizers which eventually leads them to 
accept that causes must be proportional to their effects.  The idea of proportionality 
is proposed as an analysis of difference-making which, when applied to cases of 
mental causation, generate their solution to the exclusion problem. 
A few preliminary remarks are in order before moving forward.  First, both 
Yablo and Shoemaker take it for granted that events are fine-grained.  I shall 
understand a commitment to fine-grained events as a thesis about the denotations of 
event nominals.  Specifically, events are fine-grained if a nominal’s denotation 
changes when (a) it’s gerund is modified by an adjective (e.g., ‘Suzy’s throwing of 
the rock’/‘Suzy’s abrupt throwing of the rock’), (b) it involves a more or less 
specific gerund (e.g., ‘Socrates’s drinking of the hemlock’/‘Socrates’s guzzling of 
the hemlock’), or (c) it involves focus (e.g., ‘Socrates’s drinking of the hemlock at 
noon’/‘Socrates’s drinking of the hemlock at noon’).  Yablo and Shoemaker at least 
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take the nominal pairs in (a) and (b) to have different denotations so I shall say that 
they hold a fine-grained view of events.   
Second, as will become clear in Section 3.2.1, Yablo explicitly argues for 
the conclusion that the mind-body relation is a species of the determinable-
determinate relation.  Shoemaker, on the other hand, talks of the mind-body 
relation as realization, but often notes the close resemblance between realization 
and the determinable-determinate relation.  Consequently, Yablo and Shoemaker 
take mental event nominals as involving gerunds less specific than 
neurophysiological event nominals.  For instance, the nominal ‘Socrates’s pain’ is 
less specific than ‘the firing of Socrates’s C-fibers’ just as ‘Socrates’s drinking of 
the hemlock’ is less specific than ‘Socrates’s guzzling of the hemlock’.  Given 
their fine-grained view of events, it follows that mental event nominals do not co-
refer with neurophysiological event nominals.     
Finally, Yablo and Shoemaker often talk of property-instances entering into 
causal relations.  I interpret them as holding the metaphysical thesis that events are 
identified with property-instances where these are exemplifications of properties by 
objects at times. 54   On this view, events are structured particulars where a 
difference, for example, in the constitutive property entails a difference in the event.  
Socrates’s drinking of the hemlock is a distinct event from Socrates’s guzzling of 
the hemlock, since the constitutive properties of drinking and guzzling are distinct.  
                                                
54 See (Kim 1976) and (Goldman 1970). 
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This view of events makes them very nearly as fine-grained as facts (i.e., true 
propositions). 
Section 3.2.1: Determination and Realization  
 As I understand them, both Yablo and Shoemaker maintain that mental 
properties and their instances are intensive parts of their neurophysiological 
realizers.  The notion of intensive parthood is purely modal and can be defined as 
follows: x is an intensive part of y just in case y entails x but x does not entail y 
(McLaughlin 2007, 159).  Let us call the thesis that mental properties and their 
instances are intensive parts of their neurophysiological realizers the intensive 
parthood thesis.  Yablo and Shoemaker argue for the intensive parthood thesis in 
different ways.  It is a direct consequence of Yablo’s view that the mind-body 
relation is a species of the determinable-determinate relation; while, Shoemaker 
argues that it follows from his most recent account of realization. 
The primary reason we should construe the mind-body relation as a species 
of the determinable-determinate relation is that it explains the “reigning orthodoxy” 
in the philosophy of mind that “the mental is supervenient on, but multiply 
realizable in, the physical” (Yablo 1992b, 254).  Mental properties are said to be 
supervenient on neurophysiological properties such that necessarily, for every x 
and every mental property M of x, x has some neurophysiological property N such 
that necessarily all N’s are M’s.  In addition to being supervenient properties, 
mental properties are also said to be multiply realized properties in which 
necessarily, for every mental property M, and every neurophysiological property N 
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which necessitates M, possibly something is an instance of M without being an 
instance of N.  Together these claims paint a picture of mental properties as 
asymmetrically necessitated by their neurophysiological realizers (Yablo 1992b, 
256).  The neurophysiological guarantees the mental, but the reverse is not the case.   
As Yablo makes clear, this kind of asymmetric necessitation is guaranteed 
to hold if we construe mental properties as determinables of their 
neurophysiological realizers.  An instance of some determinate property is an 
instance of its determinable property, not simpliciter, but in a specific way (Yablo 
1992b, 252).  Consider, for example, the determinable property red and its 
determinate scarlet.  Every instance of scarlet is a specific way of being red such 
that (a) necessarily, if something is scarlet then it is red and (b) it is possible for 
something to be red without being scarlet (say, by being crimson).  This relation of 
determination guarantees that determinables supervene on and are multiply realized 
in their determinates.  Adopting the hypothesis that mental properties are 
determinables of their neurophysiological realizers enables a straightforward 
explanation for why the mental is both supervenient on and multiply realized in the 
neurophysiological.  But, more importantly, we are assured that mental properties 
are intensive parts of their neurophysiological realizers.  Determinates entail their 
determinables, but the reverse is not the case. 
 Shoemaker (2001) arrives at the intensive parthood thesis by adopting a 
new definition of realization.  The traditional account of realization is associated 
with the functionalist idea of role occupancy.  Realized properties are second-order 
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properties and their realizers first-order.  A property P is said to realize a distinct 
property Q just in case P is the first-order property that occupies the causal role 
assigned to the second-order property Q by either folk or scientific psychology.  
Shoemaker however resists this account of realization, attributing to it a variety of 
problems, in particular, that it leads to either overdetermination or 
epiphenomenalism for mental properties (Shoemaker 2001, 76 – 77).  As a 
replacement, Shoemaker (2001) stipulates, with some minor modifications given in 
(2007), that P realizes a property Q just in case the set of forward-looking 
conditional powers of Q is a proper subset of the set of forward-looking conditional 
powers of P.55 
 Shoemaker explains the notion of a conditional power, 
Any property whose instantiation can be a cause or partial cause of 
something will be such that its instantiation bestows on its subject a 
set of what I call ‘conditional powers’.  A thing’s having a power 
simpliciter is a matter of its being such that in certain circumstances, 
for example, its being related in certain ways to other things of 
certain sorts, causes (or contributes to causing) certain effects.  A 
thing has a conditional power if it is such that if it had certain 
properties it would have a certain power simpliciter, where those 
properties are not themselves sufficient to bestow that power 
simpliciter (Shoemaker 2001, 77). 
 
                                                
55 The modifications first offered in (Shoemaker 2007) won’t matter much for our discussion but 
include that (a) the set of backward-looking conditional powers of P is a proper subset of the set of 
backward-looking conditional powers of Q and (b) that P is not a conjunctive property having Q as a 
conjunct.  The forward-looking conditional powers of P are powers of P such that if P were 
instantiated in some object along with certain other properties then the instance of P would cause or 
contribute to causing such and such effect.  The backward-looking conditional powers of P are 
powers of P such that if certain other properties were instantiated then an instance of P would be an 
effect.  Roughly, forward-looking conditional powers of P are features of P having to do with “how 
the instantiation of the property contributes to producing various sorts of effects” and backward-
looking conditional powers of P are features of P having to do with “what sorts of states of affairs 
can cause the instantiation of the property” (Shoemaker 2007, 12). 
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For example, the property of being knife-shaped bestows on objects that possess it 
the conditional power of being capable of cutting butter if it is made of a certain 
material (e.g., wood, iron, steel, etc.).  Therefore, if an object possessed both this 
property and the property of being made of steel, it would have the power 
simpliciter to cut butter. 
 When one property P realizes another property Q, P and Q literally share 
their conditional powers.  The conditional powers of Q are a proper subset of the 
conditional powers of P.  The realizer property will, more than likely, have 
conditional powers that go beyond those of the realized property, but any 
conditional power of the realized property is also a conditional power of the 
property that realizes it.  Take, for instance, the properties red and scarlet which 
Shoemaker considers to be a paradigmatic case of one property realizing another 
(Shoemaker 2001, 78).  Sophie the pigeon is trained to peck at red things to the 
exclusion of non-red things.  The property of being red confers upon objects that 
possess it the conditional power of “evoking a pecking response in the likes of 
Sophie” (Shoemaker 2001, 78).  And since the determinate property scarlet realizes 
the property redness, it is also true that scarlet bestows upon objects that possess it 
this very same conditional power.56  But now imagine that Sophie has a sister 
named Alice who has been trained to peck at scarlet things and not at other shades 
of red.  The property of scarlet bestows upon objects that possess it the conditional 
                                                
56 For Shoemaker, this does not entail that the scarlet property-instance causes Sophie’s pecking 
behavior because causes must be proportional to their effects and scarlet fails to satisfy this 
condition.  See Section 3.2.2 for a discussion of this constraint on causation and the role it plays in 
providing a solution to the exclusion problem. 
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power of evoking a pecking response in the likes of Alice, and this is a conditional 
power that the property redness lacks.  An instance of the property scarlet realizes 
an instance of red because the conditional powers of redness are a proper subset of 
the conditional powers of scarlet. 
Elaborating further Shoemaker claims that,  
The instantiation of the determinate entails the instantiation of the 
determinable, and can be quite naturally said to include it.  It seems 
natural to say that being scarlet is in part being red.  Likewise, the 
instantiation of a realizer property entails, and might naturally be 
said to include as a part, the instantiation of the functional property 
realized (Shoemaker 2001, 81). 
 
This suggests that Shoemaker sees the relationship between mental properties and 
their realizers as similar to that between determinables and their determinates.  
Realizer properties include the properties they realize as a part just as determinates 
include their determinables as parts.  Shoemaker claims that his alternative account 
of realization guarantees that realized properties are intensive parts of their 
realizers: if P realizes Q, then an instance of P entails an instance Q, but not vice 
versa (Shoemaker 2001, 94 – 95).57 
Section 3.2.2: The Proportionality Thesis 
 Suppose the nonreductive physicalist accepts Yablo’s and Shoemaker’s 
thesis that mental properties and their instances are intensive parts of their 
neurophysiological realizers.  Exactly how does this help them avoid the threat of 
overdetermination?  After all, an instance of a mental property is distinct from the 
instance of its neurophysiological realizer regardless of the fact that the former is 
                                                
57 However, see (McLaughlin 2007, 159 – 161) for arguments that Shoemaker’s account of 
realization does not guarantee that realized properties are intensive parts of their realizers. 
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an intensive part of the latter.  When a mental property instance causes some bodily 
effect, what prevents its intensive whole – the neurophysiological property-instance 
that realizes it – from also counting as a cause?  What rules out that we once again 
have redundant causation of the bodily effect?   
 In order to answer this question, both Yablo and Shoemaker claim that 
causes make a difference to their effects and that this should be understood as 
causes being proportional to their effects.58  The idea here is that causes “should 
incorporate a good deal of causally important material but not too much that is 
causally unimportant” (Yablo 1992b, 274).  That is, “causes should be specific 
enough but no more specific than is required to make the difference to their effect” 
(Menzies 2008, 209).  A part is sometimes better suited to being a cause than a 
whole because it is the part rather than the whole that is proportional to the effect.  
Let us call the thesis that causes must be proportional to their effects the 
proportionality thesis.  Although Yablo defines proportionality in terms of four 
distinct notions, it will only be necessary to discuss two: the proportionality thesis 
entails that c causes e only if (a) c is required for e and (b) c is enough for e.59 
 It is useful to employ a terminology introduced by Matthew McGrath 
(1998) to capture the notions of required and enough.  Let us define screening off 
as follows: 
                                                
58 See (Yablo 1992b, 274), (Shoemaker 2001, 93), and (McLaughlin 2007, 168). 
59 There are two other conditions Yablo puts on causation that will not be necessary for our 
discussion.  The first he calls the contingency condition and states that effects must be 
counterfactually dependent on their causes in the sense of Lewis (1973a).  See Section 3.4.1.  The 
second he calls the adequacy condition which states that if the cause had not occurred then if it had, 
the effect would have occurred as well.  
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(Screening Off) x screens off y from an effect e just in case if x had 
occurred without y then e would still have occurred. 
 
Now Yablo defines the required condition as follows60: 
(Required) x is required for an effect e just in case none of x’s 
determinables screens off x from e. 
 
If we prefer Shoemaker’s terminology we can say that x is required for an effect e 
just in case nothing realized by x screens it off from e.  We can illustrate this 
condition by considering a scenario in which Socrates guzzles some hemlock and 
dies.  Furthermore, we stipulate that Socrates could not have drunk the hemlock 
without guzzling it.  He was, to the dismay of Xanthippe, a notoriously sloppy 
drinker.  Yablo remarks, 
Intuitively, it appears that not all of the guzzling was needed, 
because there occurred a lesser event, the drinking, which would 
still have done the job even in the guzzling’s absence.  By 
hypothesis, of course, without the guzzling this lesser event would 
not have taken place; but that doesn’t stop us from asking what 
would have happened if it had, and evaluating the guzzling on that 
basis (Yablo 1992b, 276). 
 
In the described scenario, Socrates’s guzzling of the hemlock is not required for the 
death, since there is a determinable of the guzzling – the drinking – that screens it 
off from the death.  The drinking screens off the guzzling because had the drinking 
occurred in the absence of the guzzling, the death would still have occurred.  An 
event c is proportional to an effect e only if c is required for e, that is, none of c’s 
determinables screens it off from e. 
 Next, Yablo defines the enough condition as follows: 
                                                
60 See (Yablo 1992b, 276) for the original terminology. 
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(Enough) x is enough for an effect e just in case x screens off all of 
its determinates from e. 
 
Once again, if we prefer Shoemaker’s terminology we can say that x is enough for 
an effect e just in case x screens off all of its realizers from e.  To illustrate this 
condition, suppose that a safety valve is connected by a pipe to a boiler.  The valve 
mechanism stiffens due to a preexisting structural defect.  This stiffening of the 
safety mechanism slows down the opening of the valve enough so that the pressure 
builds up in the boiler and it explodes.  The opening per se of the valve is not a 
cause of the explosion, since intuitively “the effect required something more” 
(Yablo 1992b, 277).  In this case, the opening per se is not enough for the 
explosion of the boiler, since there is a determinate of the opening per se – the slow 
opening – that is not screened off from the explosion.  The opening per se does not 
screen off the slow opening because had the opening per se occurred without the 
slow opening, the explosion would not have occurred.  An event c is proportional 
to an effect e only if c is enough for e, that is, c screens off all of its determinates 
from e. 
Section 3.2.3: A Solution to the Exclusion Problem 
 Yablo and Shoemaker are each committed to the intensive parthood thesis 
and claim that sometimes parts rather than wholes are better suited for being a 
cause of some effect.  This depends on their views about causation, in particular, 
that causes make a difference and so must be proportional to their effects.  If the 
proportionality thesis is correct, there are some interesting consequences for the 
exclusion problem. 
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Let us first consider a case in which we assume that some bodily effect b 
has a difference-making mental cause m and that m is realized by some neural 
activity n.  Let us say that Suzy arrives on Jones’s doorstep and decides to ring the 
doorbell.  Under the conditions in which Suzy’s decision is a cause and so is 
proportional to the ringing behavior, it follows that the neural activity that realizes 
this decision is excluded from being a cause of ringing behavior.  The proof of this 
is as follows: 
(1) x is enough for y iff x screens off all its determinates from y (definition of 
Enough), 
(2) x is required for y iff none of x’s determinables screens it off from y 
(definition of Required), 
(3) m is enough for movement b (assumption), 
(4) therefore, m screens off all its determinates from b (by 1, 3), 
(5) n is a determinate of m (Yablo’s mind-body relation), 
(6) therefore, m screens off n from b (by 4, 5), 
(7) therefore, n is not required for b (by 2, 6). 
 
If causes must be proportional to their effects, the fact that Suzy’s decision is a 
cause of her ringing behavior entails that the neurophysiological realizer of this 
decision fails to be proportionate to her ringing behavior.61  Generally, if some 
mental property-instance is enough for an effect, then its realizer cannot be 
required for it (Yablo 1992b, 278).  If we assume that the intensive part makes the 
causal difference, then given the proportionality thesis it follows that the intensive 
whole does not.  This vindicates an exclusion principle Menzies (2008) calls 
“downward” exclusion: 
                                                
61 If we define realization as Shoemaker does, then the fact that the neurophysiological realizer of 
Suzy’s decision fails to count as a cause of her ringing behavior does not entail that this realizer 
lacks the conditional power to bring about the ringing behavior.  In other words, the intensive whole 
that is the realizer of Suzy’s decision still has all the same conditional powers as Suzy’s decision, 
but the whole fails to be proportionate to Suzy’s ringing behavior.   
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(Downward Exclusion) If some mental property-instance m is a 
difference-making cause of e, then no neurophysiological property-
instance n that realizes m is a difference-making cause of e. 
 
The truth of “downward” exclusion is incompatible with m and n causally 
overdetermining the effect e, since it is false that both m and n are causes of e.  If 
causes must be proportional to their effects, then mental causes guarantee that their 
realizers are not causes.  The worry that mental causation always introduces a 
superfluous cause into the story is entirely misguided once causation is understood 
to be a proportional relation. 
 We arrive at a similar result when we consider a case where it is assumed 
that some bodily effect has a difference-making neurophysiological cause.  This 
time it follows that the mental property-instance fails to be a cause.  The proof is 
similar to the one above: 
(1) x is enough for y iff x screens off all its determinates from y (definition of 
Enough), 
(2) x is required for y iff none of x’s determinables screens it off from y 
(definition of Required), 
(3) n is required for b (assumption), 
(4) therefore, none of n’s determinables screens it off from b (by 2, 3), 
(5) m is a determinable of n (Yablo’s mind-body relation), 
(6) therefore, m does not screen off n from b (by 4, 5), 
(7) therefore, m is not enough for b (by 1, 6). 
 
If the neurophysiological realizer of a mental property-instance is required for a 
bodily effect, the mental property-instance cannot be enough for it.  This 
conclusion vindicates another exclusion principle Menzies (2008) has called 
“upward” exclusion: 
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(Upward Exclusion) If some neurophysiological property-instance n 
is a difference-making cause of e, then no mental property-instance 
m realized by n is a difference-making cause of e. 
 
Once again, the proportionality thesis has ruled out the possibility of 
overdetermination. 
 But what about a case in which both the mental and neurophysiological 
property-instances purport to be a cause of some bodily effect?  It would be wrong 
to interpret Yablo as holding that the mental property-instance always counts as a 
cause under these circumstances.  Instead which property-instance is really a cause 
of the effect depends on which satisfies the proportionality constraints placed on 
causation.  As it turns out, this is something that depends upon the finer empirical 
details of the case.  Generally, there is mental causation whenever the occurrence of 
the bodily effect is “relatively insensitive to the finer details” of the mental’s 
neurophysiological realization (Yablo 1992b, 278).  And often the 
neurophysiological realizers of mental property-instances are “overladen with 
materials to which the effect is in no way beholden” (Yablo 1992b, 279).  This is 
another way of saying that sometimes an intensive whole is laden with causal 
details that are superfluous to the effect.  In such cases, it will be some intensive 
part of the whole that is proportionate to the effect.  But, again, determining that 
this is true for any particular bodily effect requires careful evaluations of the 
counterfactuals associated with the required and enough conditions.  Regardless of 
which property-instance ends up being a cause, we do know that only one can –
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overdetermination of an effect by a mental property-instance and an instance of its 
realizer is impossible given the proportionality thesis.   
 Before moving on let me deflect the worry that mental property-instances 
are never enough for intentional bodily movements.  Suppose that Suzy’s decision 
occurs, but is realized in some radically different way, say, in ectoplasm.  It is not 
obvious that had the decision been realized in this way that the ringing behavior 
would still have occurred.  Perhaps in such a case the behavior might not have 
occurred.  Yablo reminds us that worlds in which the decision is realized in some 
radically different way are not worlds relevant to evaluating the enough 
counterfactual.  All that matters are “the nearest world[s] where its physical 
implementation was not as actually – the world[s] in which it undergoes only the 
minimum physical distortion required to put its actual implementation out of 
existence” (Yablo 1992b, 278).  The question of whether the ringing behavior 
might not have occurred if the decision had been realized in ectoplasm does not 
need to be answered.  All we need to answer is whether the ringing behavior would 
still have occurred in the nearest worlds where it is realized differently, that is, if 
the decision had been realized in a slightly different neurophysiological way.  And 
this looks to be a more tractable question and one we can, for the most part, be 
confident in answering.    
 In conclusion, Yablo’s and Shoemaker’s solution to the exclusion problem 
is fairly simple: if there is a mental cause of some bodily effect, then its 
neurophysiological realizer cannot be a cause of that effect and so 
98  
overdetermination is avoided.  A proper understanding of causation, namely that it 
requires causes to be proportional to their effects, ensures that mental causation 
does not introduce overdetermination into the causal story.  However, Yablo and 
Shoemaker must deny that every bodily effect that has a cause has a 
neurophysiological difference-making cause.  If some bodily effect has a mental 
cause, then from the principle of “downward exclusion” it follows that the realizer 
of this mental cause cannot itself be a cause.   
Nonetheless, rejecting this version of Completeness does not threaten the 
claim that every bodily effect has a sufficient neurophysiological cause, since 
everything that happens is still a strict “causal consequence of its physical 
antecedents” (Yablo 1992b, 279).  That is, mental causation without 
overdetermination is consistent with there being some neurophysiological condition 
of the brain and nervous system that determines or fixes the objective probability of 
the occurrence of the bodily effect.  Once causal sufficiency is distinguished from 
causation, we can see that our mistake and the primary source of confusion in 
discussions of the exclusion problem is to assume that the “outcomes of the kind 
normally credited to human agency are caused by their physical antecedents” (my 
emphasis) (Yablo 1992b, 280).  The effects of mental causes are not 
overdetermined because they fail to have neurophysiological causes.62 
                                                
62 Peter Menzies (2008) also endorses this response to the exclusion problem.  In the final 
paragraphs of his paper he remarks, “Acceptance of the new version of the exclusion principle does 
not automatically compel us to accept the conclusion of the exclusion argument to the effect that 
mental properties do not cause physical properties.  However, the plausibility of the new exclusion 
principle does mean that the critical spotlight needs to be shifted to the other crucial principle of a 
reformulated version of [the] argument – the strengthened causal closure principle” (Menzies 2008, 
99  
Section 3.3: Problems for the Proportionality Thesis  
The notions of realization, causal relevance, and causal sufficiency are 
importantly different from the notion of causation.  The former are technical 
philosophical terms and authors are allowed to stipulate how they understand them 
without having to test them against our considered judgments.  The only reason we 
have to adopt stipulated definitions of technical terms depends on their potential to 
resolve a range of philosophical problems.  But the notion of causation is not like 
this.  There are fairly robust pre-reflective intuitions we have about specific cases 
and these judgments, for the most part, ought to be respected.  There is, of course, 
no implication that these intuitions are sacrosanct and therefore unrevisable.  My 
point is only to draw attention to the fact that our theory of causation should 
incorporate our considered judgments about causation as much as possible.  In this 
section, I argue that if the proportionality constraint is consistently applied, it 
leaves few pre-reflective causal judgments intact and, therefore, ought to be 
rejected.  Consequently, a rejection of proportionality on these grounds undermines 
its utility in offering a solution to avoid the threat of causal overdetermination.   
The proportionality thesis states that it is part of the truth conditions for 
causal claims that causes are proportional to their effects.  Specifically, Yablo and 
Shoemaker propose that ‘c causes e’ is true only if c is required for e and c is 
enough for e.  The idea is that causes make a difference to their effects because 
                                                                                                                                   
216).  Menzies argues that on his account of causation, just as on Yablo’s and Shoemaker’s, it is 
reasonable to maintain that intentional bodily movements will sometimes have mental causes but no 
neurophysiological causes.   
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they are specific enough, but not too specific to bring about their effects.  We can 
state their partial truth conditions as follows: 
(PC) ‘c causes e’ is true only if (a) no determinable of c screens it 
off from e and (b) c screens off its determinates from e. 
 
Making the underlying counterfactual claims explicit, (PC) says that the following 
counterfactuals must hold in order for ‘c causes e’ to be true: (a) for every 
determinable d1 of c, if d1 had occurred without c, then e would not have occurred; 
and (b) for every determinate d2 of c, if c had occurred without d2, then e would 
still have occurred.  These counterfactuals are at the heart of the proportionality 
thesis. 
Let us first consider a pair of causal claims familiar from Yablo’s 
exposition of proportionality in which Socrates guzzles some hemlock and dies: 
(1a) Socrates’s drinking of the hemlock caused his death. 
(1b) Socrates’s guzzling of the hemlock caused his death. 
Yablo considers (1a) and (1b) together and stipulates that the guzzling “contributed 
nothing” to Socrates’s death, so that (1a) is true while (1b) is false (Yablo 1992b, 
275).  Yablo’s truth conditions for causal claims demand that causes be required 
for their effects and so the truth of (1a) entails that no determinable of the drinking 
screens it off from the death.  This, however, is not the case.  Consider the claim 
that: 
 (1c) Socrates’s ingesting of the hemlock caused his death. 
The ingesting of the hemlock is a determinable of the drinking that screens it off 
from the death because if Socrates had ingested the hemlock without drinking it, he 
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would still have died.  We are strongly inclined to judge (1a) true and (PC) does not 
respect this intuition.  This provides some prima facie reason for rejecting the view 
that causes must always be required for their effects.    
The proportionality thesis captures the idea that “causes should be specific 
enough but not more specific than is required to make the difference to their effect” 
(Menzies 2008, 209).  In addition to threatening the truth of causal claims like (1a) 
and (1b), this idea also threatens the truth of (1c) for the very same reasons.  The 
ingesting of the hemlock is, contrary to what we intuitively think, not a cause of the 
death.  There is a determinable of the ingesting – namely, doing something fatal – 
that screens the ingesting off from the death (Bontly 2005, 340).  If Socrates had 
done something fatal without ingesting the hemlock, he would still have died. 
The issue here is more problematic than it might first appear.  (PC) commits 
one to holding, not just that token-causal claims like (1a) – (1c) are false, but that 
all token-causal claims of this general sort are false.  Suppose that Plato drinks 
some hemlock and dies.  Given that every instance of drinking hemlock is 
invariably accompanied by an instance of its determinable doing something fatal, 
every instance of drinking hemlock is screened off from the death it purportedly 
causes.  The result is that no instance of drinking hemlock will ever or has ever 
caused someone’s death.  It would be unreasonable to hold in spite of this that 
‘drinking hemlock tends to cause death’ is a true causal generalization.  So (PC) not 
only threatens token-causal claims like (1a) – (1c) but their associated causal 
generalizations as well.  Drinkings, guzzlings, and ingestings of poisons do not tend 
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to cause deaths, since, given (PC), none of these are required for their purported 
effects.  This is a significant cost to those who maintain that causes must be 
required for their effects and more prima facie reason to reject the proportionality 
thesis. 
As I see it, the proportionality thesis forces us to reject many causal claims 
we think capture paradigmatic cases of causation.  Suzy throws a rock at an empty 
glass bottle and it shatters.  We are not hesitant in accepting (2): 
 (2) Suzy’s throwing of the rock causes the shattering of the bottle. 
But Yablo and Shoemaker must insist that, contrary to intuition, (2) is false, since 
there is some less specific event that is required for the effect.  Perhaps someone’s 
throwing of the rock, Suzy’s throwing of a hard object, or even Suzy’s propelling 
of the rock screens off Suzy’s throw from the shattering.  A related issue is that in 
most cases it will be practically impossible for us to identify a cause of an effect, 
since we will rarely be in a position to find an event that is specific enough but no 
more specific than is required to make a difference.  This leads to a sort of causal 
skepticism about most, if not all, of our ordinary causal claims, since we cannot be 
sure we’ve found a cause until we can be sure we’ve found an event of the right 
specificity.  I submit that a better alternative is to doubt the veracity of the 
proportionality thesis itself.        
 A related issue is that similar concerns arise if we accept only a fine-grained 
view of events and ignore the requirement of proportionality.63  If Socrates’s 
                                                
63 See (Dowe 2010) for a similar point. 
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drinking of hemlock is distinct from his guzzling of it which is distinct from his 
ingesting of it, and all of these events occur at the same time in the same space that 
Socrates occupies, then the question naturally arises which one of these events 
caused Socrates’s death?  If only one is a cause, it would be practically impossible 
for us to identify which one.  There would have to be some constraint on causation 
by which to separate the non-causes from the cause and so we are lead back to 
something very much like the problematic proportionality thesis.  Again, we would 
be forced to reject many, if not most, of our ordinary causal claims.  If, on the other 
hand, all of these events are causes of Socrates’s death, then it appears that the 
death is radically overdetermined, or involves a strange sort of “over”-causation.  
However, if we instead accepted that Socrates’s drinking of the hemlock just is his 
guzzling it which just is his ingesting it, we wouldn’t be forced into this dilemma.  
On a coarse-grained view of events, there is no need to appeal to the problematic 
proportionality constraint nor is there a worry about “over”-causation or causal 
skepticism.64 
 Proponents of proportional causation might respond that (PC)’s results 
indeed do not conform with many of our intuitive causal judgments and perhaps 
even leads to a sort of causal skepticism.  But, the reply goes, none of this provides 
any reason to reject (PC).  Instead, the defender of proportional causation may 
                                                
64 I think something like this argument provides solid grounds for preferring a coarse-grained view 
of events over a fine-grained view of events.  To my mind, the crucial premise is that the death is 
radically overdetermined or involves a strange sort of “over”-causation.  But why is this supposed to 
be an unwelcome consequence?  If this argument works at all, there must be some reason why 
overdetermination is bad and ought to be avoided.  This question assumes center stage in Chapter 5 
as the claim that overdetermination is bad plays an important role in the exclusion argument.  To 
foreshadow, I do not think the kind of overdetermination involved in this example is bad at all but 
rather is a pervasive feature of our world. 
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reasonably claim that their partial truth conditions are not intended as a “conceptual 
analysis” of our commonsense concept of causation.  Conforming with intuition 
and avoiding causal skepticism are, at best, secondary concerns or, at worse, no 
concern at all.  This reply certainly has some force, but it is not available to Yablo 
and Shoemaker.  Their primary motivation for accepting the proportionality thesis 
is to solve the exclusion problem and this is only a problem if they are concerned to 
respect the “Moorean fact” of mental causation (Bontly 2005, 331).  Mental 
causation is central to the commonsense picture we have of ourselves as agents and 
the exclusion problem is troublesome precisely because it threatens this picture.  
The fact that (PC) has such unintuitive consequences should be disconcerting for 
those like Yablo and Shoemaker who are inclined to defend the commonsense 
picture of mental causation.  These problems are sufficient to motivate an 
alternative account of causes as difference-makers, one that conforms with our 
intuitive judgments better and offers new directions for avoiding the threats posed 
by the exclusion problem. 
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Chapter 4 
The Exclusion Dilemma: The Epiphenomenalist Horn     
 I am a physicalist who maintains that there is mental causation and, 
specifically, the kind of mental causation that is able to sustain both human agency 
and moral responsibility.  This implies that mental events are among the causes of 
our bodily movements.  Furthermore, I accept the principle of Completeness, that is, 
I hold that in tracing the causal history of our bodily movements we will find, 
amongst this history, difference-making neurophysiological causes.  But I am also a 
nonreductionist who holds that mental events are distinct from their 
neurophysiological realizers.  Many have thought that the picture which emerges 
from these ideological commitments is a troublesome one.  Take any piece of 
intentionally controlled behavior, some bodily movement we take to be an action.  
Amongst the causal history of this action, there will be a mental event and that 
event’s neurophysiological realizer.  But the principle of Exclusion tells us that if 
some neurophysiological event n causes an action b, then unless b is 
overdetermined no mental event m distinct from and existing simultaneously with n 
is such that it causes b.  Therefore, I am forced into the exclusion dilemma: either I 
must reject mental causation and forsake both human agency and moral 
responsibility or embrace the view that mental events are, at best, redundant and 
superfluous causes. 
 In this chapter, I do not forsake mental causation.  Instead, I offer a proposal 
for vindicating mental causation consistent with nonreductive physicalism.  This 
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means that I am obligated to deal with the charge of overdetermination, which I 
tackle in Chapter 5.  In Section 4.1, I reiterate David Lewis’s simple theory of 
causation which takes counterfactual dependence among distinct events to capture 
the idea of difference-making.  In Section 4.2, I endorse one component of Lewis’s 
simple theory, namely that counterfactual dependence among distinct events is 
sufficient for causation, and claim that it provides us with the resources for 
grounding mental causation.  My defense of this proposal, which I call 
counterfactualism, comes in two parts.  The negative part fends off objections 
raised by Jaegwon Kim (2003, 2007) that counterfactual dependence cannot do the 
work required to ground mental causation.  The positive part argues that, at least 
compared to so-called productive accounts of causation, the counterfactual account 
I offer is superior, since it is compatible with the empirical details of the 
physiological mechanisms of human action.  Section 4.3 summarizes my arguments 
in this chapter and brings up several problems that remain for the counterfactualist 
to deal with.  These problems are serious – some more so than others – but, 
regardless, a complete defense of counterfactualism must say something about 
them.  Unfortunately, the present project must remain woefully incomplete. 
Section 4.1: Lewis’s Simple Theory  
The fundamental idea of Lewis’s (1973, 1979) simple theory of causation is 
that we can understand what it means for causes to make a difference to their 
effects in terms of counterfactual dependence, 
We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the 
difference it makes must be a difference from what would have 
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happened without it.  Had it been absent, its effects – some of them, 
at least, and usually all – would have been absent as well (Lewis 
1973a, 557). 
 
If we allow O(c) and O(e) to be the propositions that the events c and e occur 
respectively, then we can say that e counterfactually depends on c just in case the 
following counterfactuals are true: 
(a) O(c) □→ O(e) 
(b) ~O(c) □→ ~O(e) 
The truth-conditions that Lewis (1973, 1979) proposes for counterfactuals involve a 
similarity relation amongst possible worlds.  For any propositions A and C, the 
counterfactual A □→ C is true just in case either there are no possible A-worlds or 
every A-world amongst the set of most similar worlds is a C-world.      
 The (a)- and (b)-counterfactuals that define counterfactual dependence must 
be evaluated in a non-backtracking fashion.65  Suppose Jim is driving well over the 
speed limit and comes upon an icy patch in the road.  The speed and angle at which 
his car comes into contact with the ice causes him to momentarily lose control of 
the car threatening to send it into a ditch.  However, Jim reacts swiftly and avoids 
the ditch.  We think that if Jim had not reacted as swiftly as he did, the car would 
have ended up in the ditch.  For instance, we think it is true that had Jim been drunk, 
he would not have regained control of the car in time and would have crashed into 
the ditch.  But we might think the truth of this counterfactual is jeopardized by the 
following backtracking argument.  We must not forget that Jim is a very 
                                                
65 I shall discuss this requirement more in Section 4.2.1. 
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responsible driver and would never have gotten behind the wheel had he been 
drunk.  So if Jim had been drunk, he would not have crashed into the ditch, since he 
wouldn’t have gotten into his car in the first place. 
This reasoning involves backtracking and although Lewis thinks it is not 
always inappropriate, it is when we are trying to determine if one event is 
counterfactually dependent on another.  The proper way to evaluate the (a)- and 
(b)-counterfactuals is by considering worlds where we suppose that A holds while 
keeping fixed the past as much as possible.  In short, the most similar A-worlds are 
not those worlds where the past is substantially changed in order to make true A.  
The metric of weights and priorities Lewis eventually proposes for determining 
similarity amongst worlds in, e.g., causal contexts is intended to rule out 
backtracking evaluations.66  Here I quote Lewis at length:  
(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse 
violations of law. 
(2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal 
region throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails. 
(3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, 
simple violations of law. 
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of 
particular fact, event in matters that greatly concern us (Lewis 1979, 
472).   
 
If the antecedent of the counterfactual is false, Lewis’s metric directs us to consider 
whether the consequent holds in every world that has a history that pretty much 
exactly matches the history of the actual world except that a small, localized 
                                                
66 Hitchcock (2001) also points out that Lewis’s metric requires that we “foretrack” when 
evaluating the relevant counterfactuals.  This means that “if c causes e, we do not want to hold fixed 
e when evaluating the counterfactual ‘If c had not occurred, then …’.  If we do, the consequent of 
the conditional will obviously not be ‘e would not have occurred’” (Hitchcock 2001, 275).  So 
Lewis’s similarity metric requires that we avoid backtracking and that we always foretrack.   
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miracle occurs which makes the antecedent true.  If, however, the antecedent of the 
counterfactual is true, then the formal constraints placed on the similarity relation 
guarantee that the counterfactual is true just in case the consequent holds in the 
actual world (Lewis 1973, 560). 
Before giving Lewis’s simple counterfactual theory, let us stipulate that 
events can be causes and effects only if they actually occur.  If c and e are actual 
events, then the (a)-counterfactual (‘if c had occurred then e would have occurred’) 
which partly defines counterfactual dependence will always be true.  Therefore, 
when c and e are actual events, e counterfactually depends on c just in case the (b)-
counterfactual (‘if c had not occurred then e would not have occurred’) holds.  
Lewis first proposes to analyze causation as follows: 
When c and e are distinct events, ‘c causes e’ is true just in case (i) c 
and e actually occur and (ii) ~O(c) □→ ~O(e). 
 
However, this initial formulation is problematic.  Consider a case of so-called early 
preemption.67 
Assassin poisons Victim’s coffee, Victim drinks it and dies.  
However, if Assassin had not poisoned Victim’s coffee, then 
Backup would have, and Victim would have died anyway.   
 
Intuitively, we judge that Assassin’s poisoning of the coffee causes Victim’s death, 
but it is false that Victim would have died if Assassin had not poisoned his coffee.  
Although Assassin’s action cuts off Backup before he can even get started, the 
mere presence of Backup is enough to break the dependency between Victim’s 
death and Assassin’s action. 
                                                
67 This example is from Hitchcock (2007). 
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 Although Victim’s death fails to be counterfactually dependent upon 
Assassin’s action, it is nonetheless true that Victim’s death is counterfactually 
dependent upon the presence of poison in his coffee.  Victim’s death is not directly 
counterfactually dependent on Assassin’s action but it is indirectly through this 
intermediate event.  The death is counterfactually dependent on the presence of 
poison in Victim’s coffee which is counterfactually dependent on Assassin’s action.  
Assassin’s action is connected to Victim’s death by a “chain” of counterfactual 
dependencies.  Therefore, as a response to cases of early preemption, Lewis’s 
simple theory identifies causation with chains of stepwise counterfactual 
dependence: 
(ST) When c and e are distinct events, ‘c causes e’ is true just in 
case (i) c and e actually occur, and (ii) there is a (possibly empty) set 
of events {d1, d2, …, dn} such that ~O(c) □→ ~O(d1), ~O(d1) □→ 
~O(d2), …, ~O(dn) □→ ~O(e).  
 
It is worth mentioning that c is a cause of e if e counterfactually depends on c.  This 
kind of direct counterfactual dependence is sufficient but not necessary for 
causation (Lewis 1973, 563).  Hence, causes make a difference to their effects 
because whether the effect occurs depends (directly or indirectly) on whether the 
cause occurs. 
Section 4.2: A Defense of Counterfactualism  
Following Lewis (1973), we can say that an event e depends nomically on 
an event c just in case there is a nonempty set of laws L and a set F of true 
propositions concerning matters of particular fact such that (L & F) entails the 
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material conditional O(c) ⊃ O(e). 68   Furthermore, a proposition P1 is 
counterfactually independent of a proposition P2 if and only if P1 holds regardless 
of whether P2 holds.  According to Lewis, if the propositions in L and F are 
counterfactually independent of O(c) and (L & F) entails the right material 
conditional such that the e depends nomically on c, then it follows that e 
counterfactually depends on c (Lewis 1973, 564).  In other words, we can think of 
the nomic dependencies of e on c as “grounding” or explaining why e 
counterfactually depends on c.  It is in virtue of e’s nomic dependence on c that it is 
true that e would not have occurred had c not occurred.  As Lewis remarks, “Often, 
perhaps always, counterfactual dependences may be thus explained” (Lewis 1973, 
564). 
Lepore and Loewer (1983) suggest that Lewis’s idea of grounding 
counterfactual dependencies in nomic dependencies is one way to explain why the 
behaviors of rational agents are counterfactually dependent on their psychologies 
(Lepore and Loewer 1983, 640 – 641).  We think, as seems likely, that in the actual 
world there is a set of ceteris paribus psychological laws which describes the 
evolution of rational agents.  In any particular circumstance, given that the ceteris 
paribus conditions hold for a rational agent S, these psychological laws entail that 
S’s behaviors depend nomically on her psychological profile.  If we assume that 
these laws and their ceteris paribus conditions are counterfactually independent of 
the propositions describing S’s psychological profile, then we can conclude that S’s 
                                                
68 Presumably this holds only if the laws are deterministic.  In what follows, I will assume 
determinism for the sake of the argument, since Lewis’s (1986) amendments for probabilistic 
causation will complicate matters unnecessarily.  
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behaviors counterfactually depend on her psychological profile.  The ceteris 
paribus psychological laws support that S would not have acted as she did had her 
beliefs, desires, decisions, intentions, etc. not been what they were.  By grounding 
counterfactuals in nomic dependencies, we can justifiably claim that mentalistic 
counterfactuals like ‘Assassin would not have poisoned the coffee had he not 
wanted to kill Victim’ are true.     
Recall that the exclusion problem presents an unappealing dilemma for the 
nonreductive physicalist: a choice between mental epiphenomenalism or causal 
overdetermination.  The program I recommend for dealing with the 
epiphenomenalist horn of the exclusion dilemma starts from the contention that, in 
the right circumstances, we can truthfully say that a rational agent’s behaviors 
counterfactually depend on her psychology.  However, concluding that the mental 
events constitutive of an agent’s psychology are among the causes of their 
behaviors requires a further premise.  Although very closely related, the premise I 
offer is not Lewis’s simple theory, but instead the following sufficient condition for 
causation69: 
(ST*) When c and e are distinct events, ‘c is a cause of e’ is true if 
(i) c and e actually occur and (ii) ~O(c) □→ ~O(e). 
 
As Jonathan Schaffer (2004) has pointed out, (ST*) and the truth of mentalistic 
counterfactuals suffices to establish mental causation (Schaffer 2004, 240).  This, I 
submit, is a natural and well-motivated way of understanding how the mental 
makes a causal difference in the world. 
                                                
69 Like many others, I think cases of late and trumping preemption present insurmountable 
difficulties for the necessity of counterfactual dependence for causation. 
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The proposal, however, is not original.  Many philosophers concerned with 
avoiding the epiphenomenalist horn of the exclusion dilemma have suggested that 
mental causation can be vindicated by appealing to mentalistic counterfactuals.  
Lynne Rudder Baker (1993) says the question ‘Does what we think ever affect 
what we do?’ deserves a simple answer once we reflect on our explanatory 
practices and the truth of certain counterfactuals (Baker 1993, 93).  Tyler Burge 
(1993) suggests something similar with his remarks that the “difference” the mental 
makes is “specified by psychological causal explanations, and by counterfactuals 
associated with these explanations” (Burge 1993, 115).  Furthermore, and more 
along the lines of my proposal above, Terrance Horgan (1997) defends mental 
causation by appealing to what he considers to be a plausible and well-motivated 
conception of causation whose “leading idea is that causal properties are ones that 
figure in robust, objective, patterns of diachronic counterfactual dependence” 
(Horgan 1997, 179).  Barry Loewer (2007) argues that “this much mental causation 
is near enough to our folk conception of mental causation to underwrite the role of 
causation in folk psychology, rational deliberation, action theory, and so on” 
(Loewer 2007, 255).  If counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation, then 
mental events do make a causal difference to what we do.70   
                                                
70 Loewer (2001, 2002) suggests something slightly more complicated vis-à-vis mental causation: m 
causes e if ~O(m) □→ ~O(e) and “there is no lower level event that preempts this relation that is not 
itself preempted by m” (Loewer 2002, 660).  A lower level event preempts m with respect to e if e 
would not have occurred had the lower level event not occurred and e would have occurred had the 
lower level event occurred without m.  Loewer (2007) appears to abandon this more complicated 
proposal.  See Section 4.2.1 fn. 71 for further discussion.   
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 Before moving forward, it will be useful to make some distinctions amongst 
the aforementioned authors and to get more clear on how I understand (ST*).  
Baker (1993) recommends looking to counterfactual dependence and our 
explanatory practices to vindicate the causal efficacy of the mental, but she does so 
in such a way to avoid commitment to conceptual or metaphysical theses about 
causation.  Several passages in Burge (1993) also suggest something along these 
lines.  As I interpret them, neither author attempts to ground mental causation by 
appealing to counterfactual dependence in the exact same way that I do.  I believe 
their project is more guarded: counterfactual dependence can ground our folk-
explanatory practices as we consider the behavior of agents.  Although 
counterfactual dependence plays an important role in avoiding the threat of 
epiphenomenalism for Baker and Burge, I do not wish to lump their positions 
together with mine.  The position I shall defend in this chapter attempts to ground 
mental causation by appealing to (ST*) which I interpret as being a metaphysical 
claim about causation.  I will refer to this less guarded position as 
counterfactualism.  Amongst the proponents of counterfactualism, I include authors 
such as Horgan (1997), Loewer (2001, 2002, 2007), and Schaffer (2004b) where 
there is at least a commitment to (ST*) understood as a metaphysical thesis about 
causation.71 
 Counterfactualism attempts to vindicate mental causation by appealing to 
(ST*), a conceptual or metaphysical thesis about causation.  What this means is that 
                                                
71 Thanks to Neal Judisch for urging that I make the difference between these authors more clear. 
115  
counterfactualists take (ST*) to be a very general, and indeed necessary, truth about 
causation.  In other words, (ST*) is not just an empirical generalization about 
causal relations in the actual world, nor is it a generalization about such relations in 
a wider but still restricted set of worlds (e.g., nomologically possible worlds).  
Instead, the counterfactualist holds that (ST*) is a truth about causation that holds 
in all of the metaphysically possible worlds.  When the counterfactualist says that 
(ST*) is a necessary truth, they mean it in an absolute or unrestricted sense of 
necessity.  That is, for any metaphysically possible world w, if there is 
counterfactual dependence between distinct events in w, there is causation between 
those events in w.  As should be fairly clear, the counterfactualist need not hold that 
the reverse is the case: they might believe that there are possible worlds in which 
causation but no counterfactual dependence is instantiated between distinct events.  
I am one of these counterfactualists (see fn. 66).  Therefore, I do not hold that 
counterfactual dependence is somehow conceptually prior or more fundamental 
than causation, but only that these concepts are tied to one another as specified in 
(ST*).  On the other hand, the counterfactualist does hold that counterfactual 
dependence is explanatorily prior to causation.  This is why they claim we are able 
to ground or explain why mental events are among the causes of bodily effects by 
appealing to facts about counterfactual dependence. 
 In the next few sections I shall argue for counterfactualism, the view that 
(ST*) can adequately ground and thereby vindicate mental causation.  However, 
Jaegwon Kim (1998, 2007) has mounted several arguments against 
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counterfactualism.  He claims that counterfactual dependence is not enough to 
“vindicate mental causal efficacy and … dissipate our epiphenomenalist worries” 
(Kim 2007, 236).  Kim’s first reason centers around his conception of what our 
philosophical task is in our attempt to vindicate mental causation.  If mentalistic 
counterfactuals are true, they must be made true by something. Mentalistic 
counterfactuals merely mark the surface of some ill-understood phenomenon and 
the real philosophical task is to understand this phenomenon.  The second, and 
more serious concern, is Kim’s claim that the truth of mentalistic counterfactuals is 
consistent with the mental being utterly non-efficacious (Kim 2007, 234).  In other 
words, Kim argues that the counterfactualist cannot distinguish between genuine 
causal relations and pseudo-causal relations that hold between mental events and 
bodily effects.  The final problem concerns the connection between agency and 
mental causation.  According to Kim, agency requires mental causation to be a 
“thick” or productive relation, a kind of relation inconsistent with that 
recommended by (ST*).  This, Kim argues, shows that (ST*) cannot sustain the 
mental causation required by genuine agency.  The first part of my defense of 
counterfactualism will be to address each of these concerns. 
Section 4.2.1: Pseudo-Causal Relations and Mental Causation 
 Recently, Jaegwon Kim (1998, 2007) has stressed that counterfactual 
dependence cannot do the work of grounding mental causation.  The following 
passage summarizes nicely Kim’s reasons for being skeptical of counterfactualism: 
What the counterfactual theorists need to do is to give an account of 
just what makes those mind-body counterfactuals we want for 
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mental causation true, and show that on that account those 
counterfactuals we don’t want, for example, epiphenomenalist 
counterfactuals, turn out to be false.  Merely to point to the apparent 
truth, and acceptability, of certain mind-body counterfactuals as a 
vindication of mind-body causation is to misconstrue the 
philosophical task at hand (Kim 1998, 71). 
 
The first reason Kim cites is that the counterfactualist leaves unanswered the real 
question: why are the mentalistic counterfactuals true?  As he says, simply 
asserting that they are “misconstrues” our philosophical task of vindicating mental 
causation.  The second reason is that in some cases the counterfactualist is 
committed to the presence of mental causation when ex hypothesi there is no such 
causation.  For instance, Kim thinks the counterfactualist cannot distinguish 
between pseudo-causal relations and genuine causal relations.  Let us consider each 
of these objections in turn. 
One way of understanding Kim’s request for what makes mentalistic 
counterfactuals true should be satisfied by noting that counterfactuals are nomically 
grounded.  Before presenting (ST*), I introduced Lewis’s proposal that 
counterfactuals are explained by nomological dependencies.  Roughly, the idea is 
that, given some further assumptions, we can explain why certain mentalistic 
counterfactuals are true by appealing to the ceteris paribus psychological laws that 
govern the evolution of rational agents.  It is true that Assassin would not have 
poisoned the coffee had he not wanted to kill Victim because in all of the most 
similar worlds in which Assassin does not want to kill Victim he does not poison 
the coffee.  Whether this is so depends in part on the laws governing the actual 
world, since world similarity is evaluated inter alia in terms of “similarity in 
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conformity to laws of the actual world” (Loewer 2002, 660).  Furthermore, Lewis’s 
proposed similarity metric directs us to evaluate the counterfactuals that define 
counterfactual dependence by considering those worlds that match the history of 
the actual world as much as possible and that contain a small, local inconspicuous 
violation of law which makes the antecedent true.  Hence, what the laws of the 
actual world are “determines what counts as a ‘small violation’” (Loewer 2007, 
256).  Grounding mentalistic counterfactuals in psychological laws and showing 
how they follow from such laws explains why these counterfactuals are true.72   
Nevertheless, I think Kim would be unsatisfied by these remarks.  Consider 
what he says with respect to Fodor’s solution to the problem posed by 
epiphenomenalism: 
To be sure, if there are causal laws in psychology, they will license 
ascriptions of causal responsibility to psychological properties and 
ground psychological causal relations.  The crucial question 
unaddressed by Fodor is whether psychological laws are causal laws 
– that is, whether the regularities we observe in the psychological 
domain are causal regularities (Kim 2007, 232). 
 
And Kim explains that Fodor’s neglect of this question results from his “regularist-
nomological conception of causation” (Kim 2007, 232).  One could easily translate 
this very complaint against the counterfactualist: 
If there are causal laws in psychology, they will license ascriptions 
of causal responsibility to psychological properties and ground 
psychological causal relations.  The crucial question unaddressed by 
the counterfactualist is whether psychological laws are causal laws – 
                                                
72 Kim would seem to agree with this point when he remarks that “one crucial respect in which the 
comparative similarity of worlds is to be determined evidently involves the similarity of laws 
holding in them.  It is difficult to see how evaluations of [counterfactual] conditionals … could 
avoid adverting to laws and regularities” (Kim 2007, 234). 
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that is, whether the regularities we observe in the psychological 
domain are causal regularities. 
 
Presumably, Kim would make a similar complaint that the counterfactualist’s 
neglect of this question results from their counterfactual conception of causation.  
Now, recall that the counterfactualist wants to explain mental causation in terms of 
mentalistic counterfactuals and, furthermore, claim that these counterfactuals are 
grounded in the psychological laws of the actual world.  But, for Kim, the real 
philosophical task is determining whether these psychological laws are causal laws.  
In short, the counterfactualist’s appeal to (ST*) to ground mental causation reverses 
the proper direction of explanation.  It is not counterfactuals (and laws) that ground 
causation, but causation that grounds counterfactuals and laws.       
 This criticism is difficult to assess because I believe it reflects a deep and 
fundamental philosophical disagreement about the nature of laws and causation.  
Yet, on the other hand, Kim’s criticism looks to beg the question against the 
counterfactualist.  The counterfactualist project is premised on explaining mental 
causation in terms of the counterfactuals defining counterfactual dependence.  As 
outlined above, these counterfactuals can be explained by inter alia the 
psychological laws of the actual world.  So, Kim’s charge that the counterfactualist 
neglects the real task of determining whether these laws are causal looks to be, at 
bottom, an expression of his dissatisfaction with their project.  If certain mentalistic 
counterfactuals are true and (ST*) presents a genuine sufficient condition for 
causation, Kim’s further requests seem inappropriate.  But Kim is not without a 
response here, for he questions whether (ST*) presents a genuine sufficient 
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condition for causation.  Are the psychological laws real, genuine causal 
regularities or “mere reflections of the causal regularities at a more fundamental 
level” (Kim 2007, 232)?  What he tells us is that there is a difference between 
“genuine, productive and generative causal processes” and “the noncausal 
regularities that are observed because they are parasitic on real causal processes” 
(Kim 1998, 45). 
 The difficulty, then, for the counterfactualist is the problem of pseudo-
causal relations.  Suppose there are psychological laws and that these laws ground 
the right kinds of mentalistic counterfactuals.  This is still not enough to ground 
mental causation because the truth of these counterfactuals is consistent with there 
being no real, genuine causation involving mental events at all.  Perhaps, as Kim 
suggests, “the observed regularity arises out of a genuine causal process” at a lower 
level where all the real causation is happening (Kim 2007, 234).  If Kim can show 
us that this is a real possibility, the kind of “mental causation” the counterfactualist 
presents to us will be a mere facsimile, a pseudo-causal relation at best, and not the 
genuine thing.  Kim’s charge is that (ST*) is committed to mental causation when 
ex hypothesi there is none.     
Jill thinks she left her keys on the bookstore counter so she returns to the 
bookstore.  However, Jill’s thought is epiphenomenal with respect to her returning 
to the bookstore and it is some neurophysiological event n in Jill’s brain that is a 
cause of both her thought that she left her keys on the bookstore counter and of her 
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returning to the bookstore.  Kim claims that in the circumstances outlined above the 
following counterfactual is intuitively true (Kim 1998, 71): 
(E) If Jill’s thought had not occurred, then she would not have 
returned to the bookstore.   
 
Presumably, if Jill’s thought had not occurred, the neurophysiological event n that 
caused it would not have occurred and she would not have returned to the 
bookstore.  This is problematic, since ex hypothesi Jill’s thought is an 
epiphenomenon, yet (ST*) delivers the verdict that Jill’s thought causes her 
returning to the bookstore. 
The counterfactualist has a straightforward reply to Kim’s objection: the 
counterfactual (E) is evaluated incorrectly.  Kim’s evaluation involves backtracking, 
which Lewis explicitly forbids when he defines counterfactual dependence (see 
Section 4.1).  If we use Lewis’s similarity metric, then the set of most similar 
worlds includes those worlds where Jill’s thought does not occur, its cause n still 
does, and Jill still returns to the bookstore.  The most similar worlds involve a 
“small, local miracle” which violates the causal law connecting n with Jill’s 
thought, but does not interfere with the occurrence of n or the causal law linking it 
with Jill’s returning to the bookstore.  Hence, if we evaluate the counterfactual 
properly, it comes out false.  As Loewer (2002) points out, when “evaluating 
Lewis’s counterfactual account of causation, one must employ counterfactuals 
characterized by Lewis’s proposed similarity relation and not merely appeal to 
intuitions about counterfactuals” (Loewer 2002, 322). 
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Next, consider a scenario similar to the one above, but this time Jill’s 
thought emerges from, and is not caused by, the neurophysiological event n and it 
is n that causes Jill’s returning to the bookstore.  Once again, Jill’s thought is 
stipulated to be epiphenomenal with respect to her returning to the bookstore.  
Again, Kim claims that in these circumstances (E) is intuitively true (Kim 2007, 
234).  Presumably, if Jill’s thought had not occurred, its “neural basal conditions” n 
would not have occurred and so Jill would not have returned to the bookstore.  This 
poses the same problem for the counterfactualist, since ex hypothesi Jill’s thought is 
epiphenomenal with respect to her returning to the bookstore, yet (ST*) licenses the 
conclusion that the emergent mental event is a cause of her bookstore returning 
behavior.   
 The counterfactualist should reply that Kim has once again evaluated the 
counterfactual (E) incorrectly; although, this time the issue is that Kim gives more 
weight to avoiding inconspicuous, local violations of law than to maximizing the 
spatiotemporal region throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails.  
The question is which of the following sets of worlds are more similar to the world 
considered as actual.  The first set contains worlds in which Jill’s thought does not 
occur because its neurophysiological base does not occur.  In these worlds, Jill does 
not return to the bookstore.  The second set contains worlds in which Jill’s thought 
does not occur because the “emergent law” connecting the neurophysiological base 
to Jill’s thought is violated.  In these worlds, the neural basal conditions still occur 
and so Jill still returns to the bookstore.  The first set of worlds matches the world 
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considered as actual less in matters of particular fact than the second set of worlds 
(i.e., the basal conditions fail to occur in the first set but still occur in the second 
set).  On the other hand, the second set of worlds matches the world considered as 
actual less in conformity to its laws than the first set of worlds (i.e., the emergent 
law is violated in the second set but not the first). 
Now, Kim appears to think that the first set of worlds is more similar to the 
world considered as actual than the second set of worlds.  But if we appeal to 
Lewis’s similarity metric, this is simply mistaken.  Lewis (1979) tells us that it is 
more important to “maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout which perfect 
match of particular fact prevails” than to avoid small, local violations of law (Lewis 
1979, 472).  Hence, the second set of worlds with its more extensive match of 
particular fact and a small violation of the emergent law is more similar to the 
world considered as actual than the first set of worlds.  This means that when 
evaluated properly according to Lewis’s similarity metric, (ST*) derives the correct 
result that (E) is false.  As long as we are careful in our evaluation of the 
counterfactual (E), neither scenario poses a problem for the counterfactualist.73 
 Although these responses are technically correct, and we must appreciate 
Loewer’s point that evaluating mentalistic counterfactuals must be done by using 
                                                
73 Loewer (2001, 2002) offers a slightly different solution to these cases than in his (2007).  He 
takes counterfactual dependence with some additional requirements as sufficient for causation (see 
fn. 70).  To avoid the conclusion that (E) is true in either scenario, Loewer holds that the 
neurophysiological event n preempts Jill’s thought with respect to her returning to the bookstore.  
This means that Loewer thinks that (a) Jill would not have returned to the bookstore had the 
neurophysiological event n not occurred and (b) Jill would have returned to the bookstore had n 
occurred without Jill’s thought.  The additional requirements outlined in fn. 70 seem to me 
unmotivated and a simpler solution is to hold, as Loewer (2007) appears to, that Kim evaluates (E) 
incorrectly.               
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Lewis’s similarity metric, there is something unpersuasive about these replies.74  
Why, for example, should backtracking be banned in causal contexts?  Additionally, 
what reason is there to place more weight on maximizing match of particular fact 
than conformity to laws?  If all that separates the counterfactualist from the 
epiphenomenalist is which worlds count as most similar to actuality, it seems as if 
we are asking Lewis’s metric to do a lot of heavy duty philosophical work.  I 
cannot deny that there is something to the residual feeling that counterfactualism 
has merely stipulated mental causation into existence rather than truly vindicating it.  
Though I cannot develop a full-fledged defense of the Lewis’s metric here, I do 
want to offer a potential diagnosis of why there remains a resistance to it and 
reiterate some reasons in its favor. 
We should recognize that Lewis’s similarity metric is not the only one 
available in our everyday evaluation of counterfactuals.  It is no part of Lewis’s 
simple theory and (ST*) that the proposed metric which disallows backtracking is 
the only correct way to evaluate counterfactuals.  As is well recognized, 
counterfactuals are “infected with vagueness” and the different ways of resolving 
this vagueness involve different metrics to compare similarity amongst worlds.  If 
some of these metrics allow backtracking (which some certainly do) (see, e.g., the 
example discussed in Section 4.1), this at least partly accounts for why there 
remains some resistance to the idea that we should disallow backtracking in causal 
contexts.  But this, I think, only makes the question of why we should accept 
                                                
74 I want to thank Martin Montminy and Neal Judisch for pressing these worries. 
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Lewis’s metric more forceful, since it is not intuitively the most plausible, nor is it 
the one we always employ in our evaluation of counterfactuals.  The answer is that 
there are good theoretical reasons to adopt Lewis’s similarity metric especially in 
causal contexts.     
(a) Lewis (1979) notes an asymmetry in counterfactual dependence.  The 
future counterfactually depends on the present and the present on the past, but “it is 
at best doubtful whether the past depends counterfactually on the present, whether 
the present depends on the future, and in general whether the way things are earlier 
depends on the way things will be later” (Lewis 1979, 455).  He argues that this 
asymmetry is a plausible explanation of the asymmetry of causation (i.e., that 
causes ordinarily precede their effects in time) and the asymmetry in our 
conception of the future as an open, “multitude of alternative possibilities” and the 
past as a closed, fixed “actuality”.  If backtracking is permitted in ordinary contexts 
(and is not, as Lewis says, only permitted in special contexts), then we no longer 
have the explanation of these asymmetries at our disposal.  The truth of various 
backtracking counterfactuals entails that the past is counterfactually dependent on 
the present and the present on the future.  This is a marked loss in explanatory 
power. 
(b) Bennett (1974) argues that we cannot permit backtracking in ordinary 
contexts if we are to have “good grounds” for believing in the truth of 
counterfactuals.  Suppose the world is deterministic.  If we allow backtracking, 
then any counterfactual antecedent entails “an earlier difference which will imply a 
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still earlier one which … and so on back for a million years” (Bennett 1974, 391).  
Furthermore, if we trace these earlier differences in the past forward through time 
in accordance with the deterministic laws, we end up with a very different future 
and likely one we have no good idea about.  As Bennett says, the point is “we 
cannot do this” and “because we cannot do it, we adopt [similarity] standards 
which don’t require us to do it” (Bennett 1974, 391).  Our similarity metric permits 
us to make counterfactual suppositions about the present while holding the past 
fixed as much as possible, that is, we disallow backtracking.  Note that the 
assumption of determinism is crucial in Bennett’s reasoning above. If 
indeterminism is true, then a counterfactual antecedent does not entail a difference 
in the past and so on back a million years.  But surely it would be absurd to suppose 
that we can only have good grounds for believing in the truth of counterfactuals if 
indeterminism is true.    
(c) Lewis’s simple theory and (ST*) have seemed to many to be a plausible 
and well-motivated analysis of causation.  But if we permitted backtracking in 
causal contexts neither analysis gets even the simplest cases of causation correct.75  
If our counterfactual supposition is that some effect e had not occurred, this entails 
that its cause c would have to have not occurred.  The truth of backtracking 
counterfactuals such as ‘if e had not occurred then c would not have occurred’ 
means that an effect e is a cause of its cause c.  This absurd result places in 
jeopardy the simple theory’s and (ST*)’s claim to be at the very least a plausible 
                                                
75 See (Hall 2004, 233 – 234) for a similar point. 
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analysis of causation.  So unless the simple theory and (ST*) are just obviously 
mistaken, there must be a ban on backtracking in causal contexts. 
(d) Lewis’s non-backtracking similarity metric reflects an important 
connection between causation and manipulation.76  The idea is that changing or 
intervening on a cause is a means to or effective strategy for manipulating its 
effects.  If an intervention took place changing whether some event occurs, this 
should influence the manner in which its effects occur or perhaps even whether its 
effects occur at all.  When Lewis’s non-backtracking metric instructs us to hold the 
past fixed as much as possible and posit a small, inconspicuous miracle making our 
counterfactual supposition true, this miracle corresponds roughly to a potential 
intervention made on a cause to manipulate its effects. 
(e) The idea of holding the past fixed as much as is possible and positing a 
“simple, localized, inconspicuous” miracle has an analogue in experimental design 
and is reflected in the reasoning that underlies experiments meant to discover 
causal relationships.77   
Suppose a scientist wants to discover the relationship, if any, that holds 
between some variable V1 and another variable V2.  In the simplest kind of 
experiment, the scientist controls the value of the independent variable V1 and 
observes changes, if any, that manifest in the value of the dependent variable V2.  If, 
under the conditions of the experiment, changes in the value of V1 are correlated 
with changes in the value of V2, then usually an inference is made that values of V1 
                                                
76 Some authors have argued this connection is conceptual (see, e.g., Woodward 2003). 
77 See (Menzies 2003, 151) for a similar point. 
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make a causal difference to the values V2.  However, this inference from 
correlation to causation can be undermined if it is shown that the experimental 
manipulations performed by the scientist on the independent variable involved 
some confounding factor (i.e., a “gratuitous” departure from the control conditions) 
that could influence the value of the dependent variable.  The ideal experiment is 
one in which changes in the independent variable involves only the changes 
necessary to determine if there is some change in the dependent variable.  If 
experiments designed to discover causal relationships are properly conducted, they 
should hold fixed as much as they possibly can, introduce a “small, localized” 
change somewhere in the experimental conditions, and determine if this is 
correlated with a change in the dependent variable.78   
There is a striking similarity here to what Lewis’s non-backtracking metric 
instructs us to do when evaluating the counterfactuals relevant in causal contexts.  
Imagine the actual world as the control conditions in which distinct events c and e 
occur.  According to Lewis’s metric, the set of most similar worlds are the 
experimental conditions in which we hold the past fixed as much as is possible, 
posit a small, local miracle such that the event c does not occur.  We then make a 
“difference observation” to determine if the event e occurs.  If it does not occur, 
then the simple theory and (ST*) license the conclusion that c makes a causal 
difference to e.  If we allow backtracking, then our counterfactual supposition that c 
                                                
78 As Menzies (2003) points out, this is the idea behind J.S. Mill’s method of difference which 
involves “a difference observation between a positive instance in which some effect E is present and 
a negative instance in which E is absent.  If some condition C is present in the positive instance and 
absent in the negative instance, it is, at least, part of what makes the difference to E” (Menzies 2003, 
151). 
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does not occur would entail that some earlier event(s) would had to have not 
occurred which has the potential to influence whether the event e occurs.  Lewis’s 
ban on backtracking in causal contexts is analogous to the scientist’s attempt to 
minimize the presence of confounding factors in experimental design.     
For these reasons, I believe there is strong epistemic pressure to accept 
Lewis’s non-backtracking similarity metric, which gives more weight to 
maximizing the region of match of particular fact then avoiding violations of law. 
 Yet there remains the residual feeling that counterfactualism presents us 
with an inadequate account of mental causation.  I believe this feeling stems partly 
from the intuition that the kind of causation, the kind of mental causation, we are 
ultimately left with is pretty “thin”.  If it is causation at all, it is “causation lite” and 
lacks the substance of the real thing.  This seems to amount to the position that 
counterfactual dependence really isn’t sufficient for causation after all, since (ST*) 
cannot guarantee that causes produce or generate their effects.  As Elizabeth 
Anscombe writes: 
Causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its cause.  
This is the core, the common feature, of causality in its various 
kinds.  Effects derive from, arise out of, come of, their causes.  For 
example, everyone will grant that physical parenthood is a causal 
relation (Anscombe 1993, 91 – 92).   
 
Counterfactualism simply does not present us with a robust enough conception of 
causation to satisfy our intuitions that causes produce and generate their effects, 
that causes are “something from which the effects derive their existence and 
occurrence” (Kim 2007, 235).  In the next section, we will see that the intuition that 
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causation is a productive or generative relation has a prominent role in Kim’s final 
argument against counterfactualism.  I shall argue that his argument falls short of 
its intended conclusion and then, in Section 4.2.3, I address this production 
intuition more directly. 
Section 4.2.2: Agency and Mental Causation 
 The most recent problem raised by Kim (2007) against the counterfactualist 
concerns the connection between agency and mental causation.  He argues that 
agency requires “thick” or productive causation in which “causes are connected to 
their effects via spatiotemporally continuous sequences of causal intermediaries” 
(Hall 2004b, 225).  Therefore, our account of mental causation must satisfy the 
strictures placed on the causal relations involved in an agent’s bringing things 
about in the world.  He remarks,   
It seems to me that mere counterfactual dependence is not enough to 
sustain the causal relation involved in our idea of acting upon the 
natural course of events and bringing about changes so as to 
actualize what we desire and intend (Kim 2007, 236).   
 
I could not agree more with Kim that “we care about mental causation because we 
care about human agency” (Kim 2007, 236).  Cursory reflection reveals that agency 
requires among other things the causal efficacy of a wide variety of mental 
phenomena (beliefs, desires, intentions, choices, decisions, etc.).  If such mental 
phenomena ended up, as it were, making no difference to the ways in which our 
bodies move, then the conception of ourselves as genuine agents – actors in the 
world who bring things about – would be swept right from underneath us. 
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However, notwithstanding our agreement on that point, Kim argues the 
connection between mental causation and agency has troublesome consequences 
for counterfactualism.  He reasons as follows: 
An agent is someone who, on account of her beliefs, desires, 
emotions, intentions, and the like, has the capacity to perform 
actions in the physical world: that is, to cause her limbs and other 
bodily parts (e.g., vocal cords) to move in appropriate ways so as to 
bring about changes in the arrangement of objects and events around 
her – open a door, pick up the morning paper, and make a cup of 
coffee.  It seems to me that without productive causation, which 
respects the locality/contiguity condition, such causal processes are 
not possible (my emphasis) (Kim 2007, 236). 
 
What Kim is saying here is that real, genuine agency is not possible without 
causation that guarantees mental events to be connected to their effects by 
spatiotemporally local and contiguous processes.  He elaborates that these 
processes are “constituted by phenomena such as energy flow and momentum 
transfer, an actual movement of some (conserved) quantity” (Kim 2007, 236).  Of 
course, mere counterfactual dependence between events does not guarantee that the 
events are connected in this way and, in fact, the events need not be connected at 
all.79  The conclusion, then, is that human agency requires something more than 
                                                
79 Cases of “double prevention” make this point clear: 
 
Suzy is piloting a bomber on a mission to blow up an enemy target, and Billy is 
piloting a fighter as her lone escort.  Along comes an enemy fighter plane, piloted 
by Enemy.  Sharp-eyed Billy spots Enemy, zooms in, pulls the trigger, and 
Enemy’s plane goes down in flames.  Suzy’s mission is undisturbed, and the 
bombing takes place as planned.  If Billy hadn’t pulled the trigger, Enemy would 
have eluded him and shot down Suzy, and the bombing would not have happened 
(Hall 2004, 241). 
  
We can add that Billy’s shooting down of Enemy took place in a region of space far removed from 
Suzy’s bombing of the target.  Presumably, this helps to make it more clear that no local and 
contiguous process connects the events.  So, although the bombing is counterfactually dependent on 
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counterfactual dependence between mental events and their effects; only “thick”, 
productive mental causation will do. 
 The question that Kim leaves unanswered is why human agency is not 
possible without productive mental causation.  The answer appears to be that such a 
notion of mental causation is a part of our very concept of an agent, that is, we 
know a priori that the mental causation involved in agency involves 
spatiotemporally local and contiguous processes connecting cause and effect.  That 
this is the sense in which human agency is not possible without “thick” mental 
causation is suggested by Kim’s remarks that “mere counterfactual dependence is 
not enough to sustain the causal relation involved in our idea of acting upon the 
natural course of events” (my emphasis) (Kim 2007, 236).  Assuming that Kim’s 
view is that agency requires productive mental causation as a matter of conceptual 
necessity, I find his claim highly dubious.  Many religious traditions countenance 
the genuine possibility of wholly disembodied agencies and, given that the concept 
of such an agency plays an important role in many human lives, there is prima facie 
reason to think that it is coherent.  For instance, the God of the Abrahamic 
traditions is thought of as an agency whose volitions not only brought into 
existence the physical universe as a whole, but also make a difference to the 
physical events that happen therein.  Yet the idea of the Abrahamic God involves 
an entirely non-physical entity whose volitions could not be connected to their 
                                                                                                                                   
Billy’s action, there is no spatiotemporal connection between them.  See (Hall 2004a, 2004b) for a 
detailed discussion of these kinds of cases. 
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effects via any spatiotemporally local and contiguous processes.80  A wholly 
disembodied agency like the Abrahamic God is prima facie a genuine conceptual 
possibility.  If this is right, then Kim’s claim that from the very concept of an agent 
we know that mental events are connected to their effects via spatiotemporally local 
and contiguous processes is mistaken.  
Furthermore, there is a way of understanding a suggestion by Loewer 
(2007) which also undermines Kim’s claim about agency requiring productive 
mental causation.  Loewer asks us to suppose that 
The batteries of counterfactuals that are associated with volitional 
control of bodily movement, with stimuli and perceptual belief, with 
rational thinking, and so on obtain but without the transfer of energy 
and without productive causation connecting individual events.  
Perhaps this would be the situation, if, as Jonathan Edwards81 
seemed to think, one state of the universe doesn’t produce the next 
via law but rather the states are produced one after another by God 
in a manner of a movie projector … Would we stop taking aspirin 
for headaches, cease taking seriously the readings on thermometers, 
and so on?  Would we think that causation as dependence (without 
production) is not worth having? (Loewer 2007, 258 – 259). 
 
Intuitively, we think of Loewer’s world without “thick” mental causation as a 
world where there is still genuine agency, since humans are still able to exercise 
volitional control over their behaviors.  My decision to take an aspirin for 
headaches is still something that I do, it is still something under my control, even 
                                                
80 I do not mean to suggest that God’s volitional action on the physical world is entirely 
unproblematic.  I only point out that the concept of a disembodied agency like God does not involve 
a contradiction and so the idea of having an agency which influences the world without a 
spatiotemporally contiguous process connecting cause and effect is not contradictory. 
81 In a discussion of persistence through time, Edwards tells us that “the existence of created 
substance, in each successive moment” is “wholly the effect of God’s immediate power, in that 
moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of nothing”.  
See Jonathan Edwards, ed. C.H. Faust and T.H. Johnson (New York, 1935): 335. 
134  
though no local and contiguous process connects my decision to my taking of the 
aspirin.  The claim that there is no real agency in this world, no real mental 
causation, is hard to swallow given that it remains true that what I decide makes a 
difference to what I do.  I wouldn’t have taken the aspirin and been relieved of my 
headache if I hadn’t decided to take it.  If this is the right way to describe such a 
possibility, then again, pace Kim, agency does not require, in the relevant sense, a 
local and contiguous process connecting mental events with their effects. 
As I have tried to make clear, Kim openly proceeds from conceptual 
considerations; it is from our very concept of an agent that it is claimed we know 
mental causes must be connected to their effects via local and contiguous processes.  
Hence, Kim’s own argumentative strategy against the counterfactualist is 
vulnerable to the conceptual possibilities outlined above.  His thesis is false if it is 
understood as giving conceptual conditions for agency.  But perhaps it remains true 
if it is understood instead as a claim about the way agency is realized in the actual 
world and nomically similar ones.  Specifically, this modified form of Kim’s thesis 
states that the mental causation sustaining agency in this restricted set of worlds 
involves mental events which are connected to their effects via spatiotemporally 
local and contiguous processes.82  This thesis is consistent with the conceptual 
possibility of disembodied agencies, like the Abrahamic God, and Loewer’s world 
and so is impervious to the aforementioned objections. 
                                                
82 This modified thesis will likely seem plausible to those philosophers who eschew a “conceptual 
analysis” of causation for an empirical characterization of what actual world relations are causal.  
See, for example, (Dowe 2000, 2004). 
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More importantly, an argument similar to the one initially raised by Kim 
can still be employed against the counterfactualist.  Consider the following: in the 
actual world, agency is not possible without causation that guarantees mental 
events to be connected to their effects by spatiotemporally local and contiguous 
processes; (ST*) cannot guarantee that in the actual world mental events are 
connected to their bodily effects in this way; therefore, agency, at least as it is 
realized in the actual world, requires something more than mere counterfactual 
dependence.  Without a doubt, counterfactualism should be rejected if the causation 
recommended by (ST*) cannot sustain agency as it is actually realized.  Luckily for 
the counterfactualist, the kind of productive mental causation referenced by Kim’s 
thesis is inconsistent with the way in which mental causal relations are 
implemented in the human organism.  In the next section, I argue for this claim and 
discuss its consequences for avoiding the epiphenomenalist horn of the exclusion 
dilemma.83 
 If my objections in this section are on the mark, I believe there is sufficient 
reason to reject the initial formulation of Kim’s final argument against 
counterfactualism.  However, we might still wonder exactly what real, genuine 
agency “requires” in an absolute and unrestricted sense of that term.  The answer, I 
believe, is Loewer’s idea of volitional control: agency is impossible without the 
capacity to exercise the right kind of volitional control over one’s bodily 
movements. As an illustration of this idea, consider the important and influential 
                                                
83 See (Schaffer 2000a, 288 – 289) for a brief discussion of this kind. 
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theory developed by Fischer and Ravizza (1998) in which the agency required for 
moral responsibility is understood in terms of guidance control.  An agent exhibits 
guidance control of some action when the action issues from the agent’s own 
moderately reasons-responsive mechanism.  Roughly, Fischer and Ravizza argue 
that a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism is to be understood as a 
mechanism that displays an appropriate sort of receptivity and reactivity to reasons.  
A mechanism with the appropriate sort of receptivity is such that there is some 
(nomologically) possible world in which the same kind of mechanism operates in 
which the agent would recognize something as a sufficient reason to do other than 
she actually did.  Furthermore, the mechanism is disposed to respond to a regular 
and understandable pattern of actual and hypothetical reasons, some of which are 
moral reasons (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 68 – 73).  A mechanism with the 
appropriate sort of reactivity is such that there is some (nomologically) possible 
world such that the same kind of mechanism operates, the agent recognizes there is 
a sufficient reason to do otherwise, and the agent does otherwise for that reason 
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 73 – 76). 
Importantly, the agent’s mechanism must also be the agent’s “own” in the 
sense that the agent has in the past, and most likely as a result of their moral 
education, taken responsibility for acting from that particular kind of mechanism 
(e.g., the mechanism of practical reason) (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 215).84  They 
explain, 
                                                
84 Fischer and Ravizza point out that practical reason is not the only kind of mechanism an agent 
can take responsibility for and so is not the only mechanism which grounds the agent’s moral 
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First, an agent must view himself – when acting from certain 
mechanisms – as an agent; he must see that certain upshots in the 
world are the results of his choices and actions.  Second, an agent 
must view himself as an apt target for the reactive attitudes … 
Finally, the cluster of beliefs specified by the first two conditions 
must be based, in an appropriate way, on the individual’s evidence 
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 238).   
 
In short, an agent’s taking responsibility for a mechanism of a certain kind consists 
in having a cluster of evidentially grounded beliefs about oneself and actions that 
stem from mechanisms of that kind. 
Although this is only a very rough characterization, it is straightforward that 
Fischer and Ravizza’s theory involves the causal efficacy of mental events.  
However, central to our present purposes, their analysis of both moderate-reasons 
responsiveness and taking responsibility does not explicitly demand that events be 
connected to their effects via spatiotemporally local and contiguous processes.  It 
appears entirely irrelevant to the agency that sustains responsibility that the events 
constitutive of the agential mechanisms be connected by spatiotemporally local and 
contiguous processes or transfer to one another some conserved physical quantity.  
While Fischer and Ravizza’s theory remains controversial, it is a plausible and 
influential take on the analysis of the agency required for moral responsibility, a 
take that is prima facie entirely consistent with the counterfactualist account of 
mental causation. 
My discussion in the last two sections leads me to conclude that Kim falls 
short of providing reasonable grounds for his claim that (ST*) cannot ground 
                                                                                                                                   
responsibility.  Other non-reflective kinds of mechanisms (e.g., habit) can issue in actions for which 
the agent can be properly held morally responsible (see (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 46 – 51, 214 – 
215)).   
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mental causation.  There are well-motivated reasons from which the 
counterfactualist can distinguish genuine mental causation from pseudo-causal 
relations.  Additionally, there is prima facie reason to doubt Kim’s initial thesis that 
agency requires mental causes to be connected to their effects via spatiotemporally 
local and contiguous processes.  At best, agency demands the exercise of a certain 
kind of volitional control.  Moreover, if we find it plausible to understand this idea 
along the lines of Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) analysis of guidance control, 
agency can be sustained by the kind of causation recommended by (ST*). 
Section 4.2.3: The Price of Mental Causation 
 In Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, I have been primarily concerned with answering 
the criticisms of counterfactualism raised by Kim (1998, 2007).  Despite the 
shortcomings of these criticisms, I believe there remains a stubborn resistance to 
counterfactualism as an adequate solution to the epiphenomenalist horn of the 
exclusion dilemma.  The issue, at its most basic level, is that something just seems 
to be missing from the picture of mental causal efficacy recommended by the 
counterfactualist.  Above I called this the production intuition: causation is a 
productive or generative relation between events.  The problem for 
counterfactualism is that a true vindication of mental causation should reveal it to 
be a productive or generative relation.  The production intuition motivates much of 
Kim’s skepticism toward counterfactualism, since counterfactual dependence does 
not guarantee mental causes are productive causes.  However, in this section, I 
would like to show that the counterfactualist can go on the offensive against this 
139  
production intuition.  I shall argue that the price of vindicating mental causation, at 
least in the human organism, is abandoning causation as a productive relation.  My 
argument relies on empirical claims about the physiological mechanisms of human 
action used by Schaffer (2000a, 2004a) in his defense of causation by 
disconnection.  I believe the conclusions drawn here tell us something deeply 
important about our approach to vindicating the causal efficacy of our minds. 
 When c is causally related to e, there is some “mechanism” or underlying 
structure which we can say implements this causal relation.  These causal 
mechanisms have traditionally been illustrated using neuron diagrams with the 
following conventions: dark circles represent firing neurons and occurring events; 
empty circles represent non-firing neurons and absences; lines headed with arrows 
represent a stimulatory connection between neurons and a causal relation between 
events.  Here is a simple example illustrating these conventions in which Terrorist’s 
pressing of the detonator causes an explosion of a bomb. 
   
  
 
Figure 1: Simple Causal Mechanism 
Figure 1 reveals the underlying structure which implements this causal relation: the 
pressing generates an electrical current which triggers the fuse and leads to the 
bomb’s explosion.  What this simple causal mechanism reveals is that the pressing 
is physically connected to the explosion.  There are no absences, breaks, or 
Pressing Explosion Electrical 
Current 
Trigger 
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disconnections in the causal chain running from the pressing of the detonator to the 
explosion, that is, a spatiotemporally local and contiguous process connects the 
cause with its effect. 
But intuitively not all causal relations are implemented in this fashion.  We 
need to introduce another convention to illustrate this.  Lines headed with dots 
represent inhibitory connections between neurons.  These inhibitory connections 
depict one event preventing another from occurring.  Inhibitory connections are 
standardly understood to take priority over stimulatory connections in the sense that 
if two neurons are connected by a stimulatory connection, the second fires if the 
first does so long as no other neuron inhibits it.85  Now, consider a case of “double 
prevention” given by Ned Hall (2004b), mentioned previously (in fn. 76), in which 
Suzy is piloting a bomber on a mission to blow up an enemy target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Standard Case of “Double Prevention” 
Figure 2 reveals that Billy’s shooting down of Enemy prevented Enemy from 
shooting down Suzy, which would have prevented Suzy from firing at and thus 
                                                
85 I follow (Schaffer 2004a, 197, fn. 1) here.    
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blowing up the target.  Suzy would not have succeeded in her mission of blowing 
up the target had Billy not shot down Enemy.  Hence, according to (ST*), Billy’s 
action is amongst the causes of Suzy’s bombing of the target.  However, unlike the 
events depicted in Figure 1, there is no spatiotemporally local and contiguous 
process connecting Billy’s shooting down of Enemy and Suzy’s bombing of the 
target.  First of all, an absence is intermediate between Billy’s action and Suzy’s 
bombing of the target.  This absence precludes the former event from being 
contiguously connected with the latter event.86   Additionally, we can suppose that 
the interaction between Billy and Enemy takes place in a region of space far away 
from Suzy implying that the cause is not locally connected to its effect.   
 Whether (ST*)’s verdict is correct here is a complex and controversial 
matter in the causation literature.  Schaffer (2000a, 2004a) has argued that (ST*) 
gets the right answer, since most of the conceptual connotations of causation are in 
full force.87  For example, Billy’s action is statistically relevant to the bombing, it 
is predictive evidence for the bombing, that the target is bombed is retrodictive 
evidence of Billy’s action, and Billy’s action is an effective way to manipulate 
whether the bombing occurs.  Furthermore, as Hall himself remarks, “Wouldn’t we 
give Billy part of the credit for the success of the mission?  Isn’t Billy’s action part 
of the explanation for that success? ...” (Hall 2004b, 242).  Nevertheless, Hall 
(2004b) argues that (ST*) gets the wrong answer: 
                                                
86 Hall (2004b) considers whether Billy’s action is connected to Suzy’s bombing of the target via a 
contiguous chain of events that consist in part of omissions.  However, the prospects of making this 
work seem slim (see (Hall 2004b, 243) for criticisms of this response). 
87 See (Schaffer 2000a, 2000b, 2004a) for this kind of argument. 
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Here [Suzy] is, in one region, flying her plane on the way to her 
bombing mission.  Here Billy and Enemy are, in an entirely separate 
region, acting out their fateful drama.  Intuitively, it seems entirely 
unexceptionable to claim that the events in the second region have 
no causal connection to the events in the first – for isn’t it plain that 
no physical connection unites them? (original emphasis) (Hall 
2004b, 242). 
 
Central to his case is an appeal to the production intuition: causes are connected to 
their effects by way of spatiotemporally local and contiguous processes and Billy’s 
action is not connected in this way to the bombing. 
Cases of “double prevention”, like the one above, are a focal point of 
disagreement between those who maintain the production intuition and those who 
accept (ST*), since they represent circumstances where there is counterfactual 
dependence but no physical connection between distinct events.  In the rest of this 
section, I want to show that the causal relations between mental events and bodily 
effects in the human organism are implemented in a way that is structurally 
isomorphic to cases of “double prevention”.  Hence, if the production intuition 
leads one to reject double preventers like Billy’s action as genuine causes, then it 
also leads one to reject mental events as genuine causes of action.  This 
demonstrates that the production intuition comes into conflict with some of the 
most paradigmatic cases of causation.  The price of mental causation is deserting 
the production intuition and forsaking causation as a productive or generative 
relation. 
First, let us follow Schaffer (2000a, 2004a) and point out that many 
intuitive cases of causation are structurally isomorphic to the case outlined above.  
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For example, we have a strong intuition that Assassin’s firing of the bullet through 
Victim’s heart is among the causes of Victim’s death, but 
Heart piercings cause death only by disconnection.  The brain is 
kept alive by an influx of oxygenated blood, and heart piercings 
cause death by disconnecting this influx, allowing oxygen starvation 
to run its course (my emphasis) (Schaffer 2000a, 286).  
  
Here is the corresponding mechanism that implements this causal relation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Another Case of “Double Prevention” 
A cursory comparison of Figure 2 and 3 reveals that the very same “double 
prevention” structure implements the intuitively causal relation between the 
piercing of the heart and Victim’s death: the piercing prevents the resupply of 
oxygen which would have prevented oxygen starvation.  For the same reasons that 
Billy’s action is not connected to Suzy’s bombing of the target, the piercing of the 
heart is not connected to Victim’s death.  Instead, Assassin’s firing of the bullet 
interferes with the process of oxygen resupply that was keeping Victim alive.  The 
causation here works by disconnecting a process, not by a connecting process.  The 
price of maintaining that Assassin’s action is among the causes of Victim’s death is 
abandoning the production intuition. 
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Brain cell 
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Oxygen 
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This same issue repeats itself when we consider the physiological 
mechanisms involved in bodily movement.  Consider the following description of 
the “sliding filament theory” of muscle contraction. 
The functional unit of muscle contraction is called the sarcomere 
which is composed of a thick filament called myosin and a thin 
filament called actin.  The heads of the myosin filaments “want” to 
bind to sites on the actin, but are blocked by the presence of 
tropomyosin which lays across the actin filament preventing the 
myosin heads from binding to the actin.  When nerve signals in the 
motor cortex fire, calcium ions (Ca2+) stored in the muscle fiber are 
released which bind to a structure on the tropomyosin called 
troponin.  When the troponin is exposed to calcium ions, it causes 
the tropomyosin to undergo a “conformational change” moving it 
away from the actin.  This enables the myosin heads to bind to the 
sites on the actin filament.  When the myosin heads bind to the sites 
on the actin, they “pull” the actin filament resulting in a sliding 
motion.  The sliding of the myosin and actin filaments across one 
another constitutes the contraction of the muscles.88 
 
What we see is that the physiological mechanism of muscle contraction has a 
“double prevention” structure.  Schaffer (2004a) explains, 
Nerve signals only cause muscle contractions … by [disconnection]: 
the firing of the nerve causes a calcium cascade through the muscle 
fiber, which causes calcium-troponin binding, which causes the 
removal of tropomyosin from the binding sites on the actin, which 
causes myosin-actin binding, and thereby causes the actin to be 
pulled in and the muscle to contract (my emphasis) (Schaffer 2004a, 
200). 
 
The neuron diagram of this physiological mechanism makes this “double 
prevention” structure explicit: 
 
 
 
                                                
88 The following YouTube video nicely illustrates the details of the “sliding filament theory”: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=fvwp&NR=1&v=f0mDFP7qn1Y 
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Figure 4: Mechanism of Muscle Contraction 
The importance of this empirical claim cannot be understated: if the “sliding 
filament theory” of muscle contraction is correct, then neurophysiological events 
are not physically connected to their bodily effects by way of spatiotemporally 
local and contiguous processes.  The movement of our bodies results from the 
complex nerve signals in our brains triggering a biochemical process that 
disconnects an ongoing physiological process in our muscles.  Again, we see that 
the causation works here by disconnecting a process, not by a connecting process. 
 Now, let us incorporate this empirical information into our treatment of the 
epiphenomenalist horn of the exclusion dilemma.  Anyone concerned with 
vindicating the mental causation of action must admit that the bodily effects 
standardly attributed to mental events are brought about by way of the movement 
of the human body, which involves the contraction of muscles.  In other words, the 
causal relation between mental events and their bodily effects is implemented 
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partly by the sliding filament mechanism depicted in Figure 4.89  How else could 
we execute our agential capacities except by way of the physiological mechanisms 
of the human organism?  What this means is that at least part of the mechanism 
implementing mental causal relations in the human organism exemplifies a “double 
prevention” structure from which it follows that mental events are not connected to 
their bodily effects via spatiotemporally local and contiguous processes. Mental 
causation works in part by disconnecting an ongoing physiological process in the 
human body.  What this empirical information implies is that the price of holding 
onto mental causation is giving up the intuition that it is a productive or generative 
relation.  As Schaffer himself notes, “Since all voluntary human actions are due to 
muscle contractions, it follows that all voluntary human actions (perhaps the most 
paradigmatic of all causes) involve [causation by disconnection]” (Schaffer 2004a, 
200).90      
                                                
89 Kim (1993b) seems to admit this much: “From what we know about the physiology of limb 
movement, we must believe that if the sensation causes my hand to withdraw, the causal chain from 
the pain to the limb motion must somehow make use of the causal chain from an appropriate central 
neural event to the muscle contraction; it makes no sense to think that there was an independent, 
perhaps telekinetic, causal path from the pain to the limb movement” (Kim 1993b, 281). 
90 The above considerations should not be taken as an argument for the claim that the implementing 
mechanism of mental causal relations in the human organism must involve a “double prevention” 
structure.  It is logically possible that mental events cause voluntary human actions, that all 
voluntary human actions are due to muscle contractions, that all muscle contractions involve 
causation by disconnection, and yet that mental causation of voluntary human actions does not 
involve causation by disconnection.  In other words, it is consistent with the empirical facts outlined 
above that mental causal relations are implemented in a simple, direct, and productive way; a way 
independent from how neurophysiological causal relations are implemented.  First, Kim rejects that 
mental causal relations are implemented independently of neurophysiological causal relations (see 
fn. 89), so the above considerations can be understood as an ad hominem against Kim.  Second, I do 
not find it plausible that any physicalist – reductive or nonreductive – would accept that mental 
causal relations are implemented independently of neurophysiological causal relations.  Thus, in the 
context of assuming a physicalist metaphysics of mind, it is plausible that mental causal relations 
are implemented in a way that involves causation by disconnection.  I want to thank Reinaldo 
Elugardo for bringing this concern to my attention.        
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 Any attempt to vindicate mental causation, at least mental causation in the 
human organism, demands that one abandon the production intuition.  If causation 
is a productive or generative relation, then causes are connected to their effects by 
way of spatiotemporally local and contiguous processes.  But, as we saw above, 
mental causes are not connected to their bodily effects in this way.  Therefore, 
causation is not a productive or generative relation.  Alternatively, we can say that 
the way in which the causal relations between mental events and their bodily 
effects are implemented in the human organism is inconsistent with productive 
causation.  To my mind, this reveals that the production intuition is a bad, 
misleading intuition about causation and the stubborn resistance to 
counterfactualism based on it is equally misleading.  If one accepts mental 
causation, then one has to reject that causation is a productive or generative 
relation.  Mental events are not physically connected to their bodily effects.  The 
price of mental causation is abandoning the production intuition.  
Near the end of his critique of counterfactualism, Kim urges that a serious 
commitment to productive causation leads to reductionism about the mental.  He 
asks, 
But if we understand causation in mental causation in the 
productive/generative sense, wouldn’t that rule out mental causation 
– in particular mental-physical causation – too quickly, without any 
need for an argument?  Especially if we require that causation 
requires energy flow or momentum transfer, how could there be 
such a process from a mental entity to a physical entity, or in the 
converse direction? ... Don’t all such conceptions of causation, 
conceptions that require some “real” connections between cause and 
effect, automatically rule out mental-physical causation (and hence 
human agency)? (Kim 2007, 239). 
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These questions betray Kim’s position that productive causation does not appear to 
sit very comfortably with nonreductionism.  As he suggests throughout the 
discussion, this set of views either has “an epiphenomenalist implication” or leads 
to “the problem of overdetermination” (Kim 2007, 239). 
But what Kim fails to realize is that reductionism does not fit comfortably 
with productive causation either.  A consequence of the “sliding filament theory” of 
muscle contraction is that the neurophysiological events of the human animal are 
not physically connected to their bodily effects.  Specifically, given that the 
contraction of the muscles involves disconnecting the process that keeps them 
relaxed, neurophysiological events are not connected to their bodily effects by 
spatiotemporally local and contiguous processes.  So, Kim’s move to reductionism 
on the basis of a commitment to productive causation is misguided.  If one is 
committed to neurophysiological causation, then one has to reject that causation is 
a productive or generative relation.  The manner in which the human brain is 
“wired” to the physiology of the human body means that our neurophysiology does 
not produce the movement of our bodies.  Surprisingly, the price of 
neurophysiological causation is giving up the production intuition. 
Finally, recall that in Section 4.2.2 we saw two very similar objections to 
counterfactualism based on two interpretations of Kim’s thesis that agency requires 
productive mental causation.  If the “sliding filament theory” of muscle contraction 
is correct, there is no productive mental causation in the human organism.  
Therefore, Kim’s thesis entails that there are no human agents!  This is more than 
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just a highly problematic conclusion; it is a reductio of Kim’s insistence that 
genuine agency requires productive mental causation.  For these reasons we should 
reject Kim’s final argument against counterfactualism.  Furthermore, we can draw 
similar conclusions here as we did above: if one accepts that there are human 
agents, then one has to reject that causation is a productive or generative relation.  
At least in the human organism, our agential capacities are exercised in a non-
productive, non-generative fashion.  Again, the price of human agency is giving up 
the production intuition.   
 Before moving forward, I would like to consider a striking admission Kim 
makes in his discussion of agency, which offers a potential avenue of response on 
behalf of the production intuition.  He remarks that it is possible that at the basic 
physical level a counterfactual account of causation is correct, since at the “bottom 
level” this is all we can get (Kim 2007, 232).  This claim is prima facie in tension 
with his thesis that agency is (conceptually) impossible without productive mental 
causation.  How is it that agency is impossible without productive mental causation 
and yet there might be causation in the actual world that is not productive?  The 
only way to square these two claims is to interpret Kim as implicitly assuming that 
whatever causation is like at the basic physical level, mental causation is of an 
entirely different sort. 
This closely resembles the position defended by Hall (2004a, 2004b) that 
there are two distinct types of causation: there is productive causation where causes 
bear a “real” connection to their effects and there is counterfactual dependence 
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which demands no such thing91.  If we suppose Hall’s “dual causation” thesis is 
correct, then the production intuition is at least not entirely misleading, since it is 
true of one kind of causation.  But it should be fairly clear that this distinction 
amongst types of causation cannot help Kim maintain his position that mental 
causation is a productive relation.  Even if there really is a productive and non-
productive kind of causation, we know that the empirical details of human 
physiology ensure that mental causation does not fall under the productive type.  
As far as I can tell, the only way to preserve the production intuition in its entirety 
without sacrificing mental causation is to reject the “sliding filament theory” of 
muscle contraction. 
Section 4.3: The Case for Counterfactualism, and Some Unresolved Issues 
 The upshot of Section 4.2.3 is that anyone concerned with vindicating 
mental causation, neurophysiological causation, or human agency had better 
relinquish the production intuition.  Instead, they are better served to search for an 
account of causation which makes no demand that causes be connected to their 
effects by spatiotemporally local and contiguous processes.  Of course, none of this 
entails that counterfactualism is true or remains our only plausible option for 
grounding mental causation.  Perhaps there are a variety of accounts of causation 
                                                
91 Hall’s thesis suggests that one might escape the exclusion dilemma by denying the Homogeneity 
Assumption (see Section 2.2).  If mental causation is simply a different kind of causation than 
neurophysiological causation, our worries about epiphenomenalism and overdetermination appear 
misguided.  But this suggestion is bankrupt, since the work done by denying the Homogeneity 
Assumption is ensuring that mental causes and their physical competitors are treated asymmetrically.  
But what the empirical details outlined in this section reveal is that mental causes and their physical 
competitors – neurophysiological causes – should be treated on a par vis-à-vis the question of 
production: neither are connected to their effects via spatiotemporally local and contiguous 
processes.    
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consistent with the empirical details outlined above that differ significantly from 
(ST*).  Nonetheless, we should recognize that the compatibility of the 
counterfactualist’s principal claim with these empirical details provides some 
powerful reasons in favor of the counterfactualist approach.  At the very least, we 
can conclude that the consistency of (ST*) with these empirical details makes 
counterfactualism a significantly better option than any rival gripped by productive 
causation.  Therefore, I submit that the failure of Kim’s arguments and the 
compatibility of (ST*) with our best empirical theories of muscle contraction 
provide us with substantial reason to adopt the counterfactualist approach to 
grounding mental causation. 
 Still, the counterfactualist’s work is not complete, for there remains several 
issues concerning their principal claim that counterfactual dependence is sufficient 
for causation.  To my mind, some of the least serious concerns come from Bennett 
(1987) and Lombard (1990).  These authors present some considerations involving 
the delay of an event which, when combined with (ST*), generate some prima facie 
troublesome conclusions.  For example, Bennett devises an example in which the 
heavy rains in April prevent the electrical storms in the following two months from 
starting a forest fire.  However, in June the electrical storms persist and the forest 
eventually catches fire.  If it had not been for the April rains, then the forest fire – 
the event that is the actual burning of the forest – would not have occurred (Bennett 
1987, 373).  The problem is that (ST*) yields the claim that the April rains caused 
the forest fire when we know that “it is a bit of good common sense that heavy 
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rains can put out fires, they don’t start them” (Lombard 1990, 197).  Menzies 
(2004) presents other examples purported to be problematic for (ST*).  Consider 
the following: 
A person develops lung cancer as a result of years of smoking.  It is 
true that if he had not smoked he would not have developed cancer.  
It is also true that he would not have developed lung cancer if he had 
not possessed lungs, or even if he had not been born (Menzies 2004, 
143). 
 
As Menzies goes on to say “it is absurd to think his possession of lungs or even his 
birth caused his lung cancer” (Menzies 2004, 143).  The problem here is that (ST*) 
is insensitive to the commonsense distinction between genuine causes and mere 
background conditions, since it counts both the smoking and the possession of 
lungs (or the birth) as causes of the lung cancer. 
I do not find these counterexamples persuasive because there is good reason 
to think that, despite the appearances, (ST*) gets the right verdict.  We should take 
seriously a “methodological sermon” offered by Ned Hall (2004): 
If you want to make trouble for an analysis of causation – but want 
to do so on the cheap – then it’s convenient to ignore the egalitarian 
character of the analysandum.  Get your audience to do the same, 
and you can proceed to elicit judgments that will appear to 
undermine the analysis, but which are in fact irrelevant to it … (Hall 
2004, 228). 
 
So what exactly is the analysandum of (ST*)?  Lewis is pretty clear that the 
analysis is intended to capture the “broad and nondiscriminatory concept of 
causation (unselectively speaking)” (Lewis 1986, 162).  And the counterfactualist 
surely agrees that (ST*) provides a sufficient condition for being a cause or among 
the causes as opposed to the cause of some effect.  Lewis tells us, 
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We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event 
and call it “the” cause, as if there were no others.  Or we single out a 
few as the “causes”, calling the rest mere “causal factors” or “causal 
conditions” … We may select the abnormal or extraordinary causes, 
or those under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or just 
those we want to talk about (Lewis 1986, 162). 
 
These purported counterexamples confuse the “egalitarian sense of ‘cause’ with a 
much more restrictive sense (no doubt greatly infected with pragmatics) that places 
heavy weight on salience” (Hall 2004, 228).  I submit that when the above verdicts 
given by (ST*) appear unacceptable it is because we have forgotten that (ST*) 
presents us with a condition for being among the causes of an effect, not what it is 
to be the cause. 
So I agree with Lewis and Hall that (ST*) gets the right answers here.  The 
April rains are among the causes of the forest fire in June.  The possession of lungs 
and the birth are among the causes of the individual’s developing lung cancer.  But, 
in most ordinary contexts, these causes are not amongst the most salient parts of the 
effect’s causal history and, therefore, are not what we consider to be the cause.  
Additional support for (ST*)’s verdict can be garnered from the following 
considerations.  Take, for instance, the example of the development of cancer and 
the individual’s possession of lungs.  The possession of lungs is statistically 
relevant to developing lung cancer, since the probability of getting lung cancer 
given the circumstances and possessing lungs is greater than getting lung cancer 
given the circumstances and not possessing lungs.  The possession of lungs may 
provide predictive evidence of lung cancer just as lung cancer provides retrodictive 
evidence of the possession of lungs.  A complete explanation of why someone 
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develops lung cancer would surely include their possession of lungs.  And, finally, 
the possession of lungs is an effective way for an agent to manipulate whether one 
gets lung cancer.  Many of the conceptual connotations of causation are at work 
here and this suggests, just as (ST*) implies, that the possession of lungs is among 
the causes of the development of lung cancer.92  The same considerations apply 
fairly straightforwardly to the other examples. 
But there is a problem facing the counterfactualist that is not so easily 
disarmed.     Consider the following well-known case of causation by omission: 
Jones plans on leaving town for a few weeks and asks his neighbor, 
Smith, to take care of the plants in his garden.  Smith agrees, but 
neglects to care for the plants by failing to water them.  The plants 
wilt and eventually die. 
 
One mark in favor of (ST*) is that it easily captures the intuitively correct verdict 
that Smith’s non-watering of Jones’s plants causes them to wilt.  The wilting of the 
plants is counterfactually dependent on Smith’s omission, as revealed by the truth 
that the plants would not have wilted had Smith watered them.  But, as opponents 
of (ST*) have often pointed out, the wilting of the plants is counterfactually 
dependent on numerous omissions that intuitively are not amongst the causes of the 
wilting.  For instance, if the Queen of England had watered the plants in Jones’s 
garden, then they would not have wilted.  Therefore, given (ST*), it follows that 
the Queen of England’s non-watering of the plants is among the causes of their 
wilting. 
                                                
92 Again, see (Schaffer 2000a, 2000b, 2004) for this kind of argumentative strategy. 
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 The problem is more widespread than this single example illustrates.  If 
(ST*) is correct, then there are an indefinite amount of absences and/or omissions 
included in the causal history of an event that we have strong intuitions are not 
included in the event’s causal history.  Here are some particularly striking examples.  
Among the causes of Jones’s asking his neighbor Smith to water his plants are (i) 
the absence of a massive earthquake occurring in the region occupied by Jones 
right before the request, (ii) the absence of an aneurism in Jones’s brain moments 
before the request, (iii) the absence of nerve gas in Jones’s house a few hours 
before the request, and, going even further back in time, (iv) the omission by Killer 
to murder Jones’s father as a young boy, etc.  The problem is that, while (ST*) 
accommodates the intuitive cases of “negative causation”, it allows far too many 
others in at the same time.  A complete defense of counterfactualism demands that 
something be said to mitigate the profligate manner in which (ST*) introduces 
absences and omissions into an event’s causal history.  Unfortunately, I cannot 
pursue a resolution of this problem in the present essay.93  Nevertheless, a strong 
case for counterfactualism has been made with the caveat that something needs to 
be done to curb (ST*)’s generous admission of “negative causation”.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
93  However, see (Schaffer 2004, forthcoming), (Hitchcock 2007), (Russo and Montminy, 
forthcoming) for potential solutions to this problem. 
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Chapter 5 
The Exclusion Dilemma: The Overdetermination Horn 
 Jerry Fodor (1989) writes, 
If it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for 
my reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for my 
scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for my saying 
… if none of that is literally true, then practically everything I 
believe about anything is false and it’s the end of the world (Fodor 
1989, 77). 
 
Throughout the previous chapter, I argued that we can avoid this “Fodorian” 
apocalypse if we ground mental causation in counterfactual dependence between 
distinct events.  At the very least, I hope to have shown that the counterfactualist 
remains in a much better position with regards to vindicating the difference-making 
causal status of the mental than any production theorist about causation. 
But, in doing so, I have incurred a special burden that I hope to discharge in 
the present chapter.  If mental events are distinct from their neurophysiological 
realizers and every bodily effect with a cause has a neurophysiological cause and 
these same bodily effects have a mental cause, then I have walked right into the 
problem of causal overdetermination.  In this chapter, I argue that 
overdetermination is a problem for three reasons, but a proper analysis of the 
relation between mental and neurophysiological events provides the resources for 
undercutting these worries. 
In Section 5.1, I discuss the three underlying concerns suggested in the 
literature as to why causal overdetermination is troublesome.  If mental causation 
involves overdetermination, then either mental causes and their neurophysiological 
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realizers are causally dispensable vis-à-vis their overdetermined effects, mental 
causation involves an unexplained coincidence or conspiracy, or overdetermined 
effects receive a duplicative transfer of “causal oomph!” which entails a failure of a 
particular sort of physical explanation.  In Section 5.2, I present a rough outline of 
how the threat from overdetermination should be handled by appealing to the mind-
body relation.  I discuss how a nonreductive physicalism which holds that mental 
events are necessitated by their neurophysiological realizers deals with these three 
concerns.  Additionally, I consider a nonphysicalist mind-body relation and argue 
that it cannot deal with the problem of causal dispensability.  Finally, in Section 5.3, 
I present an analysis of event realization and show that it is able, with some of our 
conclusions from Chapter 4, to overcome all of the difficulties associated with 
overdetermination.  If my arguments are successful, we would have a vindication 
of mental causation without the threats associated with causal overdetermination, 
all of which is consistent with nonreductive physicalism.          
Section 5.1: Why Overdetermination is Bad  
 The primary concern of this chapter is the tension between the claim that 
both a mental event and its neurophysiological realizer are among the causes of 
some bodily effect and that this kind of overdetermination is not a problem.  As 
Karen Bennett (2003) remarks, “The more you go out of your way to establish the 
full-fledged efficacy of the mental, the more it sounds like its effects are 
overdetermined” (Bennett 2003, 472).  Perhaps we should insist that our goal is to 
show that the nonreductionist picture of mental causation that has emerged from 
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our discussion is not really overdetermination at all.  I think we could insist on this 
goal, but what we really want to show is that it is not problematic for a single 
bodily movement to be an effect of both a mental cause and its neurophysiological 
realizer.  Whether we label this as not really overdetermination at all or an 
unproblematic form of overdetermination is a terminological issue.  In the interest 
of clarity, I assume that the situation which presents the nonreductive physicalist is 
a form of overdetermination, which I shall refer to as MN-overdetermination.  The 
goal of the present chapter, then, is to argue that “the mental/physical case is 
importantly different from the standard textbook examples of firing squads, houses 
that are struck by lightning at the same moment that someone tosses a lit cigarette 
into the draperies, and so forth” (my emphasis) (Bennett 2003, 474).  What the 
nonreductive physicalist needs to do is “break the analogy” between cases of MN-
overdetermination and standard cases of overdetermination. 
 At the end of the day, those who endorse the exclusion argument as a 
serious dilemma facing the nonreductive physicalist claim that the analogy is an apt 
one, that is, the differences in MN-overdetermination are not important enough to 
avoid the problems associated with standard cases of overdetermination.  But a 
frequently unaddressed issue in the literature on the exclusion problem is why 
overdetermination is an outcome to be avoided.  This point bears some emphasis, 
for it is a crucial premise in the exclusion argument that overdetermination is 
problematic and should not be welcomed as a consequence.  A particularly obvious 
reply may be that MN-overdetermination is supposed to be a pervasive 
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phenomenon.  In other words, if mental causes are as pervasive as we 
pretheoretically think they are, then the nonreductive physicalist committed to MN-
overdetermination is committed to systematic overdetermination.  And if it is 
systematic, it is a problem. 
 Oftentimes, this is the view implicit in the literature.  For instance, Trenton 
Merricks (2001) tells us that a substance dualist who concedes that the physical 
world is causally complete is “pre-theoretically” committed to “an ugly picture” 
and that “the redundancy is all by itself a reason to resist this form of substance 
dualism” (original emphasis) (Merricks 2001, 67).  More generally, he claims that 
“we always have reason to resist systematic causal overdetermination, along with 
any view that implies it” (Merricks 2001, 67).  Jaegwon Kim, the most notable 
proponent of the exclusion problem as a reason to move back towards type-
reductionism, can occasionally be read in a similar way, endorsing the view that 
systematic overdetermination should be avoided at all costs.  He asks, “If C and C* 
are each a sufficient cause of the event E, then why isn’t E overdetermined?  It is at 
best extremely odd to think that each and every bit of action we perform is 
overdetermined in virtue of having two distinct sufficient causes” (Kim 1989, 86).  
What Merrick’s and Kim’s remarks suggest is that systematic overdetermination is 
just bad punkt. 
 However, it is reasonable to ask why the frequency in which the 
overdetermination occurs makes it troublesome.  That systematic 
overdetermination is problematic is an indispensable premise in Merrick’s primary 
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argument for the elimination of inanimate macro-physical objects and in Kim’s 
central critique of nonreductive physicalism.  It seems to me that once this premise 
is employed in controversial philosophical argument, it would be bad philosophy to 
leave it unquestioned.  Certainly, it is not as if systematic overdetermination “wears” 
its badness on its face.  I am in agreement with Ted Sider (2003) when he writes 
that there is a reason why overdetermination is bad and, until the source of the 
badness is specified, the complaint is philosophically useless (Sider 2003, 721).  In 
the next few sections, I attempt to give some content to the idea that systematic 
overdetermination is problematic. 
Section 5.1.1: Causal Dispensability 
One very natural reason for taking overdetermination to be problematic is 
that it involves some kind of causal redundancy or dispensability.94  To bring this 
idea into sharper focus, consider the standard case of overdetermination first 
introduced in Section 1.5.2: 
Assassin and Badgirl simultaneously poison Victim’s coffee with 
identical doses of a lethal poison.  Either dose by itself would have 
sufficed for Victim’s death.  Victim drinks the coffee and dies.  He 
would have survived if the coffee had not been poisoned.  
  
What we see here is that, given the circumstances, neither Assassin’s nor Badgirl’s 
poisoning of the coffee is needed for the occurrence of Victim’s death.  This is why 
each cause is considered to suffice for the effect and, furthermore, why this is not a 
case of joint causation.  If we wanted to explain why Victim died on this occasion, 
we would only need to cite either Assassin’s action or Badgirl’s action; there is no 
                                                
94 Something like this is suggested in Menzies (2003) discussion of the exclusion problem. 
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need to cite both.  For example, we could offer a fully satisfactory explanation of 
the death without even mentioning Assassin’s poisoning of the coffee.  This makes 
Assassin’s action a causally dispensable part of the death’s causal history. 
 In order to assess this proposal, we need to assign a more concrete sense to 
the claim that overdetermining causes are causally dispensable.  A natural way of 
understanding this is as follows: 
(Causal Dispensability) When c is an overdetermining cause of e, c 
is causally dispensable with respect to an effect e just in case e 
would still have occurred if c had not occurred. 
 
I have defined causal dispensability in terms of the counterfactual ‘if c had not 
occurred then e would still have occurred’ so I must specify how the counterfactual 
is to be evaluated.  I submit that the evaluation proceeds in the manner specified by 
Lewis’s similarity metric, that is, we hold the past fixed as much as possible, 
countenance an inconspicuous violation of law – a small, local miracle – resulting 
in the non-occurrence of c, and determine whether the effect e still occurs.  At this 
point it should be fairly obvious that saying an overdetermining cause is causally 
dispensable with respect to its effect is equivalent to saying that the effect does not 
counterfactually depend on the overdetermining cause.  This is exactly what we 
should expect: the presence of one overdetermining cause breaks the dependency 
between the effect and the other overdetermining cause.95  It is straightforward to 
see that both Assassin’s action and Badgirl’s action are causally dispensable with 
                                                
95 Isn’t it problematic to claim that an overdetermined effect is not counterfactually dependent upon 
either overdetermining cause?  It is if counterfactual dependence is necessary for causation, but this 
is not the relation between causation and counterfactual dependence defended in the last chapter. 
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respect to Victim’s death.  Victim’s death would still have occurred if either 
Assassin’s action had not occurred or if Badgirl’s action had not occurred. 
According to this proposal, in that very same sense, mental events are 
causally dispensable parts of their effect’s causal history.  This fact alone might 
not be so troublesome if MN-overdetermination is infrequent.  But this is precisely 
not the situation the nonreductive physicalist is committed to, since they claim that 
every instance of mental causation is concurrent with an instance of causation by its 
distinct neurophysiological realizer.  The problem, then, is that the nonreductive 
physicalist makes mental events causally dispensable across the board.  Every 
mental event is a dispensable part of its effect’s causal history.  Of course, we can 
say the same thing about the neurophysiological realizers of those mental events.  
Kim (1993b) insists that this has a rather unfortunate consequence.  He tells us that 
“the overdetermination idea seems to violate the causal closure principle as well: in 
the counterfactual situation in which the physical cause does not occur, the closure 
principle is violated” because “if the physical cause hadn’t occurred, the mental 
cause by itself would have caused the effect” (Kim 1993b, 281).  Systematic 
overdetermination is bad because it makes both mental and neurophysiological 
events dispensable across the board.  In addition, the causal dispensability of 
neurophysiological events seems to violate the “causal closure principle”.   
 Before moving forward, we should be clear that the above proposal does not 
claim overdetermining causes must be causally dispensable with respect to their 
overdetermined effect.  To see that this is not a requirement on overdetermination, 
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suppose that c1 and c2 each cause an effect e and that there is some mechanism 
present in the circumstances with the following features: it is set up to prevent c2 
from causing e but the presence of c1 inhibits or blocks the mechanism from 
preventing c2 in this way.  Under such circumstances, it is false that if c1 had not 
occurred then e would still have occurred, for if c1 failed to occur, the mechanism 
would no longer be inhibited and thus would prevent c2 from causing e.96  All of 
this seems consistent with c1 and c2 overdetermining the effect e, which implies 
that causal dispensability is not necessary for overdetermination.  All that is 
proposed is that overdetermination often involves causal dispensability so 
systematic MN-overdetermination involves a lot more of it.  The result is that the 
nonreductive physicalist makes mental events causally dispensable to their effects 
and this is a rather unwelcome consequence. 
Section 5.1.2: Coincidence and Conspiracy 
In the literature, one is often confronted with the claim that 
overdetermination is problematic because it involves unexplained correlation or 
coincidence.  Ted Sider (2003) writes: 
Imagine a paranoiac who thinks that every time someone is shot, 
there are two causally independent shooters.  He is crazy, but why?  
One reason (not the only one) is that it would be a coincidence that 
all these sharpshooters just happen to fire at the same places at the 
same times.  This great regularity would need an explanation, and 
none could be given.  Likewise, it may be claimed, widespread 
overdetermination … by mental and physical causes, would require 
a massive, unexplained correlation between the multiple causes 
(Sider 2003, 722). 
 
                                                
96 See (Simona 2011, 475) for an example of this kind. 
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The suggestion seems correct.  Overdetermination often involves a coincidence of 
some kind.  An unlucky victim is shot independently by two assassins at the same 
time.  The cigarette just happens to ignite the curtains at the exact moment the 
house is struck by lightning.  Given the ubiquity of MN-overdetermination on the 
nonreductive physicalist picture, these coincidences would have to be pervasive 
features of our world.  Such widespread and massive unexplained correlation is 
surely a reason why systematic overdetermination is bad. 
Again, we should be careful to not misconstrue the proposal as claiming 
that coincidence is necessary for overdetermination.  A simple addition to our 
example from Section 1.5.2 demonstrates why. 
Assassin and Badgirl simultaneously poison Victim’s coffee with 
identical doses of a lethal poison as a part of a carefully crafted 
scheme to ensure Victim’s death.  Either dose by itself would have 
sufficed for Victim’s death.  Victim drinks the coffee and dies.  He 
would have survived if the coffee had not been poisoned.   
 
Assassin’s action and Badgirl’s action overdetermine Victim’s death, but it is not 
true that this correlation lacks an explanation.  This is no coincidence because 
Assassin and Badgirl decided to work together, concocting their plan such that each 
poisons the coffee at the same time.  Or perhaps their actions were part of a larger 
conspiracy against Victim led by Cautious, who is well-known for employing two 
assassins to complete the same job to increase the probability of success.  Whatever 
the exact details, it should be clear that overdetermination does not require 
coincidence. 
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 This last observation suggests we extend the proposal in the following 
manner.  Suppose our paranoiac thinks instead that every time someone is shot, 
there are two shooters working in tandem as part of some larger conspiracy.  He 
may not be as crazy as our first paranoiac, but he is, at the very least, irrational.  
His explanation for why all these sharpshooters fire at the same places at the same 
times is prima facie implausible.  If conspiracy is appealed to in order to avoid 
unexplained correlation, then widespread overdetermination with its widespread 
coincidence would seem to demand widespread conspiracy.  The implausibility is 
compounded.  Similarly, MN-overdetermination looks to require the postulation of 
some sort of widespread conspiracy in order to avoid coincidence.  This result 
looks significantly worse for the nonreductive physicalist, for what, short of 
Leibnizian pre-establish harmony, could explain the correlations between mental 
and neurophysiological causes? 
Section 5.1.3: Duplicative “Causal Oomph!” 
 Often, the lesson drawn from the exclusion argument is not that the mental 
is stripped of its causal powers, but rather that the causal power it has is of a 
different sort.  More specifically, the mental possesses a derivative causal status, a 
causal status it acquires from its relationship to causes of a more fundamental 
variety.97  Motivated partly to respect the “closed character of physical theory”, 
Kim (1984) presents his account of supervenient or epiphenomenal causation: 
“When a mental event M causes a physical event P, this is so because M is 
                                                
97 See Section 2.2. 
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supervenient upon a physical event, P*, and P* causes P” (Kim 1984, 267 – 268).  
As he goes on to tell us, 
It would be foolish to pretend that the proposed account accords to 
the mental the full causal potency we accord to fundamental 
physical processes … Mental causation does take place; it is only 
that it is epiphenomenal causation, that is, a causal relation that is 
reducible to, or explainable by, the causal processes taking place at a 
more basic physical level (my emphasis) (Kim 1984, 268). 
 
But we could just as easily see this account motivated to avoid the purported 
problems associated with overdetermination.  If both a mental event and its 
neurophysiological realizer cause some bodily effect, then this is overdetermination 
and that is a problem.  Well, it would only be a problem if we held that the mental 
is afforded full causal potency in addition to the potency possessed by the 
neurophysiological.  Kim’s account of “epiphenomenal causation” avoids the threat 
of overdetermination because the mental’s causal potency is derived from, 
reducible to, or otherwise explained in terms of, the potency had by the 
neurophysiological. 
 Likewise, Jackson and Pettit (1990) are motivated by exclusion-like 
concerns and argue that being efficacious in the production of an effect is not the 
only way to be causally relevant to that effect (Jackson and Pettit 1990, 112).  On 
their view, there are “at least two distinct ways in which a property can be causally 
relevant: through being efficacious in the production of whatever is in question, or 
through programing for the presence of an efficacious property” (Jackson and Pettit 
1990, 115).  Extending and applying this to mental events, we can say that mental 
events are relevant to their effects, not by being efficacious in the production of 
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these effects, but rather by “programing for” some efficacious event.  The mental 
event “does not figure in the productive process leading to the [effect] but it more 
or less ensures that a property-instance which is required for that process does 
figure” (Jackson and Pettit 1990, 114).  Once again, the threat posed by 
overdetermination is avoided, since mental events do not exercise their causal 
potency in the same way as their neurophysiological realizers.  The mental is 
merely “instrumentally effective” with respect to its bodily effects, since its 
realization is “a good tactic for producing the effect”, not by producing it directly, 
but by ensuring or “programing for” something that does (Jackson and Pettit 1990, 
109). 
 I believe the project of avoiding the threat of overdetermination by claiming 
that the mental enjoys a “lesser grade of causal efficacy” (Levine 2001, 28) betrays 
the following underlying worry about overdetermination.  Schaffer (2004b) 
remarks, 
If causation is taken to be a primitive (and at times a directly 
observable) relation, then it is hard to resist the idea of “causal 
oomph!” with its disastrous implications that overdetermination 
should generate excess “oomph!” (– the person hits twice as hard, or 
jumps twice as far) (Schaffer 2004b, 237 – 238).   
 
Similarly, the thought is that full causal potency or causal efficacy easily leads one 
to the idea that real, genuine causation involves some “oomph!”.  This implies that 
the nonreductive physicalist’s commitment to MN-overdetermination involves a 
duplicative transfer of causal “oomph!” to overdetermined bodily effects. 
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The idea of “causal oomph!” deserves to be elucidated, but at the very least 
it conveys a picture of causation where events transfer something to their effects.  
Schaffer (2004a) notes that the views defended in the literature that take “causal 
oomph!” seriously share the idea that causation requires a physical connection 
between cause and effect, since a connection is needed in order to transfer the 
“oomph!” (Schaffer 2004a, 203 – 204).98  Their differences lie in what must persist 
through time and be transferred from cause to effect.  According to Aronson (1971), 
Fair (1979), and Castaneda (1984), causation requires the transfer of the property of 
energy-momentum from cause to effect.  Dowe (1992, 1995, 2000) following 
Salmon (1998) defends a similar view by characterizing “causal processes” as 
involving the persistence through time of an object possessing some conserved 
physical quantity and a “causal interaction” as an intersection of causal processes 
involving an exchange of the conserved physical quantity.  Ehring (1997) argues 
that causation requires the transfer of a trope from cause to effect and Kistler (1998, 
2001) limits these to tropes of conserved quantities. 
Whatever the precise details of the story, the problem with 
overdetermination if “causal oomph!” is taken seriously is the failure of a certain 
type of physical explanation.  The nonreductive physicalist committed to MN-
overdetermination who admits that the mental has full causal potency must allow 
                                                
98 Dowe (2004) expresses nicely this idea: “Suppose I had thrown the rock through the window.  
Then my throwing the rock caused the window to break precisely because there is a causal process, 
the trajectory of the rock, possessing momentum, which links my throw to the window’s breaking.  
And the window’s breaking involves an exchange of momentum” (my emphasis) (Dowe 2004, 189).  
Causation requires a connection or linkage from cause to effect in order to transfer or exchange 
something. 
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that there are two connecting processes running from both the mental event and the 
neurophysiological event to the bodily effect.  Kim (1984) writes, 
It is hardly conceivable that the pain sensation qua mental event acts 
directly on the muscles of my arm, causing them to contract … If 
the pain is to play a causal role in the withdrawal of my hand, it 
must do so by somehow making use of the usual physiological 
causal path to this bodily event; it looks as though the causal path 
from the pain to the limb motion must merge with the physiological 
path at a certain point (Kim 1984, 265 – 266). 
 
But the concession that the two connecting processes must “merge” has an 
undesirable consequence: 
If there is such a point, that must be where psychophysical causal 
action takes place … [but] there is the deeper problem that any such 
nonphysical intervention in a physical system would jeopardize the 
closed character of physical theory.  It would force us to accept a 
conception of the physical in which to give a causal account of, say, 
the motion of a physical particle, it is sometimes necessary to go 
outside the physical system and appeal to some nonphysical agency 
and invoke some irreducible psychophysical law (Kim 1984, 266). 
 
Recall that these connecting processes involve the transfer of something from cause 
to effect.  Call whatever precisely is transferred ‘Q’.  The point of “psychophysical 
causal action” is where the mental and neurophysiological connecting processes 
merge.  This intersection involves the exchange of Q, which implies that some part 
of the remaining connecting process leading to the bodily effect – say, some 
physiological event p* in the body – receives an additional amount of Q.  In other 
words, the event p* instantiates additional energy-momentum or includes more of 
the “conserved-quantity-bearing object” or has an additional conserved quantity 
trope.  The fact that p* has some additional Q is something that cannot be 
explained physically.  No antecedent physiological event nor any 
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neurophysiological event can explain why p* has as much Q as it does.  Therefore, 
we must leave “the realm of the physical” in order to explain this fact about p*. 
Kim suggests that this type of failure of physical explanation is an outright 
violation of the “closed character of physical theory”, or the assumption of 
Completeness.  Regardless of whether this is so, we can at the very least conclude 
that this type of failure in physical explanation does not sit comfortably with those 
who endorse Completeness.  Furthermore, the systematic nature of MN-
overdetermination ensures that this type of failure in physical explanation is 
ubiquitous in our world.  This is a powerful reason to reject MN-overdetermination.  
When this is the worry associated with overdetermination working in the 
background, it becomes rather natural to avoid the threat of double “oomph!” by 
either holding that the mental inherits its “oomph!” from its realizer (e.g., Kim 
(1984)) or merely ensures an “oomphy!” realizer will be there to do the causing 
(e.g., Jackson and Pettit (1990)).99        
Section 5.2: The Mind-Body Relation 
Karen Bennett’s (2003, 2008) treatment of the exclusion problem provides a 
particularly clear discussion of what the nonreductive physicalist’s task is and 
presents some novel ideas worth repeating.  For our purposes, the principal claim 
Bennett offers us is that the analogy between MN-overdetermination and standard 
cases can be broken when we realize that “there is an important tight relation 
                                                
99 I think the same issues concerning “oomphy!” causation are working in the background of Kim’s 
causal inheritance principle.  See Section 1.5.2.  If having a causal power is being disposed under 
certain conditions to cause something in an “oomphy!” fashion, then when an instance of a 
functional property is said to share its causal powers with the instance of its realizer, the “oomph!” 
is shared and the troublesome duplication avoided.    
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between the mental and the physical” that does not hold between the causes in 
standard cases of overdetermination (Bennett 2003, 475).  In other words, for some 
mental event m and its neurophysiological realizer n, there is some relation R such 
that R(n, m) and it is due to m being so related to n that cases of MN-
overdetermination do not inherit the problems associated with overdetermination.  
 A few particularly salient examples of an R are worth mentioning here.  
Suppose that the neurophysiological event n is among the causes of the mental 
event m which is among the causes of some intentional body movement b.  The 
neurophysiological and mental event are part of a single causal chain that 
eventually terminates in the intentional body movement.  That is, if R = causation, 
then n’s being among the causes of m enables us to avoid the problems associated 
with overdetermination.  First of all, neither m nor n are causally dispensable with 
respect to b.  If the neurophysiological event n had not occurred, then neither would 
have the mental event and thus the bodily effect would have not occurred.  If the 
mental event would not have occurred, the neurophysiological event still would 
have, but it would have failed to cause the bodily effect, since the causal chain 
leading to b would have been broken.  Second, the correlation between the causes 
of the bodily effect is not unexplained nor is there any need to appeal to some sort 
of conspiracy.  Both events are among the causes of the bodily effect because these 
events are part of a single causal chain leading to it.  Finally, the concerns with 
duplicating “causal oomph!” are misplaced.  If there is a connecting process 
running from the event n to the effect b, then the event m “makes use” of that very 
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process, since it is itself an effect of n.  Hence, whatever is transferred from m to b 
via this connecting process is something that was previously transferred from n to 
m.  There is no threat of failing to physically explain why the bodily effect has as 
much of the transferred quantity as it does, since an appeal to the 
neurophysiological effect suffices here.  In fact, if R = causation, then we are 
disinclined to even consider the situation to involve overdetermination at all so a 
fortiori it does not involve a problematic form of overdetermination. 
Of course, the nonreductive physicalist does not claim that the relation 
between mental events and their realizers is causation.  But consider what some 
nonreductive physicalists do say, namely R = token-identity.100  If the mental event 
is identical to the neurophysiological event, then all the problems associated with 
overdetermination are solved.  Neither event is causally dispensable to the bodily 
effect.  If the mental event had not occurred, then neither would have the 
neurophysiological event (given that m = n) and so the bodily effect b would have 
failed to occur.  Similarly, if the neurophysiological event had not occurred, the 
mental event would not have either (given that n = m) and so the bodily effect 
would not have occurred.  The correlation between the causes is not unexplained 
nor is there a need to appeal to a conspiracy, since the events are one and the same.  
In fact, as J.C.C. Smart writes in his discussion of type-identity, speaking of type-
identical properties as being correlated carries the implication that they are 
“something ‘over and above’.  You cannot correlate something with itself” (Smart 
                                                
100 See, for instance, (Davidson 1980d). 
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1959, 142).  Likewise, according to the token-identity theorist, saying there is some 
unexplained correlation between m and n is to convey something false about the 
situation.  Similarly, to say that the event m “makes use” of the connecting process 
running from n to b carries the false implication that m is distinct from n.  But 
under the present assumption this is false and so whatever connecting process runs 
from n to b is the very same process that runs from m to b.  The event identity 
entails that only a single “dose” of the transferred quantity makes its way from m 
and n to b.  We can physically explain why b has as much of the quantity as it does.  
Finally, if R = token-identity, then the situation does not involve overdetermination 
and so a fortiori does not involve a problematic kind of overdetermination.101 
Now, it should have been obvious from the start that R = token-identity 
provides a simple and straightforward solution to the problem of overdetermination.  
But there are nonreductive physicalists, like myself, who take there to be good 
reason to reject the token-identity of mental and neurophysiological events.  In 
Section 1.2.2, we saw some modal arguments against token-identity that appealed 
to a difference in de re modal properties to conclude that mental events are distinct 
from neurophysiological events.  To my mind, these arguments have much prima 
face plausibility, but whether or not they ultimately can be made to work is a 
complex philosophical question in its own right.  Henceforth, what I shall be 
                                                
101 This is why a token-identity theory offers an immediate dissolution of the overdetermination 
horn of the dilemma.  But, as mentioned in Sections 1.4 and 2.4, most discussions of this position in 
the literature quickly shift focus to the epiphenomenalist horn, mental properties, and whether these 
are at all relevant to the causal relations entered into by mental events.  However, Davidson’s 
nominalist ontology enables him to dissolve these type-epiphenomenalist worries.  Mental events 
are mental “only as described” (Davidson 1980d, 215) and not in virtue of instantiating some mental 
properties.  There are no mental properties and so the concern that they may end up being irrelevant 
to causation is misplaced.           
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primarily concerned with in this chapter is what a nonreductive physicalist who 
rejects token-identity can say in response to the overdetermination horn of the 
exclusion dilemma.  My project, then, is to find some non-identity relation R that 
holds between mental and neurophysiological events that provides similar 
explanations for why MN-overdetermination does not inherit the problems 
associated with typical cases of overdetermination. 
Section 5.2.1: The Determinate-Determinable Relation 
Some immediate candidates for a non-identity R that may help avoid the 
problems associated with overdetermination are the various forms of asymmetric 
necessitation discussed in the literature, which hold that mental events are only 
weakly modally distinct from their neurophysiological realizers.102  As an example 
of such a mind-body relation, consider Yablo’s (1992b) claim that the mental 
events are determinables of their neurophysiological realizers, that is, R = 
determination.  As we discussed in Section 3.2.1, Yablo argues that mental 
properties are determinables of the neurophysiological properties that realize them.  
As a reminder, intuitively, we can capture the idea as follows: 
(Property Determination) Where P and Q are properties, P 
determines Q just in case for a thing to be P is for it to be Q, not 
simpliciter, but in a specific way (Yablo 1992b, 252). 
 
The determinate-determinable relation is the “paradigm of one-way necessitation” 
(Yablo 1992b, 250), which means that P determines Q only if (a) necessarily, for 
                                                
102 I am here considering asymmetric necessitation to pick a one-way metaphysical necessitation 
relation and not some restricted form of necessitation (e.g., nomological).  See Section 1.2, fn. 6.  
Metaphysical necessitation is, of course, the kind of necessitation involved in Yablo’s understanding 
of determination and Shoemaker’s definition of realization.  
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all x, if x has P then x has Q; and (b) possibly, for some x, x has Q but lacks P.103  
Things are a bit trickier if we want to explicate a determination relation between 
events, but a similar intuitive characterization should suffice for present 
purposes.104 
(Event Determination) Where p and q are events, p determines q just 
in case for p to occur (in a possible world) is for q to occur (there), 
not simpliciter, but in a certain way (Yablo 1992b, 260). 
 
The bolt’s sudden snapping determines the bolt’s snapping per se because for the 
bolt to suddenly snap in this world is for the bolt to snap in this world, not 
simpliciter, but in a certain way (viz., suddenly).  And again, it should be 
understood that event determination is an asymmetric necessitation relation.  You 
cannot have the bolt suddenly snap without it snapping per se though you can have 
it snap per se without it snapping suddenly. 
 Let us assume, then, that R = determination and that R(n, m).  The 
neurophysiological realizer n of some mental event m determines that mental event 
such that for m to occur in the actual world is for n to occur there, not simpliciter, 
but in a certain way.  Additionally, necessarily: if n occurs, m occurs but possibly: 
                                                
103 Additionally, Yablo tells us there is no presumption that the necessitation of Q by P is a priori 
knowable.  Perhaps it is (e.g., the property of being red necessitates the property of being colored) or 
perhaps it is not (e.g., the property of being K, some highly specific micromechanical state, 
necessitates the property of being at temperature 95 degrees C) (Yablo 1992b, 252 – 253). 
104 The problem, as Yablo states, is that “determination involves the idea that the requirements 
associated with one thing include the requirements associated with another; and although properties 
are requiremental on their face, particulars are not” (Yablo 1992b, 261).  His solution is to appeal to 
the notion of individual essence.  The idea is that an event p determines an event q only if: (a) 
necessarily, if p exists, q exists and is “categorically indiscernible” from p; and (b) possibly, q exists 
and p does not.  Roughly, an event p is categorically indiscernible from an event q when p’s essence 
includes all of q’s essence plus a bit more (i.e., p subsumes q) and, in the world of occurrence w, the 
way p is in w is just like the way q is in w with respect to their categorical properties.  The obvious 
circularity here should not matter for our purposes.  See (Yablo 1992b, 263 – 265) for the details.  
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m occurs without n occurring.  This entails a commitment to what, in Section 1.3.1, 
I labeled L-Nonreductionism, for mental events locally supervene on 
neurophysiological events: 
(M-N Local Supervenience) Any minimal neurophysiological 
duplicate of an actual individual is a psychological duplicate 
simpliciter of that actual individual. 
 
Where Ni reports all the neurophysiological facts about a specific individual and Mi 
reports all of that individual’s mental facts, if neurophysiological events determine 
mental events, then ‘if Ni then Mi’ is a necessary truth.  In short, 
neurophysiological duplicates are psychological duplicates. 105   What is most 
relevant for present purposes is how we can appeal to R = determination to “break 
the analogy” between MN-overdetermination and typical cases of 
overdetermination.106 
 Immediately, we can see that the coincidence and conspiracy concern 
simply evaporates.  Consider the standard case of the determinate-determinable 
relation mentioned previously.  Every time the bolt suddenly snaps, it snaps per se.  
These events are correlated and they are systematically correlated, but the 
correlation is not unexplained.  The snapping of the bolt is determined by its 
suddenly snapping.  Similarly, the systematic correlation between mental events 
and their neurophysiological realizers can be explained by the fact that 
neurophysiological events determine mental events.  As Block (1990) has pointed 
                                                
105 We might wonder whether this commits Yablo to a rejection of anti-individualism.  This will be 
addressed at the end of this section. 
106 I am examining Yablo’s position without a commitment to the proportionality thesis; thus, 
causes have to be neither required or enough for their effects in the sense defined in Section 3.2.2.  
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out, “We are normally reluctant to accept overdetermination because it is wrong, 
other things equal, to postulate coincidence” (Block 1990, 159), but no such 
coincidence would be involved when R = determination.  Furthermore, the 
correlation between the mental and neurophysiological causes is not the result of an 
implausible conspiracy or a Leibnizian pre-established harmony.  Rather it is the 
result of the asymmetric necessitation relation that holds between mental events 
and their neurophysiological realizers.  If R = determination, then MN-
overdetermination is quite unlike standard cases of overdetermination which 
regularly involve coincidence or conspiracy. 
 The problems concerning causal dispensability are also avoided by 
appealing to R = determination.  Recall in the case of R = token-identity, if the 
mental event had not occurred, then the neurophysiological event would not have 
occurred either.  Our evaluation of the counterfactual relevant to determining 
whether m is a causally dispensable part of the bodily effect’s causal history 
requires we consider the most similar not-m world.  This is a world where the 
causal history of m is held fixed as much as possible and a small, inconspicuous 
violation of law results in m’s non-occurrence.  If the event m is identical to the 
event n, then it is impossible for the small, inconspicuous violation of law to affect 
the occurrence of the mental event m without affecting the occurrence of the 
neurophysiological event n identical with m.  Hence, the most similar not-m world 
is also a not-n world.  Thus, the bodily effect b would not have occurred and m is 
not a causally dispensable part of b’s causal history.  Similarly, if R = 
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determination, then if the mental event m had not occurred, the neurophysiological 
event n would not have occurred either.  However, this is not because m and n are 
identical, but rather because n determines m.  Consider the most similar world in 
which the bolt’s snapping per se does not occur.  This is also a world in which the 
bolt’s sudden snapping does not occur, for it is impossible for the bolt to suddenly 
snap without snapping per se.  Hence, if n determines m, it is impossible for n to 
occur without m occurring.  Thus, the not-m world is a not-n world where the 
bodily effect b also fails to occur.  If R = determination, the mental event is not a 
causally dispensable part of the bodily effect’s causal history. 
 We come to the same conclusion concerning the neurophysiological event 
so long as we are careful to evaluate the counterfactual correctly.  It is a natural 
thought that the most similar not-n world is a world where the mental event m still 
occurs.  The reason is the small, inconspicuous violation of law would result in n’s 
non-occurrence, but this non-occurrence of n would yield a very similar 
neurophysiological event n* to take n’s place.  This different though similar 
neurophysiological event n* is another way to realize the mental event m 
(remember: the mental event m is multiply realizable) so m’s occurrence remains 
fixed.  In a world where n’s non-occurrence is replaced by n*, n* would determine 
m and the bodily effect b would still occur.  Hence, it looks as if the 
neurophysiological event n is a causally dispensable part of b’s causal history.  
However, as we saw in Section 2.4., the most similar not-n world is not a world 
where n is replaced by n* which also realizes m.  These kinds of “replacement 
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readings” of counterfactuals are inappropriate in causal contexts, since we lose the 
counterfactual dependencies that intuitively should hold.107  Again, it is worthwhile 
to cite Bennett on this point, 
When you are supposed to imagine c1 gone, you imagine it gone.  
You do not worry about how the past would have to be different to 
make it fail to occur, and you do not worry about what else might 
occur in its place.  You simply snip it away as though you had a 
metaphysical hole-puncher (Bennett 2003, 482). 
 
So, if we make sure to avoid a replacement reading, then the world we should 
consider is a not-n world where n is not replaced by n*, but is simply “snipped 
away”.  In such a world, there is nothing there to realize and so determine the 
mental event m so the bodily effect b fails to occur.  We arrive at the same 
conclusion: the neurophysiological event n is not a causally dispensable part of the 
bodily effect’s causal history.  This once again reveals how different MN-
overdetermination is from typical cases of overdetermination if R = determination. 
 It is worth reiterating these points in a different way.  In standard cases of 
overdetermination, the overdetermining causes are causally dispensable parts of the 
effect’s causal history because, so to speak, the small, inconspicuous violation of 
law is able to “surgically intervene” on the events.  In other words, the violation of 
law can “act on” one of the causes without affecting the occurrence of the other; it 
                                                
107 Perhaps another example will help.  Suppose I seek some chocolate cake because I desire to eat 
some chocolate cake.  Presumably, there is a ceteris paribus psychological law connecting those 
types of desires with that type of behavior.  Hence, my seeking behavior is counterfactually 
dependent on my desire for chocolate cake.  But if the most similar world where my desire for 
chocolate cake does not occur is a world where it is replaced by a different though similar desire, 
say a desire to eat something sweet, then my seeking some chocolate cake behavior might still occur.  
It follows from this that my chocolate seeking behavior is not counterfactually dependent on my 
desire to eat chocolate cake.  Just as we must put on ban on backtracking in causal contexts, we 
must ban replacement readings as well.   
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can “differentiate” between them.  And by doing so it can reveal that the effect is 
counterfactually dependent on neither overdetermining cause and hence why each 
is causally dispensable with respect to the overdetermined effect.  The work done 
by the determination relation in this case is to bring the mental and 
neurophysiological events close enough together that a surgical intervention on one 
is not possible.  Of course, it is metaphysically possible to separate the events in 
one direction, since determination is only an asymmetric necessitation relation.  But, 
in a restricted sense of ‘possible’, it is not possible to separate them.  At least it is 
not possible to separate them in the worlds that qualify as most similar to the actual 
world in causal contexts.  Therefore, the small, inconspicuous violation of law 
cannot affect the occurrence of either the mental or neurophysiological event 
without affecting the occurrence of the other. 
 Woodward (2011) comes to a similar conclusion working in a 
manipulationist framework for understanding causal relations.  The underlying idea 
of the manipulability theory of causation is that causal relations are relations that 
are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control.  Roughly, 
events are represented in terms of variables taking certain values, so what it means 
for an event x to be among the causes of an event y is that the variable Y would 
change in value under some suitable intervention that changes the value of the 
variable X.  The key notion is that of a suitable intervention which can be 
intuitively grasped as follows: an intervention on X with respect to Y is an 
exogenous causal process that changes X in such a way that if any change occurs in 
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Y, it occurs only in virtue of Y’s relationship to X and not in any other way 
(Woodward 2003, 47).108  With this in mind, Woodward (2011) argues that 
interventions on variables related by non-causal relationships of dependency, like 
determination, are exogenous causal processes that act on or change the value of 
both variables.109  In assessing the efficacy of events related by determination, it is 
not appropriate to consider what would happen to the effect if the determinable is 
intervened on and determinate held fixed or vice versa.  Similarly, in our 
assessments of causal dispensability, we must treat the small, inconspicuous 
violation of law – the Lewisian analog of an intervention – as acting on both the 
determinable and its determinate and discount the possibility of acting on either 
separately. 
In short, what we see is that both the Lewisian framework endorsed in this 
essay and Woodward’s manipulationist treatment of causation treat events that are 
tightly related via determination as a “unity”, that is, as if they were one and the 
same event across the worlds deemed most similar to the actual world.  When 
neurophysiological events determine mental events, a small, inconspicuous 
violation of law in the most similar worlds cannot surgically intervene on the 
events.  In effect, it acts as if the events were identical.  This is how the mental and 
the neurophysiological avoid being causally dispensable with respect to the 
overdetermined effect.  Equivalently, if these events are treated as if they were one 
and the same across the most similar worlds, the overdetermined effect 
                                                
108 See (Woodward 2003, Ch. 3) for a more precise definition of intervention. 
109 See (Woodward 2011, Sections 6, 7, and 8) for the details of how to implement this requirement 
into a manipulationist framework and the rationale for it. 
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counterfactually depends on both.  In the most similar worlds, if a small, 
inconspicuous violation of law results in m’s (n’s) non-occurrence, then n (m) also 
fails to occur and the bodily effect b does not occur.  In Chapter 4, I argued that 
counterfactual dependence between distinct events is sufficient for causation, so 
accepting this entails that both the mental and neurophysiological events are among 
the causes of the bodily effect. 
 Nevertheless, there remains the problem of duplicative “causal oomph!” 
and the threat that such a duplication leads to a failure of a certain type of physical 
explanation.  Unlike both R = causation and R = token-identity, it is not 
immediately obvious how Yablo’s account of the relationship between mental and 
neurophysiological events avoids this worry.  After all, the events are still weakly 
modally distinct and each is a cause of the bodily effect b.  Some remarks by Yablo 
suggest a familiar way to handle this problem.  He writes, 
One could try to counter this impression by enlarging on what has 
already been said, viz. that to be in pain is part of what it is to be in 
such and such a brain state.  When one state is included in another, 
any influence that the first has on subsequent events is included in 
the influence had by the second.  Brain state and pain thus share 
power in a more literal sense than the one intended: not by dividing 
it up between themselves, in the way that books share space on a 
shelf with other books, but by possessing it in common, in the way 
that an encyclopedia share shelf space with the volumes making it 
up (my emphasis) (Yablo 1997, 257). 
 
In Section 3.2.1, we saw that Shoemaker’s account of realization – an asymmetric 
necessitation relation – similarly involves the sharing of causal powers between 
what is realized and what does the realizing.  Following Shoemaker, Jessica Wilson 
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(2009) develops a general account of determination appealing to the idea that 
determinables share in the causal powers of their determinates: 
(Powers-Based Determination) A property P determines a property 
Q just in case the set of powers associated with Q is a proper subset 
of the set of powers associated with P.110 
 
On the assumption that causal powers are dispositions of some kind, it should be 
straightforward how to extend this proposal to events.  On this account, the 
increased specificity at the heart of determination is understood as the determinate 
event being associated with a more specific set of causal powers than its 
determinable (Wilson 2009, 166). 
 If neurophysiological events determine mental events and this is understood 
in accordance with Powers-Based Determination, then it follows that the causal 
powers associated with mental events are a proper subset of the causal powers 
associated with their neurophysiological determinates.  Suppose that having a 
causal power is being disposed under certain conditions to cause something in an 
“oomphy!” way.111  If some causal power Pm of mental event m manifests, then 
some causal power Pn of neurophysiological event n manifests such that Pm = Pn.  
Thus, there will be only a single connecting process running from both m and n to 
the bodily effect b.  With only a single connecting process, there will not be a 
duplicative transference of some quantity to the overdetermined effect b and the 
                                                
110 Wilson is well aware of the problems disjunctive and conjunctive properties pose for Powers-
Based Determination.  She formulates Powers-Based Determination to accommodate these 
problems by stating that the powers associated with P but not with Q cannot be powers associated 
with any property (Wilson 2009, 166). 
111 This is not to claim that either Yablo, Shoemaker, or Wilson endorse an “oomphy!” view of 
causation. 
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threat of failing to physically explain why b has as much of the quantity as it does 
is avoided.  In summary, R = determination with the further assumption that mental 
events share their causal powers with the neurophysiological events that determine 
them ensures the duplicative “causal oomph!” problem is circumvented.112 
 There is no denying a striking similarity between this response to the 
duplicative “causal oomph!” worry and Kim’s (1984) account of supervenient 
causation.  On both accounts, mental events “make use of” the productive causal 
processes taking place at the neurophysiological level.  However, it seems there is a 
difference here worth pointing out.  On Kim’s account of supervenient causation, 
mental events cause some bodily effect b in virtue of supervening on a 
neurophysiological event that causes b.  In other words, the mind-body relation (i.e., 
supervenience) appealed to here is what affords the mental a causal status.  The 
reverse seems to be the case with Powers-Based Determination.  A mental event m 
is determined by a neurophysiological event n because the mental shares its causal 
powers with the neurophysiological.  On this account, the causal powers in 
question do not “belong” more to the n than to m, nor do they belong more to m 
than to n.  Instead, both events have an equal claim to the causal process 
culminating in the bodily effect and it is in virtue of this equal claim that the mental 
is determined by the neurophysiological.  By reversing the direction of explanation, 
Powers-Based Determination does not afford the mental a causal status because of 
                                                
112 The similarities between Yablo’s account of determination understood in terms of Wilson’s 
Powers-Based Determination and Shoemaker’s account of realization are apparent.  So I think it is 
safe to say that if Shoemaker is concerned with the duplicative “causal oomph!” problem, then he 
could avoid it in the same way. 
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its relation to the neurophysiological; the mental’s relation to the 
neurophysiological is explained by their sharing in causal powers.  This avoids the 
concern that the mental has only a derivative causal status, a status it inherits from 
its relationship to the neurophysiological. 
 As we have seen, R = determination needs some additional assumptions 
about the mental’s relationship to the neurophysiological in order to avoid the 
problem of duplicative “causal oomph!”.  Another option – the option I prefer – is 
simply to deny that the “causal oomph!” problem is really a problem at all.  In short, 
if one rejects the underlying idea that causation requires a physical connection 
involving a transfer of something from cause to effect, then the worry that a certain 
type of physical explanation fails evaporates.  Presently, I shall postpone a 
discussion of this option, since I take it up in later sections. 
 We have seen that R = determination fares quite well with respect to 
“breaking the analogy” between MN-overdetermination and standard cases of 
overdetermination.  With some additional assumptions, this is a mind-body relation 
consistent with a nonreductive physicalism that can avoid the problems associated 
with overdetermination discussed in Section 5.1.  However, a worry that remains is 
whether it is true that mental events are determinables of the neurophysiological 
events that realize them.113  More generally, one might wonder how plausible it is 
to construe the neurophysiological as necessitating the mental.  In Section 1.3.1, I 
pointed out that such a supervenience thesis, which I called M-N Local 
                                                
113 See Funkhouser (2006) for criticisms that mental phenomena are not determinables of their 
physical realizers. 
186  
Supervenience, is far stronger than what is required by physicalism.  In short, 
where P reports all the physical facts and M reports all the mental facts, if 
physicalism is true, then ‘if P then M’ is a necessary truth.  But it is not entailed by 
this that ‘if Ni then Mi’ is a necessary truth.  The physicalist can consistently deny 
that neurophysiological duplicates are psychological duplicates even if they hold 
that any physical duplicate of the actual world is a psychological duplicate of the 
actual world. 
Now, Yablo’s position that the neurophysiological metaphysically 
necessitates the mental is not in itself a problem, since M-N Local Supervenience is 
consistent with physicalism.  However, there are reasons why physicalism is 
typically formulated in terms of a global rather than local supervenience thesis and 
these reasons would speak against the view that R is some kind of necessitation 
relation, like determination.  For instance, according to the anti-individualist, the 
pattern of neural firings in my prefrontal cortex could occur in a world where I 
have been causally-historically embedded in a different physical and/or socio-
linguistic environment.  Thus, this event could occur without entering into the 
“broad” causal-historical relations definitive of my thought that water is thirst-
quenching.  Given anti-individualism, this pattern of neural firings in my prefrontal 
cortex does not determine my thought that water is thirst-quenching; only this 
neurophysiological event embedded in the right physical/social environment 
determines my thought that water is thirst-quenching. 
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One possible response is to restrict the thesis that R = determination to just 
those mental events with narrow content and/or those mental events that are non-
intentional.  However, I do not find either option terribly plausible, since I doubt 
there are any non-intentional mental phenomena or mental phenomena with only 
narrow content.114  Moreover, this sort of restriction leaves our task woefully 
incomplete.  The problem of mental causation is a problem threatening the causal 
efficacy of the whole range of mental phenomena with specific concern for the 
propositional attitudes.  It is the efficacy of my beliefs, my desires, and my 
intentions that sustain my capacity as an agent and plausibly anti-individualism is 
true of these contentful of mental events.  So, if these sorts of mental events are not 
necessitated by the neurophysiological, then the problems associated with 
overdetermination remain and another R-relation will have to be appealed to in 
order to “break the analogy”. 
Another response is simply to reject anti-individualism about mental 
content.  Again, this is not a position I find plausible especially for the 
propositional attitudes, but I will not offer any arguments for this here.  
Nevertheless, even the individualist about mental content should reject the thesis 
that R = determination.  The neurophysiological events said to be the primary 
causal competitors of mental events are “localized brain event[s], capable of 
occurring in isolation from anything like [their] actual neural context” (Yablo 
1992b, 270 – 271, fn. 51).  Suppose that the pattern of neural firings in my 
                                                
114 Crane (2001) argues for the view that there are no purely qualitative, non-intentional mental 
phenomena.  Tye (1995, 2000) and Dretske (1996) defend an anti-individualism about the content of 
phenomenal mental phenomena. 
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prefrontal cortex could occur outside of its actual neural context isolated in some 
brain matter “afloat in agar jelly”.  If this is a genuine possibility, it could occur in a 
world where it is not disposed to enter into the “narrow” causal-functional relations 
definitive of my thought that water is thirst-quenching.  Hence, in such worlds this 
pattern of neural firings occurs in the absence of my thought that water is wet.  
Therefore, given individualism, this pattern of neural firings in my prefrontal cortex 
does not determine my thought that water is thirst-quenching; only this 
neurophysiological event causally embedded in an appropriate neural environment 
determines my thought that water is thirst-quenching. 
Aware of these issues, Yablo suggests that “most mental events … seem not 
to be localizable in any specific portion of the brain”, so we should understand 
mental events to be realized and thus determined by one’s “overall neural condition” 
(Yablo 1992b, 271, fn. 51).  This is problematic for two reasons.  First, all along we 
have thought that the primary causal competitors of mental events are localized 
brain events and not an individual’s overall neural condition.  Suppose I am 
cooking some bacon and some hot oil splashes onto my hand, triggering some 
physiological processes terminating in a specific pattern of neural firings in my 
somatosensory cortex (i.e., philosophical code name: C-fiber firings).  This 
localized pattern of neural firings realizes my sensation of pain.  Both the 
neurophysiological event and the pain are amongst the causes of the retraction of 
my hand from the location of hot oil.  What we have been primarily concerned with 
is the threat that these localized neurophysiological events pose to the causal status 
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of mental events.  At best, Yablo’s suggestion looks ad hoc, changing our subject 
to avoid the aforementioned problems.  Second, we think of the realizers of distinct 
mental events as themselves being distinct.  But if my overall neural condition 
realizes the pain I feel, then it also realizes every other mental event occurring in 
me during that time.  I experience a burning sensation in my hand at the same time 
I experience the distinct odor of bacon cooking on a skillet and the acute hunger 
sensation in my stomach.  Yablo’s suggestion implies that all of these mental 
events have the same neurophysiological realizer, viz., the overall neural condition 
I am in during that time.  This is in marked contrast to the way philosophers have 
originally thought of relation between mental and neurophysiological events and 
how we have been thinking of the exclusion problem. 
What I hope to have shown in this section is that R = determination can do 
quite a bit of work in demonstrating the differences between MN-
overdetermination and standard cases of overdetermination.  But it is simply too 
strong of a relation to hold between mental events and “localized brain events” and 
it is these sorts of neurophysiological events that have been taken to threaten the 
causal status of the mental.  In the rest of this chapter, I plan to show that there is a 
weaker relation, one consistent with either individualism or anti-individualism and 
which does not entail M-N Local Supervenience, that is capable of avoiding the 
concerns with causal overdetermination.                      
Section 5.2.2: Irreducible Psychophysical Laws 
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 In this section, I want to consider a nonphysicalist mind-body relation to 
determine if it has the resources for avoiding the problems associated with 
overdetermination.  Recall that the nonphysicalist rejects the truth of Global 
Supervenience and holds that mental events are strongly modally distinct from  
neurophysiological events.  In other words, if nonphysicalism is true, then ‘if P 
then M’ is a contingent truth and, furthermore, ‘if Ni then Mi’ is a contingent truth.  
Bennett describes this general position, often called “property dualism”, as such, 
The property dualist does not propose to ignore the evidence from 
neuroscience.  He does not think that phenomenal properties float 
utterly free of physical properties; he thinks they are connected to 
physical properties in important ways.  Crucially, though, he thinks 
the connections are merely contingent.  They are on a par with the 
laws of science, not those of logic or metaphysics … Phenomenal 
properties emerge from their physical bases in some causal or quasi-
causal fashion (Bennett 2005, 1).  
 
Before we begin, it is important to note that nonphysicalists tend to concern 
themselves exclusively with phenomenal properties and events.  They claim that 
facts about intentional mental phenomena are metaphysically necessitated by the 
physical facts, but facts about consciousness are not.  In this section, I shall speak 
about mental phenomena and not make a distinction between the phenomenal and 
the intentional.  Thus, the nonphysicalism I am concerned with thinks that neither 
the phenomenal nor the intentional is necessitated by the overall physical state of 
the world and so hold that ‘if Ni then Mi’ is a contingent truth, where Mi reports 
both the intentional and phenomenal mental facts concerning an individual. 
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 Property dualism comes in at least three different varieties.  The first is 
called epiphenomenalism.115  According to the epiphenomenalist, mental events are 
contingently connected to neurophysiological events in virtue of being the causal 
effects of these events.  Furthermore, mental events themselves have no physical 
effects.  The bodily effects that appear to be caused by the mental events we 
undergo are caused only by the neurophysiological events which cause those 
mental events.  In short, mental events and bodily effects share a common 
neurophysiological cause.  This variety of property dualism does not face the horn 
of overdetermination because it accepts the horn of epiphenomenalism.  We shall 
ignore this type of property dualism here. 
 The second variety of property dualism is called emergentism.  Like the 
epiphenomenalist, the emergentist holds that mental events are contingently 
connected to neurophysiological events, but this connection is non-causal.  Mental 
events are taken to “naturally supervene” on neurophysiological events in the sense 
that the neurophysiological facts about an individual necessitate the mental facts 
about that individual across those worlds that “conform to the laws of nature of our 
world” (Chalmers 1996, 37).  The principal idea is that natural supervenience arises 
when “two sets of properties are systematically and perfectly correlated in the 
natural world … it is just a fact about nature that there is this correlation” 
(Chalmers 1996, 36).  This last component is crucial, for central to the 
emergentist’s position is that the correlation between mental and 
                                                
115 See (Jackson 1982, 133 – 136) for a contemporary defense of such a view as it pertains to 
“qualia”.   
192  
neurophysiological events is “grounded in brute and fundamental physical-mental 
law-like connections (primitive ‘laws of emergence’)” (Kim 2006, 556).  Consider 
the following example, 
The pressure exerted by one mole of gas systematically depends on 
its temperature and volume according to the law pV = KT, where K 
is a constant … In the actual world, whenever there is a mole of gas 
at a given temperature and volume, its pressure will be determined: 
it is empirically impossible that two distinct moles of gas could have 
the same temperature and volume, but different pressure (Chalmers 
1996, 36).   
         
The pressure of a specific mole of gas naturally supervenes on its temperature and 
volume.  When the temperature and volume of a mole of gas are fixed, as a matter 
of law the pressure of that mole of gas is fixed.  This is a contingent truth about our 
world, and its truth is grounded in the law pV = KT. 
However, the law that holds between temperature and volume of a mole of 
gas and its pressure is explainable in terms of the energy-momentum of the gas 
molecules, the collisions between these molecules and the gas’s container, and the 
laws describing the evolution of these micromechanical states.  There is a deeper, 
more fundamental reason why temperature, volume, and pressure of a mole of gas 
are lawfully connected in the way they are.  These lawful connections are not basic 
truths about our world, but explained in terms of and entailed by lawful 
connections between lower-level entities.  But the emergentist contends that these 
sorts of “reductive” explanations are not available for the non-causal lawful 
connections between mental events and their underlying neurophysiological bases.  
These psychophysical laws are irreducible and basic truths about our world. 
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In addition to the irreducibility of the contingent connection between mental 
and neurophysiological events, the emergentist also holds that mental events have 
irreducible and novel causal powers.  Horgan (2002) writes, 
[Emergentists] maintained that at various junctures in the course of 
evolution, complex physical entities came into being that had certain 
non-physical, ‘emergent’, properties.  These properties … are 
fundamental force-generating properties, over and above the force-
generating properties of physics; when such a property is 
instantiated by an individual, the total causal forces operative within 
the individual are a combination of physical and non-physical forces, 
and the resulting behavior of the individual is different from what it 
would have been had the emergent force(s) not been operative 
alongside the lower-level forces (Horgan 2002, 151).   
 
What this passage suggests is that, like the epiphenomenalist, the emergentist does 
not face the horn of overdetermination, but for a different reason.  Mental events 
have novel causal powers and thus have effects that do not have any physical 
causes.  In short, the emergentist escapes the problem of overdetermination by 
rejecting Completeness. 
 The final variety of property dualism, the sort I want to focus on in this 
section, shares some features with emergentism.  They hold that the connection 
between mental and neurophysiological events is a lawful connection.  Furthermore, 
like the emergentist, they maintain that these contingent connections are irreducible 
and basic truths about our world.  According to this sort of property dualist, we 
must recognize that an adequate theory of mind must posit “new fundamental 
properties and laws” (my emphasis) (Chalmers 1996, 126).  However, unlike the 
epiphenomenalist, these irreducible psychophysical laws are not causal laws 
describing how mental events causally depend on neurophysiological events 
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occurring in the brain.  Instead, these are “supervenience laws” informing us as to 
how mental phenomena “arise from physical processes” (Chalmers 1996, 127).  As 
Loewer (2001) remarks, if our world contains such laws, then “God, when he made 
the world, had to make them in addition to the physical facts and laws” (Loewer 
2001, 49).  Additionally, this sort of property dualism is unlike the emergentist, 
since mental events have novel causal powers only in a weaker sense.  Mental 
events do have physical effects, but these effects also have neurophysiological 
causes.  Therefore, this variety of property dualism faces the same problem of 
causal overdetermination that faces the nonreductive physicalist.  Presently, the 
question I want to consider is whether an irreducible psychophysical law 
connecting mental and neurophysiological events is sufficient to avoid the 
problems associated with overdetermination. 
 Recall that R = determination avoided the coincidence and conspiracy 
problem because the correlations between mental events and their 
neurophysiological realizers had an explanation.  Even though the mind-body 
relation we are considering here is a much weaker relation than determination, the 
correlation still has an explanation.  Mental and neurophysiological events are 
lawfully connected and so the multiple causes of an overdetermined bodily effect 
are not coincidentally related.  The systematic correlation between mental and 
neurophysiological events is explained by the fundamental psychophysical laws 
linking certain neurophysiological types with certain mental types.  Similarly, our 
property dualist does not have to appeal to some implausible conspiracy or 
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Leibnizian pre-established harmony in order to explain the correlation between the 
overdetermining causes.  Therefore, if the mind-body relation is an irreducible 
psychophysical law, then MN-overdetermination does not involve coincidence or 
conspiracy like standard cases of overdetermination. 
 Now consider the problem of duplicative “causal oomph!” and the threat 
that a certain kind of physical explanation fails.  If our property dualist admits that 
causation is a productive relation involving connecting processes, transference of 
quantities, and the like, then they will be hard pressed to deny that MN-
overdetermination entails a systematic failure of a certain sort of physical 
explanation.  If mental events transfer some “oomph!” to their effects not 
transferred by the neural, then MN-overdetermination is a problem.  But, I do not 
think that our property dualist needs to be committed to productive causation.  The 
duplicative “causal oomph!” problem is only a problem if causation is taken to 
involve a connecting process running between cause and effect.  Nothing in our 
dualist’s position entails this.  If one is inclined towards a view that eschews this 
productive understanding of causation, even the sort of property dualism we are 
considering here can avoid this worry about causal overdetermination.       
However, the problem of causal dispensability is not so easily avoided.  
Central to our property dualist’s position is the claim that ‘if Ni then Mi’ is a 
contingent truth grounded in irreducible psychophysical laws connecting the mental 
with the neurophysiological.  When a fundamental psychophysical law connects the 
mental event m with its neurophysiological base n, the most similar not-m world is 
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a world where the bodily effect b still occurs.  In order to see this, recall that 
Lewis’s similarity metric informs us that similarity amongst worlds ought to be 
measured with respect to two features: region of match of particular fact and 
conformity to laws.  Furthermore, matching of particular matters of fact is more 
important than conformity to laws, so a small, inconspicuous violation of law 
should be tolerated at the expense of maximizing the region of match of particular 
matters of fact.  Therefore, the most similar world to the actual world is one where 
the history of the actual world is held fixed as much as possible, but an 
inconspicuous violation of law results in the non-occurrence of the antecedent 
event.  Now, ex hypothesi, an irreducible psychophysical law connects the 
antecedent event m with its neurophysiological base n.  Hence, a counterfactual 
world where this psychophysical law is violated is a world that perfectly matches 
the history of the hypothesized actual world at the expense of a single, 
inconspicuous violation of law.  In this counterfactual world, the mental event m 
fails to occur, n still occurs, and so the bodily effect still occurs.  Therefore, if 
mental events are linked to neurophysiological events via irreducible 
psychophysical laws, they are causally dispensable parts of their bodily effect’s 
causal histories.116 
The neurophysiological events that serve as the physical bases of the mental 
events in question do not suffer the same fate.  If the neurophysiological event n 
                                                
116 Loewer (2001) comes to pretty much the same conclusion when he argues that bodily effects do 
not counterfactually depend on mental events linked by irreducible psychophysical law to 
neurophysiological events.  See Loewer (2001, 51 – 52).  Furthermore, there is no obstacle to 
applying this same line of reasoning to those property dualists that insist these psychophysical laws 
are causal.  
197  
had failed to occur, then the bodily effect b would not have occurred either.  The 
most similar world to the hypothesized actual world involves an inconspicuous 
violation of law that “breaks” a causal link between n and one of its proximate 
causal antecedents and does not replace n with any distinct but similar 
neurophysiological event n* that is also linked to m by law.  In other words, as long 
as we are careful to avoid so-called “replacement readings”, the most similar world 
where n fails to occur, m fails to occur, and so the bodily effect b does not occur.  
Hence, the neurophysiological event n is not a causally dispensable part of the 
bodily effect’s causal history even if it is linked by an irreducible psychophysical 
law to the mental event m. 
In conclusion, if the mind-body relation is an irreducible psychophysical 
law, cases of MN-overdetermination differ from standard cases in that one cause 
but not the other is causally dispensable with respect to the overdetermined effect.  
This asymmetry might be thought to be enough to “break the analogy” with 
standard cases of overdetermination, but it nevertheless remains the case that 
mental events are causally dispensable with respect to their bodily effects.  The 
systematic nature of MN-overdetermination entails that mental events are 
systematically redundant and ultimately unnecessary components of their bodily 
effect’s causal histories.  The consequence that we do not need to cite mental 
events to explain the occurrence of their bodily effects is a troublesome result that 
comes along with our property dualist’s position.117  Therefore, at least part of the 
                                                
117 Our property dualist can rightly object that mental events are not entirely explanatorily 
dispensable with respect to their effects, since we still need to cite them in order to make sense of 
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reason why overdetermination is problematic applies to those nonphysicalists who 
take mental and neurophysiological events to be linked by contingent, irreducible 
psychophysical laws.  Overall, if a nonphysicalist is to avoid the worries associated 
with overdetermination, they had either accept epiphenomenalism or deny 
Completeness.      
Section 5.3: Event Realization and Overdetermination 
 My mental events are realized by certain neurophysiological events 
occurring in my brain and nervous system.  I have used the language of realization 
all throughout this essay and it is high time something be said as to what this 
relation is.  The central concern of this section is to propose an analysis of the 
realization relation and illustrate how it applies to mental and neurophysiological 
events.  Additionally, I aim to show that this relation can be employed to avoid the 
problems typically found with standard cases of overdetermination. 
Importantly, the realization relation must be spelled out in a way consistent 
with the kind of nonreductive physicalism we have been concerned with in this 
essay.  First of all, realization consists in a nonreductive relation between events.  
In other words, the nonreductive physicalist who accepts that R = realization denies 
that mental and neurophysiological events are token-identical and they deny this 
because these events differ in their de re modal properties.118  If mental and 
                                                                                                                                   
our actions.  Although the mental is unnecessary to explain why some bodily effect occurs, it still 
provides a rationalizing explanation for those effects.  Perhaps this kind of explanatory power is 
enough to mitigate the problem with overdetermination that I have argued our property dualist faces.  
I cannot pursue this response further here, but I believe it is worth consideration.      
118 In Section 1.2.2, we discussed some modal arguments along these general lines: mental event m 
is essentially F; neurophysiological event n is not essentially F; therefore, m ≠ n (or alternatively: 
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neurophysiological events are not token-identical, we can ask in what sense they 
are distinct.  As we saw in Section 1.2, distinctness is an ambiguous notion.  Events 
p and q are weakly modally distinct in virtue of the possibility that q could occur in 
the absence of p, although p asymmetrically necessitates q.  In Section 5.2.1, we 
looked at a physicalist mind-body relation (viz., R = determination) of this sort, 
which holds that it is possible for mental event m to occur in the absence of the 
neurophysiological event n while n necessitates m.  Events p and q are strongly 
modally distinct in virtue of the possibility that either p or q could occur in the 
absence of the other, which implies that no necessitation relation holds between 
them.  In Section 5.2.2, we looked at a nonphysicalist mind-body relation of this 
sort, which holds that it is possible for m to occur in the absence of n and for n to 
occur in the absence of m.  In this section, we are concerned with the realization 
relation which falls somewhere in between these extremes.  Where R = realization, 
mental and neurophysiological events are not token-identical because they are 
strongly modally distinct, but their relationship is not one of brute psychophysical 
law.  Rather, it is explainable in a way acceptable to the physicalist. 
Section 5.3.1: The Technical Apparatus 
 Ever since Putnam’s (1975b) proposal of mind-body functionalism, talk of 
realization has become common philosophical parlance.  But only recently has 
                                                                                                                                   
neurophysiological event n is essentially G; mental event m is not essentially G; therefore, n ≠ m).  
These kinds of modal arguments have been challenged in various ways.  See (Lewis 1971), 
(Gibbard 1975), and (Della Rocca 1996).   
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there been attempts to analyze this relation.119  Let us begin by first looking at some 
cases of event realization.  Consider an example inspired by Fodor’s (1974) 
discussion of multiple realizability in which the handing over of particular physical 
items (e.g., dollar bills) realizes a specific monetary exchange.  Presumably, this is 
so because my handing over these physical items in the right circumstances 
performs the economic functions of being a monetary exchange (e.g., having 
particular sorts of relations to certain economic institutions, etc.).  By performing 
this function, my handing over of these physical items, in some sense, “makes real” 
a monetary exchange.  Putnam (1975b) also provides an example: some 
micromechanical event occurring at the hardware-level in my computer’s central 
processing unit is said to realize some computation in virtue of that hardware-level 
event being in the right circumstances to perform the associated computational 
functions (e.g., having certain formal/mathematical relations to other “machine 
states”).  When this hardware-level event performs this function, it “makes real” the 
computation.  The fundamental idea of event realization seems to be this: one kind 
of event p realizes another kind of event q when, in certain circumstances, p 
performs the function associated with q-type events.  This intuitive characterization 
is certainly rough, but it brings out the central components that must be elucidated 
in our analysis of realization. 
 The first thing our intuitive characterization makes clear is that realization is 
a relation that holds between distinct kinds of events.  Following Lynne Rudder 
                                                
119 See (Gillett 2002, 2003), (Polger 2004, 2008), (Shapiro 2000, 2004), and (Shoemaker 2001, 
2003c, 2007). 
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Baker (2002), we can understand these kinds as “primary kinds”, where a primary 
kind is specified by an answer to the question ‘What most fundamentally is x?’ 
(Baker 2002, 32).  An object’s primary kind is essential to that object and among 
other things determines the persistence conditions of the object.  This expresses the 
idea that objects have certain of their properties essentially and others accidentally.  
This is easily extended to events, since the question ‘What most fundamentally is 
x?’ seems applicable to them just as much as it does to objects.  Like objects, 
events have some of their properties essentially and others accidentally.  The 
monetary exchange that took place between myself and the shopkeeper is most 
fundamentally a monetary exchange and could not have occurred at any time and in 
any world where it failed to be so.  The computation of ‘2 + 3’ is most 
fundamentally a computation of ‘2 + 3’ and, similarly, could not have occurred at 
any time or in any world where it failed to be such a computation.  Let us say, then, 
that when the question ‘What most fundamentally is x?’ pertains to events, our 
answer will be some primary event-kind. 
 Additionally, our intuitive characterization of realization encourages we 
make a distinction between different sorts of primary event-kinds.  Some primary 
event-kinds are associated with a function; others are not.  Specifically, the realized 
event-kind has a distinctive function that individuates it from other event-kinds.  In 
other words, the primary event-kinds that are realized are functional event-kinds, 
where these primary event-kinds are individuated extrinsically, i.e., in terms of 
relations to other sorts of things.  However, what relations individuate these 
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functional event-kinds depend on the kind in question.  Some functional event-
kinds are individuated in terms of causal dispositions.  This is plausibly the case for 
the functional event-kind monetary exchange, which is individuated in terms of its 
disposition to cause various sorts of economic events.   
Other functional event-kinds are individuated in terms of their causal 
history.  For example, Jerrold Levinson (1979) argues that a work of art is 
essentially historical such that it is “a thing intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art” as 
works of art have been correctly regarded in the past (Levinson 1979, 234).  If this 
is correct, then the primary event-kind creation of an artwork must be a functional 
event-kind individuated in terms of a specific causal history, namely one involving 
specific artistic intentions.  Another example comes from Ruth Millikan (1989) 
who argues that hearts are functionally individuated in terms of a particular history 
of selection.  This implies that the primary event-kind beating of a heart is a 
functional event-kind individuated (at least partly) by a specific evolutionary 
history.   
Still other functional event-kinds are individuated in terms of non-causal 
relations.  According to Thomas Polger (2008), computations like addition are 
functional kinds individuated in terms of their “formal or mathematical relations” 
to other “machine states” (Polger 2008, 240).120  I want to leave it open that some 
functional event-kinds could be non-causal functional kinds.  However, our 
                                                
120 One lesson I draw from Polger’s discussion is that our analysis of realization should leave open 
the possibility that not every functional kind is a causal-functional kind.  One criticism Polger raises 
against Gillett’s (2002, 2003) account of realization is that it does not keep this possibility open and 
thus fails to apply to Putnam’s (1975b) original example of computations being realized in hardware. 
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concern with the mental’s realization in the neurophysiological will reveal that the 
functions are causal in one or both of the ways outlined above. 
 Finally, our intuitive characterization mentions one kind of event 
performing the function associated with some other event-kind.  What this amounts 
to depends on the functional event-kind in question.  If a functional event-kind is 
individuated in terms of causal dispositions (e.g., monetary exchange), then what it 
is for something to perform the function associated with monetary exchange is for 
it to possess the causal dispositions which individuate that functional event-kind.  
When my handing over of particular physical items performs the function 
associated with being a monetary exchange, it is disposed to enter into a specific 
set of causal relations with other economic events.  Now, my handing over of these 
items need not occur and be so disposed, for it could have occurred in a world 
where none of the requisite economic institutions exist.  The monetary exchange 
between me and the shopkeeper is essentially causally disposed to have certain 
economic effects, but my handing over of these physical items is not.   
If a functional event-kind is individuated in terms of causal history (e.g., 
creation of an artwork), then what it is for something to perform the function 
associated with creation of an artwork is to have the causal history which 
individuates that functional event-kind.  When the strokes of my paint brush on a 
blank canvas perform the function associated with being the creation of an artwork, 
its causal history includes a specific artistic intention, namely that the thing being 
created be regarded as past artworks have been properly regarded.  Similarly, these 
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actions of mine need not occur and have such a history, for they could have 
occurred in a world in which I had no such artistic intention.  My creation of an 
artwork essentially has a particular causal history involving an artistic intention of a 
certain kind, but the strokes of my paint brush on a blank canvas do not.    
Finally, if a functional event-kind is individuated in terms of non-causal 
relations (e.g., computations), then what it is for something to perform the function 
associated with that computation is to be causally disposed to enter into those 
relations which “map” onto the formal/mathematical relations which individuate 
that functional kind.  Robert Van Gulick (1988) puts this nicely when he writes that 
performing the function associated with a computation requires, 
Roughly that there be some mapping from the formal states, inputs, 
and outputs of the abstract machine table into physical states, inputs, 
and outputs of the instantiating system, such that under that mapping 
the relations of temporal sequence among those physical items are 
isomorphic to the relations for formal succession among the 
machine table items (Van Gulick 1988, 80). 
 
When some micromechanical event at the hardware level performs the function 
associated with being a computation of ‘2 + 3’, it is causally disposed to enter into 
relations that are isomorphic with specific formal/mathematical relations.  Again, 
this event at the hardware level need not be so causally disposed, for it could have 
occurred outside of my computer’s central processing unit on an isolated microchip.  
The computation of ‘2 + 3’ is essentially related to certain other “machine states”, 
but the event at the hardware level is not essentially causally disposed to enter into 
relations that “map” in the requisite way.        
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 The analysis of realization I offer is inspired partly by Lynne Rudder 
Baker’s (2000, 2002) modal analysis of constitution and I want to draw some 
connections between event realization and constitution.  The first reason I find it 
natural to model our analysis of realization on Baker’s account of constitution is 
that both relations are understood to capture the idea of one kind of thing “making 
real” another kind of thing.  Baker writes,  
Constitution makes an ontological difference.  When a piece of 
marble comes to constitute a statue, it is not just that the piece of 
marble acquires a new property of being a statue.  Rather, a new 
thing of a new kind with new causal powers and new persistence 
conditions – a statue – constituted by that piece of marble, comes 
into existence (Baker 2002, 33). 
 
Likewise, realization makes an ontological difference, bringing into being an 
instance of a new kind of event.  These new kinds of events have their own “causal 
powers” and, at least in some cases, are individuated entirely in terms of those 
powers.  The second reason I find it natural to model realization on Baker’s modal 
analysis of constitution is that the relata of both relations are taken to be, in some 
sense, a “unity” while being distinct, viz., they differ in their de re modal properties.  
According to Baker, constitution is a relation intermediate between identity (in a 
classical sense) and what she calls “separate existence”.  She says, “If x and y are 
constitutionally related at t, there is a unity of x and y at t – a unity without identity” 
(Baker 2002, 39).  The nonreductive physicalism considered here maintains a 
similar position with regard to, e.g., mental and neurophysiological events.  When 
the mental is realized in the neurophysiological, they form a unity without 
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identity.121  Now, I want to be clear that Baker’s analysis of constitution is 
extremely controversial and I do not intend anything I say about event realization to 
commit me to accepting her analysis of the relation between, e.g., the piece of 
marble and the statue. 
These remarks on the similarities between event realization and constitution 
are programmatic, but I hope they provide at least some motivation for why I have 
found it fruitful to make connections to Baker’s understanding of constitution.  
There are more concrete similarities I have found between these relations as well.  
When the piece of marble constitutes the statue, it is commonly held that the lump 
and statue occupy the same space and share all the same parts.  In other words, 
constitution is standardly taken to require both spatial and material coincidence.122  
It is common to talk about objects having spatial locations and parts, but it is not as 
common to think of events in this way. 
 There are, of course, important differences between objects and events.  For 
instance, as Hacker (1982) has pointed out, objects but not events are properly said 
to exist, while events and not objects are properly said to occur.  However, this 
difference seems to be of little importance, since both objects and events are 
concrete entities, existing or occurring in both space and time.  Whereas most 
                                                
121 The idea of a “unity without identity” is similar to some ideas developed in detail by Yablo 
(1987).  Entities are strictly distinct if they differ in any of their properties (e.g., de re modal 
properties), but there is a range of “identity-like” relations which “seem to be ways of being 
contingently identical” (Yablo 1987, 296).  Although I have not worked out the specifics, I think the 
analysis of event realization offered here can be understood as a way of being contingently identical 
as Yablo understands this notion. 
122 See (Thomson 1998, 155) and (Doepke 1996, 196 – 198) for a discussion of constitution and 
spatial coincidence.  See (Sider 2002), (Wasserman 2002), and (Zimmerman 1998, 2002) for a 
discussion of constitution and material coincidence.  Mereological notions are notably absent from 
Baker’s (2000, 2002) modal analysis. 
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objects have fairly clear locations in space, most events do not.  The statue is 
located on the artist’s desk and we are easily able to recognize its spatial boundaries 
through our perceptual faculties.  But the artist’s creation of the statue, an event, 
does not have spatial boundaries we can easily ascertain through perception.  But it 
does not follow from this that the event lacks a location in space altogether.  In fact, 
although it is not a straightforward matter to say exactly where the event is located, 
it does seem relatively clear that it has some location or other.  The artist’s creation 
of the statue occurs in her art studio and not, for instance, in her home across town.  
Therefore, even though the spatial location and boundaries of events are unclear to 
perception and perhaps indeterminate, it stands to reason that events have locations 
in space.  
 Historically, another important difference between objects and events has 
been that the former, but not the latter, persist through time by enduring.  In short, 
objects have often been thought to be “wholly present” at each moment of their 
existence, whereas events are said to take up time, have duration, and thus persist 
by having different temporal parts at different moments of their occurrence.123  
Some philosophers argue that objects, just like events, have temporal parts, but the 
important point here is that events are standardly taken to be mereologically 
complex entities.  Consider, for example, my 12th birthday party.  The party began 
at noon and ended at 2pm on September 1st, 1996.  This means the event that is my 
12th birthday party persists through this duration of time entailing that it exists at 
                                                
123 See, for example, (Mellor 1980). 
208  
1pm of that day.  But it is quite absurd to think that my 12th birthday party endures 
through this two hour period.  For example, my 12th birthday party is not “wholly 
present” at 1pm.  This is why you could not show up at 1pm and leave a moment 
later and have stayed for the entire party.  Instead, only a part of my 12th birthday 
party occurs at 1pm, another part occurs at noon, and still another part occurs at 
2pm.  My 12th birthday party is mereologically complex by being temporally 
extended and thus has temporal parts.  More generally, we can say that all events 
are mereologically complex entities having temporal parts. 
 Now, consider the monetary exchange between me and the shopkeeper 
which occurred during some interval of time.  This event is said to be realized by 
my handing over of particular physical items.  It strikes me as prima face plausible 
that this economic event occurred in the same location as my handing over of these 
items.  Furthermore, it is also plausible that these events occurred during the same 
duration of time.  How long did the monetary exchange take?  As long as it took 
me to hand over the physical items.  The same, I believe, can be said of our other 
cases of event realization.  The computation of ‘2 + 3’ is realized by some 
micromechanical event in my computer’s central processing unit and, plausibly, 
these events occurred in the same location and during the same interval of time.  
The computation took place in my computer’s central processing unit right where 
its realizer occurred and its temporal boundaries are the same as its realizer’s 
temporal boundaries.  Moreover, this would seem to be precisely what the 
nonreductive physicalist would want to say about my belief that water is wet and 
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the pattern of neural firings in my prefrontal cortex.  My belief has a location in 
space and it is located precisely where its realizer is.  Additionally, my belief (at 
least as long as it is an occurrent belief) would seem to have the same duration as 
its neurophysiological realizer.  Therefore, it is a plausible condition on an analysis 
of event realization that the realized and realizing events are spatially and 
temporally coincident.        
The final similarity I want to point out between event realization and 
constitution is an appeal to circumstances.  Above I claimed that an intuitive 
characterization of event realization is that one kind of event realizes another kind 
of event when, in particular circumstances, the first event performs the function 
associated with the second event.  What are these circumstances supposed to be?  
Following Baker, we can say that these circumstances are the “milieu” in which 
something can perform the function which individuates the functional event-kind.  
However, we must put an obvious restriction on our characterization of these 
circumstances.  They cannot themselves entail the occurrence of the functional 
event-kind in question.  These circumstances must be necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions for the functional event-kind to occur then and there (Baker 2000, 42). 
Moreover, the correct characterization of this “milieu” depends on the 
correct theory of that functional event-kind.  For instance, the circumstances in 
which some micromechanical event in my computer’s central processing unit 
realizes an addition computation will be different from the circumstances in which 
my handing over particular physical items realizes a monetary exchange, for the 
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function associated with monetary exchanges is different than the function 
associated with computations.  What are the circumstances in which my handing 
over of particular physical items can realize a monetary exchange?  These 
circumstances entail the existence of intelligent creatures with certain kinds of 
intentions, the existence of particular social and economic institutions, and perhaps 
even certain conventions.  What are the circumstances in which a micromechanical 
event in my computer’s central processing unit realizes a computation of ‘2 + 3’?  
These circumstances entail the existence of a particular sort of computational 
architecture being implemented in the computer hardware, an architecture that 
sustains the potential to enter into the requisite mathematical and formal “machine 
states”.  Roughly, the role of circumstances here is to “enable” the realizing event 
to perform the function associated with realized primary event-kind. 
Section 5.3.2: A Modal Analysis of Event Realization 
Now that some of the technical apparatus is in hand, I propose the following 
analysis of event realization inspired by Baker’s (2000, 2002) account of 
constitution: 
(ER) An event p realizes an event q during t iff there are distinct primary event-
kinds P and Q and Q-favorable circumstances such that: 
(1) p has P as its primary event-kind, 
(2) q has Q as its primary event-kind, where Q is a functional kind individuated 
in terms of some function F, 
(3) p and q are spatially and temporally coincident during t, 
(4) p occurs in Q-favorable circumstances during t, 
(5) necessarily: for any event e and duration t, if e has P as its primary event-
kind and e occurs in Q-favorable circumstances during t, then there occurs 
some event g such that g has the functional event-kind Q as its primary 
event-kind and g is spatially and temporally coincident with e, 
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(6) possibly: there is a duration t such that p occurs and there is no h such that h 
has the functional event-kind Q as its primary event-kind and h is spatially 
and temporally coincident with p. 
 
I have already discussed conditions (1) – (3) above.  Condition (4) introduces the 
notion, following Baker, of “Q-favorable circumstances”.  Above I glossed this 
notion as the “milieu” which is necessary, but not sufficient, for the occurrence of 
the functional event-kind Q.  Recall that the proper characterization of the Q-
favorable circumstances depends on the correct theory of the functional event-kind.  
Condition (5) states that it is a necessary truth that when a P-event occurs in Q-
favorable circumstances, there occurs a Q-event which is spatially and temporally 
coincident with the P-event.  Condition (6) entails that the P-event is not identical 
to the Q-event, since it is possible for the P-event to occur in the absence of any Q-
type event spatially and temporally coincident with it. 
 The nonreductive physicalism we are primarily concerned with in this 
section claims that mental events are realized in neurophysiological events.  
According to (ER) this implies that: the pattern of neural firings in my prefrontal 
cortex has as its primary event-kind some neurophysiological kind N; my belief 
that water is wet has as its primary event-kind a mental kind M, which is distinct 
from N and individuated in terms of some function; the neural firings in my 
prefrontal cortex and my belief that water is wet are spatially and temporally 
coincident; these neural firings occur in M-favorable circumstances; it is a 
necessary truth that when an N-event (like these neural firings) occur in M-
favorable circumstances, there occurs an M-event (like my belief that water is wet) 
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spatially and temporally coincident with it; and, finally, it is possible that the N-
event occurs in the absence of any M-type event spatially and temporally 
coincident with it.  There are two features of this application of (ER) that I want to 
discuss: that M is a primary event-kind individuated in terms of some function and 
that these neural firings are in M-favorable circumstances.  These features are 
connected and I want to illustrate just how they are vis-à-vis our present case. 
Let us begin by considering an objection raised by Derk Pereboom (2002).  
His discussion suggests that our condition (6) is too strong.  Pereboom’s principal 
concern is that there could be cases in which a neurophysiological event n realizes a 
mental event m where “[n] could exist without being spatially coincident with [m] 
but not without [n] being spatially coincident with something of the same primary 
kind as [m]” (Pereboom 2002, 616).  Suppose that the primary event-kind of my 
belief that water is wet is belief.  He continues, 
It would seem that a token neural state could exist without being 
spatially coincident with the belief that water is wet – say, on Twin 
Earth – nevertheless it must be that this neural state be spatially 
coincident with some belief or other – on Twin Earth it would be 
spatially coincident with the belief that twin-water is wet (Pereboom 
2002, 616). 
 
It seems to me that Pereboom is wrong that the “neural state” which realizes my 
belief that water is wet must be spatially coincident with some belief or other.  Is it 
not a genuine possibility that this neurophysiological event could occur outside of 
its actual neural context in some isolated brain matter afloat in agar jelly?  In other 
words, it seems to me that we can imagine this very pattern of neural firings in my 
prefrontal cortex as occurring in circumstances far removed its actual 
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circumstances.  In such a radically different environment, no coincident belief of 
any kind occurs.   
 However, Pereboom’s concern raises an important point.  We must 
recognize that the primary event-kind of my belief that water is wet is not simply 
belief.  When we ask ‘What most fundamentally is x?’ about some intentional 
mental event such as my belief that water is wet, it seems correct to say that it most 
fundamentally is a belief.  There is no time or world in which that very event occurs 
and fails to be a belief.  This event could not, for example, have been a desire or a 
pain.  But it also seems correct to say that it is most fundamentally a contentful 
event related to a particular propositional content, namely that water is wet.  At no 
time and in no world could this belief have occurred and failed to have this 
propositional content.  A belief that twin-water is wet would not have been my 
belief.  Therefore, when the question ‘What most fundamentally is x?’ pertains to 
intentional mental events, like my belief that water is wet, our answer must specify 
an intentional event-kind, which is an ordered pair of an attitude event-kind (e.g., 
belief, desire, intention, etc.) and a propositional content.  On Twin-Earth, the 
neurophysiological event n may be coincident with some belief or other, but it is 
wrong to say that it is coincident with some event of the relevant intentional event-
kind, which specifies both an attitude event-kind and a propositional content.  
When we apply (ER) to intentional mental events, we must keep in mind that their 
primary event-kinds are intentional event-kinds and not merely attitude event-kinds. 
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 If intentional mental events are realized in neurophysiological events, then, 
by condition (2), intentional event-kinds must be associated with a particular 
function.  What are these functions?  And what are the M-favorable circumstances 
in which some neurophysiological event is said to “perform” that function?  
Without answers to these questions our account of the mental’s realization in the 
neurophysiological will be incomplete.  One virtue of (ER) is that it connects, in a 
rather intimate way, with much of the theorizing done on mental content.  In 
particular, (ER) enables us to see that different theories of mental content are 
attempting to answer our two questions above.  Another virtue of (ER) is that it is 
consistent with either individualistic or anti-individualistic theories. 
According to individualistic theories, the functions associated with 
intentional event-kinds are relations entirely internal to the psychological subject.  
One influential version of this individualism is proposed in Block (1986).  What is 
the function that individuates the intentional event-kind belief that water is wet 
from other intentional event-kinds?  The answer appeals to the inferential or 
conceptual role of this type of event in the subject’s psychology.  More specifically, 
Block writes that the function which individuates intentional event-kinds is 
The causal role of the [event-kind] in reasoning and deliberation 
and, in general, in the way the [event-kind] combines and interacts 
with other [event-kinds] so as to mediate between sensory inputs 
and behavioral outputs (my emphasis) (Block 1986, 93).   
 
In short, this theory specifies the function associated with intentional event-kinds in 
terms of a specific set of causal dispositions.  What makes some mental event a 
belief that water is wet are the causal dispositions it possesses to other sorts of 
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intentional mental events in the subject’s reasoning and deliberation.  Now, if this 
individualistic theory is correct, the M-favorable circumstances for the intentional 
event-kind belief that water is wet can be characterized by a list of open sentences 
describing the causal dispositions that individuate that event-kind:124 
 x is disposed to cause beliefs that water is good for washing clothes 
 x is disposed to cause beliefs that water is liquid at room temperature 
 x is disposed to cause water seeking behavior given certain sorts of desires 
 x is disposed to be caused by certain sorts of perceptual experiences 
 etc. 
 
When this list of open sentences is true of some neurophysiological event n, it is in 
the relevant M-favorable circumstances and is said to “perform” the function 
associated with the intentional event-kind.  By condition (5) in (ER), if n is in M-
favorable circumstances, there occurs a belief that water is wet which is spatially 
and temporally coincident with n.   
 A venerable tradition stemming from arguments given by Putnam (1975a) 
and Burge (1979, 1986) has it that the functions associated with intentional event-
kinds are not entirely relations internal to the psychological subject.  These anti-
individualistic theories claim that the functions which individuate intentional event-
kinds include, in addition to some set of causal dispositions, relations external to 
the psychological subject.  Putnam’s (1975a) arguments suggest that in addition to 
a particular “causal-functional role”, intentional event-kinds are individuated in 
terms of their causal history to a particular physical environment.  Specifically, the 
psychological subject must be “embedded” in an environment in which there is 
                                                
124 See (Baker 2002, 44) for characterizing circumstances in terms of open sentences. 
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water in order to have, e.g., a belief that water is wet.  Burge (1979, 1986) extended 
this line of reasoning by including a causal history within a particular socio-
linguistic community.  These anti-individualistic theories specify the functions 
associated with intentional event-kinds in terms of a set of causal dispositions plus 
causal-historical relations to a physical and/or social-linguistic environment.  If 
these sorts of anti-individualistic theories are correct, the M-favorable 
circumstances for the intentional event-kind belief that water is wet can be 
characterized by a list of open sentences describing a set of causal dispositions and 
the requisite historical relations that individuate the event-kind: 
 x is disposed to cause such and such beliefs 
 x is disposed to cause such and such actions given certain desires 
 x is disposed to be caused by certain sorts of perceptual experiences 
x is historically related in the right way to a its physical and/or socio-
linguistic environment 
etc. 
 
Similarly, when this list of open sentences is true of some neurophysiological event 
n, it is in the relevant M-favorable circumstances and, by condition (5), is spatially 
and temporally coincident with a belief that water is wet.            
 Of course, there is no philosophical consensus on precisely what the correct 
theory of mental content is, but central to our present project is that any of these 
theories individuate different kinds of mental events in relational terms.125  Either 
some set of causal dispositions or a set of dispositions plus a causal history 
individuates mental event-kinds.  The best theories we have on mental content 
                                                
125  Phenomenal events, viz., “qualia”, are perhaps a different story and arguably are not 
individuated in terms of a function in the sense at issue.  If this is correct, then there is a subset of 
mental event-kinds which are not able to be realized in the neurophysiological.  I have my doubts, 
but will not pursue this vexed topic here.     
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entail that these kinds of events are prime candidates for being individuated in 
terms of functions.  Furthermore, each comes along with a story of what it would 
be for some neurophysiological event to “perform” the function which individuates 
a particular mental event-kind.  In other words, a theory of mental content proposes 
answers to our two questions: (a) what are the functions that individuate intentional 
event-kinds?; and (b) what are the M-favorable circumstances of some intentional 
event-kind in which something can realize that event-kind? 
Section 5.3.3: Handling Cases of MN-Overdetermination  
 Proposing an analysis of event realization has been a means to an end.  
What we really want is a plausible account of a mind-body relation consistent with 
the nonreductive physicalism under consideration that avoids the problem of causal 
overdetermination.  In the rest of this section, I aim to demonstrate that when R = 
event realization (along with some further assumptions), MN-overdetermination 
does not inherit any of the problems associated standard cases of overdetermination.  
Let’s begin with the simplest problem to handle, viz., coincidence and conspiracy. 
 In Section 5.1.2, we saw that one issue with standard cases of 
overdetermination is that the causes are correlated with one another in a way that 
has no explanation or in virtue of some conspiracy.  If MN-overdetermination 
inherits these features, then its systematic nature entails that coincidence or 
conspiracy are pervasive features of our world.  The nonreductive physicalist who 
endorses that R = event realization can provide a similar response to this concern as 
Yablo and the property dualist.  When the mind-body relation is determination, the 
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correlation between mental and neurophysiological events is governed by a 
metaphysically necessary truth.  Necessarily, when a determinate event occurs, its 
determinable event also occurs.  When the mind-body relation is a brute 
psychophysical law, the correlation between these events is governed by a 
nomologically necessary truth.  Across all possible worlds with our laws of nature, 
if there occurs a neurophysiological event of a certain sort, a mental event of a 
specific kind occurs as well.  As Sider (2003) points out, “It is no coincidence that 
… mental and physical events are correlated, given the necessary truths governing 
these correlations” (Sider 2003, 722). 
Similarly, when the mind-body relation is event realization, mental events 
are correlated with neurophysiological events and this correlation is systematic, but 
it is not a correlation without an explanation nor is it some sort of Leibnizian pre-
established harmony.  Why?  Because there is a metaphysically necessary truth that 
governs this correlation.  Necessarily, when a neurophysiological event occurs in 
the right circumstances, viz., properly causally “wired” within the neural 
environment of an organism embedded in a particular physical and/or socio-
linguistic environment, then there occurs a coincident mental event.  In short, 
mental causes are correlated with neurophysiological causes in virtue of the 
mental’s realization in our neurophysiology.  It is no coincidence or conspiracy that 
mind and brain make a concurrent difference to our bodily movements. 
 In Section 5.1.3, we discussed the concern that MN-overdetermination 
entails that overdetermined bodily effects receive a “double dose” of “causal 
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oomph!”.  Additionally, this implies that there is a systematic failure of a particular 
kind of physical explanation.  In order to explain why some bodily movement has 
as much of some physical quantity as it does, we must make an essential appeal to 
an irreducible mental event.  I propose that the best way to handle this particular 
worry with MN-overdetermination is not to present a solution to the problem, but 
to “dissolve” it and show that it is not really a problem at all. 
In Chapter 4, I argued for the view I called counterfactualism: 
counterfactual dependence between distinct events is sufficient for causation.  
Furthermore, I concluded that the main rival to counterfactualism – productive 
views of causation – are at a significant disadvantage in their attempts to ground 
mental causation.  In short, I provided reason to believe that their requirements on 
causation, viz., some sort of physical connection between cause and effect, is 
inconsistent with both mental and neurophysiological causation.  The empirical 
details about how mental and neurophysiological events are “hooked up” to the 
physiology of the human organism precludes a physical connection between cause 
and effect.  Both mental and neurophysiological causes make a difference to our 
bodily movements in virtue of disconnecting a physiological process in our bodies; 
not in virtue of a connecting process. 
If these arguments are successful, we have principled grounds on which to 
“dissolve” this second worry about MN-overdetermination.  The problem 
presupposes that causation involves the transfer of some “causal oomph!” (e.g., 
energy-momentum) from cause to effect and this sort of transfer requires a physical 
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connection between the causal relata.  The arguments of Chapter 4 concluded that 
neither mental nor neurophysiological causes are physically connected to their 
bodily effects.  Ergo, neither mental nor neurophysiological causation involve the 
transfer of some “causal oomph!” from cause to effect.  My conclusion, then, is that 
this concern about MN-overdetermination presupposes a false conception of mental 
and neurophysiological causation.  Once we dispel this misguided picture, we can 
see that “the problem” is not really a problem after all.   
 The final and most difficult concern is the problem that MN-
overdetermination makes both mental events and their neurophysiological realizers 
causally dispensable.  What it means for an event to be causally dispensable vis-à-
vis some effect is for the following counterfactual to be true of that event: if the 
event c had not occurred, then the effect e would still have occurred.  In other 
words, overdetermined effects are not counterfactually dependent on their 
overdetermining causes.  This is plausibly true of most causes in standard cases of 
overdetermination.  If MN-overdetermination inherits this problem, then both 
mental events and their neurophysiological realizers end up being redundant and 
superfluous parts of their effect’s causal history.  This would be a prima facie 
troubling result for the nonreductive physicalist.  However, when R = event 
realization, neither the mental nor its neurophysiological realizer are causally 
dispensable with respect to their overdetermined bodily effect. 
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 In order to demonstrate this, I shall show that these effects do indeed 
counterfactually depend on their mental and neurophysiological causes.  Let us first 
consider whether the following counterfactual is true: 
(A) If n had not occurred, I would not have searched for something to drink 
where n is some neurophysiological event occurring in my brain which realizes my 
desire m that I drink some water.  Our question is this: if n realizes m, then is the 
most similar not-n world a world where I do not search for something to drink?  If 
the most similar world in which n fails to occur is a world where n is replaced by a 
similar neurophysiological event n* which also realizes m, then the counterfactual 
(A) is false and n is causally dispensable with respect to my searching behavior.  
But the most similar not-n world is not a world where n is “replaced” by n*.  These 
sorts of “replacement readings” are inappropriate in causal contexts.  When we 
imagine n gone, we imagine it gone punkt.   
Now, properly evaluating (A) must accord with Lewis’s similarity metric, 
which instructs us to tolerate an inconspicuous violation of law in order to match 
matters of particular fact as much as possible.  In other words, we hold the past 
fixed as much as we can and posit a “small, local miracle” that results in the non-
occurrence of the neurophysiological event n.  This implies that the most similar 
not-n world is one where the miracle violates the causal law between n and one of 
its proximate causal antecedents.  This inconspicuous violation of law leaves the 
M-favorable circumstances in which n actually occurs virtually undisturbed.  But, 
recall, these circumstances are necessary, but not sufficient, for the occurrence of m.  
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Therefore, in the absence of n, the mental event m also fails to occur.  And if the 
most similar not-n world is a not-m world, then it is also a world where I do not 
search for something to drink.  Ergo: the counterfactual (A) is true and n is not a 
causally dispensable part of its bodily effect’s causal history.     
 Now consider whether the following counterfactual is true: 
 (B) If m had not occurred, I would not have searched for something to drink. 
Our question is this: if m is realized by n, then is the most similar not-m world a 
world where I do not search for something to drink?  What if the most similar 
world in which m fails to occur is a world where m is replaced by a similar mental 
event m* (i.e., a desire that I drink some twin-water)?  The neurophysiological 
event n still occurs in this world, but in slightly different circumstances, viz., M*-
favorable circumstances instead of M-favorable circumstances.  This not-m world 
is a world where n still occurs and so my searching behavior still occurs.  Hence, 
the counterfactual (B) is false and m is causally dispensable with respect to my 
searching for something to drink.  But it should be obvious by now that a 
“replacement reading” is not the appropriate way to evaluate (B) in causal contexts.  
When we imagine that the mental event m fails to occur, we do not replace it with 
any similar event.  As Bennett’s (2003) remarks vividly illustrate, “You simply 
snip it away as though you had a metaphysical hole-puncher” (Bennett 2003, 482). 
How, then, do we wield Bennett’s “metaphysical hole puncher”?  What 
precisely are the most similar worlds supposed to look in which the mental event m 
fails to occur?  Given that m is realized by n, there are two relevant sets of 
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possibilities to consider.  The first consists in those worlds where condition (4) is 
violated such that the neurophysiological event n does not occur in the M-favorable 
circumstances in which it actually occurs.  Depending on the details of the function 
associated with the intentional event-kind M, this involves changing facts about n’s 
causal history and/or n’s causal dispositions.  On the one hand, if n has a causal 
history different from its actual one, then n occurs in my brain such that I have been 
causally-historically “embedded” in a different physical and/or socio-linguistic 
environment.  This means these counterfactual worlds diverge from the actual 
world in numerous matters of particular fact.  For example, all the actual facts 
about my past causal interactions with water fail to hold as these interactions have 
instead been with a different substance, like XYZ.  On the other hand, if n has a 
sufficiently different set of causal dispositions such that it is not capable of 
performing the causal role which individuates M, then n occurs but is “embedded” 
in a different neural environment, where it is not “wired” to the rest of my brain in 
the way it is in the actual world.  Again, this implies that our counterfactual world 
diverges in numerous matters of particular fact, viz., facts about my brain’s 
internal neurophysiological connections. 
The second set of worlds to consider are those in which condition (4) is 
violated, not because n fails to occur in M-favorable circumstances, but rather 
because the neurophysiological event fails to occur simpliciter.  This non-
occurrence of n is brought about by an inconspicuous violation of the causal law 
connecting n with one of its proximate causal antecedents.  This leaves the M-
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favorable circumstances virtually untouched, but, again, this “milieu” is only 
necessary and not sufficient for the occurrence of m.  Importantly, if m’s non-
occurrence is achieved in this way, there is an extensive match of particular matters 
of fact between these worlds and the actual world. 
The point of this comparison should be obvious.  According to Lewis’s 
similarity metric, the most similar worlds consist of those with a greater match of 
particular fact achieved at the expense of a small, inconspicuous violation of law.  
The first set of worlds involves no violation of law, but achieves m’s non-
occurrence by an extensive mismatch of particular matters of fact.  The second set 
of worlds involves an inconspicuous violation of law and retains an almost perfect 
match of particular matters of fact.  Therefore, the set of most similar worlds 
consists of this second set of worlds, where m fails to occur because its realizer n 
fails to occur.  If neither m nor n occur in this set of worlds, then my searching 
behavior also fails to occur.  We can conclude, then, that the (B) counterfactual is 
true and m is not a causally dispensable part of its overdetermined effect’s causal 
history. 
 What this demonstrates is that if the mental event m is realized by the 
neurophysiological event n along the lines of (ER), then neither event is a causally 
dispensable part of its overdetermined bodily effect’s causal history.  The effect is 
counterfactually dependent on both overdetermining causes.  Although standard 
examples of overdetermination result in both events being superfluous or redundant 
causes, this does not hold true for cases of MN-
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realization.  The nonreductive physicalist who upholds that mental events are 
realized in neurophysiological events can successfully avoid the threat posed by 
causal dispensability. 
 I want to end this section with some programmatic remarks on the idea that 
realization implies a “unity without identity”.  What I have tried to show is that the 
(A) and (B) counterfactuals are both true, that is, neither the mental event m nor its 
neurophysiological realizer n are causally dispensable vis-à-vis my searching 
behavior.  However, it is not just that both of these counterfactuals are true, but the 
set of most similar worlds for each are exactly the same set of worlds.  Which 
worlds are relevant to the evaluation of (A) ‘if n had not occurred, I would not have 
searched for something to drink’?  The worlds in which an inconspicuous violation 
of law “breaks” the connection between the event n and one of its proximate causal 
antecedents.  Which worlds are relevant to the evaluation of (B) ‘if m had not 
occurred, I would not have searched for something to drink’?  The exact same set 
of worlds: ones where an inconspicuous violation of law “breaks” the connection 
between the event n and one of its proximate causal antecedents. 
This fact speaks to the almost paradoxical relationship realization ties 
between realized events and their realizing events.126  Mental events and their 
neurophysiological realizers are distinct events.  In fact, these events are strongly 
modally distinct, since neither metaphysically necessitates the other.  In this way, 
realization is similar to the relation the property dualist holds between mental and 
                                                
126 See (Baker 2002, 38 – 40) for similar remarks concerning constitution and (Yablo 1987) for 
these sorts of remarks more generally. 
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neurophysiological events.  For instance, if n realizes m, then these events differ in 
their de re modal properties.  Yet, these events are so closely related that the very 
set of worlds relevant to evaluating whether an effect counterfactually depends on 
m is the same set of worlds relevant to evaluating whether this effect 
counterfactually depends on n.  In this way, realization is similar to the relation the 
token-reductionist holds between mental and neurophysiological events (viz., 
token-identity).  If n realizes m, then whatever counterfactually depends on m also 
counterfactually depends on n.   
In Chapter 4, I argued for the position that counterfactual dependence 
between distinct events is sufficient for causation.  This conceptual connection 
implies that if whatever counterfactually depends on m also counterfactually 
depends on n, then whatever m causes, n causes and vice versa.  To put it 
somewhat suggestively, if we had to consider these events qua causes only across 
the set of worlds relevant to establishing counterfactual dependencies, then mental 
events and their neurophysiological realizers could be treated as if they were the 
very same event.127  Although it is a relation between distinct events, realization 
binds these events together to form a “causal unity”.  To my mind, realization 
presents the physicalist with a viable middle position between the identity of the 
token-reductionist and the dualism of the property dualist; a middle position that 
                                                
127 In Section 5.2.1, we made the same observation with respect to determinates and their 
determinables.  There I said that the Lewisian analog of an intervention – the “small, local miracle” 
– could not “surgically intervene” on the two events across the set of most similar worlds.  This 
applies to our present case as well.     
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embraces an MN-overdetermination that inherits none of the problems 
accompanying standard cases of overdetermination.  
Conclusion 
In his discussion of Descartes’s substance dualism, Gassendi wondered, 
“How could there be effort directed against anything, or motion set up in it, unless 
there is mutual contact between what moves and what is moved?  And how can 
there be contact without a body … ?”.128  Gassendi’s conception of causation as 
involving contact between cause and effect is certainly antiquated, but his question 
is penetrating and resonates to this day.  How could the mental cause anything 
unless it just is something physical?  If the mental isn’t physical, then it must either 
be epiphenomenal or a merely redundant, overdetermining cause.  This is the 
dilemma we have been concerned with throughout this essay.  I have attempted a 
systematic treatment of this problem from the perspective of the nonreductive 
physicalist, those who deny that the mental “just is” something physical. 
In Chapter 2, I discussed several important responses to resolving this 
dilemma in order to differentiate my preferred solution from them.  One could deny 
the reality of mental phenomena in the way advanced by John Heil (1999, 2003).  
Or one could reject the Homogeneity Assumption identified by Tim Crane (1995) 
and claim that mental causation is a different sort of causation from 
neurophysiological causation.  Lynne Rudder Baker (1993) rejects the assumption 
of Completeness, thereby dismantling the dilemma before it even gets started.  Fred 
                                                
128 The Essential Descartes, ed. M. Wilson (New York: New American Library, 1969): 373. 
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Dretske (1988) and Ausonio Marras (1998) argue, in different ways, that mental 
phenomena have different effects than neurophysiological phenomena.  Finally, 
one could simply embrace Jaegwon Kim’s preferred solution and reduce the mental 
to the neurophysiological in order to avoid the dilemma’s horns.  My rejection of 
these responses define the “problem space” in which I provide my preferred 
solution to the exclusion problem.  In other words, I assume throughout this essay 
that mental phenomena are real, that mental causation is the same sort of causation 
as neurophysiological causation, that Completeness is true, that mental phenomena 
have the same effects as neurophysiological phenomena, and that both type- and 
token-reductionism are false.      
In Chapter 3, I discussed and criticized Stephen Yablo’s and Sydney 
Shoemaker’s attempts to solve the exclusion dilemma.  Their common approach 
appeals to an intimate relation between mental and neurophysiological events, and 
construes making a causal difference as satisfying a proportionality constraint.  
Their approach to the problem has much to recommend it, but I argue that the 
proportionality requirement on causation cannot withstand critique.  If the 
proportionality constraint is consistently applied, it leaves few pre-reflective causal 
judgments intact and, therefore, ought to be rejected.  This motivates looking for a 
different account of what it is to make a causal difference, one that better matches 
our intuitive judgments about causation. 
In Chapter 4, I argued that we should understand what it is to make a causal 
difference in terms of counterfactual dependence between distinct events and that 
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this account can vindicate mental causation.  Moreover, I defended this position, 
which I called counterfactualism, from some recent criticisms made by Jaegwon 
Kim.  According to Kim, counterfactual dependence cannot vindicate mental 
causation because it cannot adequately distinguish between genuine causal relations 
and pseudo-causal relations nor does it satisfactorily ground human agency.  Kim’s 
underlying motivation for rejecting counterfactualism stems from the production 
intuition, the idea that causation involves spatiotemporal local and contiguous 
processes connecting causes with their effects.  This alternative to 
counterfactualism fails, however, for it is inconsistent with the physiological 
mechanisms of human action.  Counterfactualism, or something very similar to it, 
remains our only option for vindicating the efficacy of our beliefs and desires. 
The positions defended in previous chapters forced me to address the horn 
of overdetermination, which I undertook in Chapter 5.  I embraced the consequence 
that our bodily movements are overdetermined by both a mental and 
neurophysiological cause, but argued that this sort of overdetermination, which I 
called MN-overdetermination, is entirely unproblematic.  To my mind, there are 
three reasons why overdetermination is a troublesome consequence and none of 
these reasons apply to cases of MN-overdetermination.  That is, none of them apply 
if (a) counterfactualism is endorsed and (b) the relation between mental and 
neurophysiological events is understood along lines of (ER). 
However, one final question remains: which of the assumptions that 
generate the exclusion problem do I reject?  I believe the problem lies in the 
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implicit assumption that our bodily movements are not causally overdetermined.  
Proponents of the exclusion problem, like Kim, go awry when they assume that all 
cases of overdetermination are problematic and ought to be avoided.  But what I 
have argued in Chapter 5 is that there are some cases of overdetermination – cases 
that systematically occur in our world no less! – that are no cause for concern.  
When the mental is realized in the neurophysiological in accordance with (ER) and 
mental causation is grounded in counterfactual dependence, our reasons for finding 
overdetermination bad simply do not apply. 
One upshot of our discussion is that the so-called “causal argument” for 
reductive brands of physicalism either begs the question against the nonreductionist 
or includes an unjustified premise.  In Section 1.5.1, we saw the following kind of 
argument, which made an essential appeal to an “overdetermination is bad” 
premise: 
(P1) For every physical event p that has a sufficient cause occurring 
at t, some physical event p* is causally sufficient for p at t, 
(P2) All mental phenomena have physical effects, 
(P3) The physical effects of mental events are not overdetermined, 
(P4) Therefore, mental events must be identical with physical events. 
The third premise clearly involves the implicit assumption that overdetermination 
is something to be avoided.  Perhaps because overdetermination is “pre-
theoretically … an ugly picture” (Merricks 2001, 67) and it is “at best extremely 
odd to think that each and every bit of action we perform is overdetermined in 
231  
virtue of having two distinct sufficient causes” (Kim 1989, 86).  But without 
providing some reason why overdetermination is bad, (P3) simply begs the 
question against the nonreductive brand of physicalism endorsed here. 
Perhaps overdetermination is bad for some unstated reason.  If so, then 
proponents of the “causal argument” can justify (P3) by appealing to these sorts of 
reasons.  In the last chapter, I considered three different ways of justifying (P3), 
none of which apply to the overdetermination embraced by the counterfactualist 
who maintains that mental events are realized in neurophysiological events.  
Therefore, until some further justification is produced, we have no reason to accept 
(P3) and a fortiori no reason to accept the reductive conclusion of the “causal 
argument”. 
Does this mean the “causal argument” is entirely bankrupt?  I do not think 
this follows.  For a similar sort of argument still provides some grounds on which 
to reject the nonreductive physicalisms that insist on productive mental causation 
or property dualisms which hold that contingent, but fundamental, psychophysical 
laws connect mental and neurophysiological events.  If causation involves a 
physical connection between the causal relata, where some “oomph!” is transferred 
in the process, then MN-overdetermination entails a duplicative transfer of “causal 
oomph!” from which it follows that a certain sort of physical explanation 
systematically fails in our world.  Additionally, if a fundamental psychophysical 
law connects mental and neurophysiological events, then MN-overdetermination 
entails that mental events are causally dispensable parts of their effect’s causal 
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history.  These are both reasons to accept (P3) and move back towards token-
reductionism or, alternatively, abandon productive mental causation or property 
dualism, respectively.129 
 Mental causation holds a primary place in our conception of ourselves as 
persons.  We are profoundly special.  We can be properly praised and blamed for 
our actions and our choices.  We are the proper targets of a dazzling array of moral 
attitudes.  We direct these attitudes at others and at our own selves.  And all of this 
makes sense only because our reasons and motives, our beliefs and our desires, our 
self-reflections and deliberations have the power to bring about what we do and the 
choices we make.  But we are also human beings, subject to the same physical laws 
and amenable to the same physical explanations as every other complex system in 
world.  We are profoundly special, but not exceptions. 
But our personhood and our creature-hood struggle to sleep comfortably 
with one another.  The exclusion problem is just one of the many problems that 
arise from the apparent conflict between the manifest image of ourselves as persons 
and the scientific image of ourselves as biological organisms.  Most philosophers 
are, by nature, reconciliatory.  This essay represents my attempt to reconcile the 
mental causation which underlies our personhood with the neurophysiological 
causation that underlies our creature-hood.   
 
                                                
129 In any case, I think there are reasons to abandon productive mental causation and property 
dualism independent of the above sort of “causal arguments”.  We have seen the reasons to reject 
productive mental causation in Section 4.2.3.  See (Bennett 2005) for some reasons to doubt 
property dualism. 
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